Digital Rights Management and Technological Tying

This paper analyzes DRM-based technological tying, where the content and hardware form a system. A closed DRM system makes the legal content incompatible with a rival's hardware, whose users must then obtain illegal copies. The main finding is that the tying firm gains market power in a competitive hardware market and invests in product upgrades at a later stage. Welfare implications of the policy that requires an open DRM system are also discussed

State-of-the-Art Design Technique of a Single-Channel Pump for Wastewater Treatment

A single-channel pump, which is commonly used for wastewater treatment, with a single-channel impeller can effectively prevent performance reduction or damage caused by foreign substances. However, the design methods for this special type of pump are different and more difficult to realize than those for general pumps. In this chapter, a state-of-the-art design technique for a single-channel pump is introduced for realizing high efficiency and low-fluid-induced vibration. In other words, advanced multidisciplinary design optimization techniques combined with unsteady flow analysis are introduced and discussed in detail to simultaneously improve hydraulic efficiency and reduce flow-induced vibration, considering the impeller-volute interaction of a single-channel pump

Employee Poaching, Predatory Hiring, and Covenants Not to Compete

Poaching key employees from close competitors has become a prevalent and controversial issue. This paper examines the condition under which employee poaching can be either predatory or competitive, and discusses its implications for the enforcement of post-employment non-compete agreements. When poaching sufficiently injures the entrant’s ability to compete, predatory hiring can occur in the sense that the incumbent would have been unprofitable in the absence of the entrant’s exit. Some antitrust implications are discussed

Corporate Lobbying Revisited

Using a panel data of S&P 500 Index firms covering 1998-2004, this paper compares the determinants of lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions and estimates the returns to lobbying as assessed by the financial market. Lobbying depends more on managerial incentives and protection needs beyond industry structures than contributions do. Lobbying also has a positive effect on the firm's equity returns relative to the market and, to a lesser degree, relative to its industry

Employee Poaching, Predatory Hiring, and Covenants Not to Compete

Poaching key employees from close competitors has become a prevalent and controversial issue. This paper examines the condition under which employee poaching can be either predatory or competitive, and discusses its implications for the enforcement of post-employment non-compete agreements. When poaching sufficiently injures the entrant’s ability to compete, predatory hiring can occur in the sense that the incumbent would have been unprofitable in the absence of the entrant’s exit. Some antitrust implications are discussed

Does Competition Affect Evolutionary Dynamics? Evidence from a Collegiate University

This paper shows that competition is inversely related to the strength of evolutionary dynamics using a Collegiate University's admission statistics during the period 2004--2009. Specifically, estimated coefficients of the replicator dynamic equation is inversely related to the subject's applications-to-offers ratio. This suggests that competition favors a choice of strategies that is serially independent of the previous round's payoffs

Determinants of Post-congressional Lobbying Employment

This paper studies the determinants of lobbying-employment decisions of former members of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 105th–108thCongresses. The main empirical findings indicate that there are two groups more likely to become lobbyists: members not re-elected who had more conservative voting records and held important committee assignments and longer-serving members who voluntarily retired and voted less conservatively in their last term compared to their previous terms in office. A decomposition analysis confirms that the revolving doors for the two groups of legislators differ because of differences in employer response rather than in legislator characteristics

Employee Poaching: Why It Can Be Predatory

There is a growing concern over predatory hiring practices that are aimed at eliminating competitors. Using a duopoly model in which firm's profits depend on the quality of the worker-employer match, this paper studies the conditions under which predatory equilibrium exists. I find that predatory hiring can occur when the match between the worker and the new employer is relatively poor and the old employer has a shallow pool of replacement candidates. Post-employment lawsuits do not affect the range of predatory equilibrium if the parties take into account expected damages payment