Design of a Social Security System: Pension System vs. Unemployment Insurance

This paper presents consideration of how the social security system evolves as the attributes of voters change. In our setting, policy determination is based on majority voting. The government has two components of social security policy: a pension system and unemployment insurance. When workers constitute most voters, the pension system is supported and when unemployed people are the majority, unemployment insurance is adopted. Under this setting, employing the concept of structure-induced equilibrium developed by Shepsle (1979), the present paper describes how the contents of the social security system evolve depending on the dynamics of capital accumulation and the unemployment rate, and demonstrates the possibility that one or the other social security system ceases to exist in certain instances.Social Security, Pension System vs. Unemployment Insurance, Majority Voting, Structureinduced equilibrium.

Solution Concept for Intergenerational Conflict: the Role of Intergenerational Bargaining

This paper specifically examines intergenerational conflict and analyzes an overlapping generations model of public goods provision from the viewpoint of time-consistency. Public goods are financed through labor-income and capital-income taxation, thereby distorting savings and the labor supply. Taxes redistribute income across generations in the form of public goods. Under such a situation, there emerge dual intergenerational conflicts: the first is related to the amount of public goods and the second is the tax burden. We then contrast the politico-economic equilibrium with commitment allocation, and analyze the sources of conflict and time-inconsistency, and attempt to resolve such a conflict by introducing the concept of eintergenerational bargainingf. Our main findings are the following. First, taxation derived using Lagrange method fails to be time-consistent. Second, depending on bargainingpower, taxation based on intergenerational bargaining can be time-consistent. Third, we portray the properties of taxation and public goods provision rules based on intergenerational bargaining.Dual Intergenerational Conflicts; Intergenerational Bargaining;Time-inconsistency; Modified Public Goods Provision Rule.

Bank-specific Determinants of Capital Structure : New Evidence from Japan

This paper is the first empirical research on the determinants of the capital structure of Japanese banks, using Japanese banks’ financial data for two decades from 2000 to 2017 and adding new evidence to previous literature on the banks’ capital structure. Previous researches show that the determinants of capital structure are different among countries or continents. We show that determinants vary and change in accordance with differences in business models among banks even within one country. By focusing on different business models between four sub-samples, “International banks before the Global Financial Crisis,” “Domestic banks before the GFC,” “International banks after the GFC,” and “Domestic banks after the GFC”, we analyze whether the determinants of capital structure differ among these sub-samples. The results are totally different and we find no determinants which can significantly and commonly explain all four sub-samples

Effect of Dropout on the Efficiency of Ds - Optimal Designs for Linear Mixed Models

Optimal designs are a class of experimental designs that are efficient with respect to some statistical criterion. Two types of optimal designs are considered in the study. D-optimal designs are designs that minimize the generalized variance of a model’s estimated parameters. Ds-optimal designs are a class of D-optimal experimental designs that are useful when the researcher is interested in estimating a subset of parameters in a given model. For a specific parameter, Ds-optimal designs would be more efficient than D-optimal designs. Although the loss in efficiency of D-optimal designs relative to Ds-optimal designs have been examined in the past literature, past research did not consider the cases where there are missing observations. Given that missing observations are ubiquitous in longitudinal studies due to dropout, the current study examines the loss in efficiency when D-optimal designs are used instead of Ds-optimal designs for data with missing observations. Results indicate that in general, location of Ds-optimal design points with dropout will shift closer towards the location of the D-optimal designs with complete data, compared to D-optimal design points with dropout. The D-optimal design with complete data corresponds with the smallest variance covariance matrix. For the data with dropout, the variance covariance matrix of the Ds-optimal design is closer in size to that of D-optimal design with complete data compared to that of D-optimal design with dropout. For both designs with dropout, efficiency loss is moderate

高分子材料の土木構造物への利用に関する研究(継2年)

金沢大学工学部研究課題/領域番号:X40120-----54081, 研究期間(年度):1965出典：研究課題「高分子材料の土木構造物への利用に関する研究(継2年)」課題番号X40120-----54081（KAKEN：科学研究費助成事業データベース（国立情報学研究所）） （https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/ja/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-X40120-----54081/）を加工して作