Chill

Courts frequently assess the constitutionality of government regulation on free speech by reference to the law’s impact on hypothetical expression not before the court. In some instances, courts have permitted litigants whose speech is not regulated by a statute to nevertheless raise First Amendment overbreadth challenges on the basis that third-party expression might be chilled—as in, silenced. Still, in other instances, courts have invalidated government regulation on the basis of its impact upon the hypothetical expression of others. In either event, the concept of a chilling effect is a speculative and superfluous misnomer that has no place in First Amendment free speech jurisprudence. The chilling effect doctrine, which reasons that laws that chill speech are unconstitutional, makes too many false assumptions about the speakers’ knowledge of the law, their ability to correctly apply the law, and their willingness to conform to the law in order to adequately capture constitutionally protected speech. For this reason, whether a law might deter putative speakers from engaging in their desired expression is an important concern, but one that should be abandoned as a measure of constitutional standing and harm. To date, scholars have addressed the chilling effect doctrine only in relation to other aspects of constitutional law without fully contemplating its role in First Amendment jurisprudence. As a result, the relevant literature is highly fractured. By focusing solely on the chilling effect doctrine and its shaky underpinnings, this Article draws from existing scholarship to create a new, universal framework for critiquing the doctrine. Because the chilling effect doctrine arises from faulty assumptions regarding knowledge and conformity, it should be abdicated and replaced with a direct impact test premised on how hypothetical expression would fare under the challenged regulation

Successful leadership in social work : leadership characteristics to accomplish a paradigm shift in services

The implementation of the Children\u27s Behavior Health Initiative (CBHI) as the U.S. Court ordered resolution of the landmark decision of the class action commonly known as Rosie D. v. Romney is an opportunity to examine a radical change to the delivery of mental health care for children and the construction of a whole new delivery system on a state-wide basis (Center for Public Representation, 2012). What were the leadership characteristics of and the key decisions made by those who successfully created Community Service Agencies (CSAs) to accomplish the delivery of such a paradigm shift in services? Executives, program directors/managers, and care coordinators from three highly successful CSAs, as determined by the Court Monitor, participated in face-to-face interviews regarding their experiences during the first three years of CBHI. All three CSAs and parent agencies had employed transformational leadership and establishment of learning organizations as leadership styles that are syntonic to social work. The degree to which agencies were able to support individual growth, autonomy, and career planning affected their ability to retain experienced care coordinators. All agencies identified difficulties in implementing workable business models in a fee-for-service funding structure and lack of flex funds as the most significant issues in providing excellent wraparound services

A comparison of the social interactions in children with developmental disabilities and their typically developing peers

The purpose of this study was to observe the quality of the social interactions that take place between children with developmental disabilities and their typically developing peers, in order to determine whether socialization and play patterns differ between the two groups

First Amendment Sexual Privacy: Adult Sexting and Federal Age-Verification Legislation

The modern sexting phenomenon amongst adults raises important questions at the intersection of relational privacy, free expression, and federal criminal law. A little-known but long-standing federal statutory scheme—18 USC 2257, 2257A, and the accompanying Attorney General regulations (“Section 2257”)—threatens to criminalize the private exchange of sexual communication between consenting adults. While there has been relatively frequent litigation involving Section 2257 initiated by the commercial adult entertainment industry, courts and scholars alike have been all but silent as to Section 2257’s impact on private, not-for-profit sexual speech. So too has the literature on the legality of sexting focused almost exclusively on adolescents, whose erotic exchanges raise concerns about child pornography and human trafficking not triggered by adult communication. Even when the debate has turned to private adult sexual expression, it has typically focused on the dangers related to non- consensual disclosure, commonly known as “revenge porn.” As a result, Section 2257’s application to a broad range of otherwise lawful adult expression remains virtually unchallenged and largely ignored by judges, academics, and the American public

Sexual Privacy in the Internet Age: How Substantive Due Process Protects Online Obscenity

Obscenity is one of the narrow categories of speech that has historically lacked First Amendment free-speech protection, and courts and scholars alike have wrestled with the indefinable and often unworkable nature of the obscenity test. The advent of the Internet has both intensified and yet potentially resolved these problems. Recent Supreme Court cases, such as Lawrence v. Texas, suggest that sexually explicit expression that falls outside the scope of the First Amendment may nevertheless be entitled to privacy protection under Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process. Yet Lawrence\u27s potential applicability to online obscenity has created tension in lower-court decisions and produced more questions than it has answered. In an attempt to address these lingering questions, this Article discusses the burgeoning right to sexual privacy and argues that certain sexual decisions fall within the autonomy of personhood protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, even when those decisions involve some public action. Relying on Stanley v. Georgia and Lawrence v. Texas, this Article examines the intersection of public expression and private decision making in the context of the Internet and argues that online obscenity that neither involves children nor unwitting adult viewers is entitled to privacy protection

Rethinking Bail Reform

The issue of pretrial detention is part of a larger, national conversation on criminal justice reform. However, no single issue permeates the landscape of criminal justice like the treatment of pretrial defendants. The policies and practices around pretrial detention have contributed to the country’s mass incarceration numbers; created a crisis for local jail management; generated unsustainable budgets; and raised important questions about race, class, and the constitutional implications of incarcerating people because they are too poor to pay a money bond. Legal scholars have written about the issue, highlighting the inequities and constitutional difficulties with such a system. Much of the discussion has surrounded solutions involving the implementation of and reliance on evidence-based practices to determine pretrial detention, rather than solutions involving reliance on money. These evidence-based practices usually take the form of pretrial assessment tools and pretrial supervision systems. Because the politics involved in criminal justice reform often paralyze reform attempts, the method by which these practices are implemented is often litigation. However, due to procedural impediments in federal court and the political realities of state courts, litigation often results in incomplete remedies that do not fully address, rectify, or prevent the range of harms inflicted by the money bail system

Chill

Article about the Chilling Effect Doctrine. Creator Jennifer M. Kinsley, faculty in Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University

Prenatal Lead Exposure Risk Assessment by Vermont Maternity Care Providers

Introduction. One percent of women of childbearing age in the U.S. have blood lead levels ≥ 5 ug/dL, which are associated with maternal hypertension during pregnancy, neural tube and cardiac defects in infants, low birth weight, prematurity, and spontaneous abortion. It is unknown whether obstetrics providers in Vermont are screening their pregnant patients for lead levels and educating them on lead exposure risks. Objective. To gain an understanding of current lead screening practices in Vermont and issue recommendations for disseminating lead screening information. Methods. We developed and e-mailed a survey to practicing OB/GYN physicians, maternity care focused family medicine physicians, nurse midwives, and professional midwives. The survey assessed current screening practices for lead exposure in their pregnant patients, interest in receiving statewide guidelines, and guideline dissemination preferences. Results. Of the 41 respondents, 12% currently conduct risk assessments for lead exposure with all of their pregnant patients. Fifty four percent of maternity providers give all of their patients educational materials about lead exposure and risk of toxicity. Seventy one percent of maternity providers think that having guidelines provided by the Vermont Department of Health would encourage them to begin or continue lead exposure screening. The two preferred methods of communicating guidelines to physicians were grand rounds and email whereas non-physician providers preferred email and webinar. Discussion. The majority of pregnant patients in Vermont are not properly assessed or educated about lead risks. However, there is interest in having statewide standardized lead risk assessment guidelines, with dissemination preferences differing by provider type.https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/comphp_gallery/1248/thumbnail.jp

Murat Aksu, Petitioner, v. People of the State of California, Respondent

Brief of the National Association for Public Defense Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition. Creator Michael Whiteman, faculty in Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University