Agent selection and threat actualization in contamination cases: Predicting action from perpetrator behavior

While existing research on the topic is sparse, previous works have shown that there is believed to be a substantial threat of intentional, malicious contamination of the supply chain by criminals and terrorists (CFSAN, 2001; WHO, 2008). Genuine contamination incidents have the potential to result in mass casualties, although empty threats are often enough to generate public fear and lead to considerable economic damage. While empty threats often appear indistinguishable from those which will result in contamination, it is thought that certain variables identified in perpetrator communications may be able to help separate empty threats from those which will be actualized. This research thus attempts to determine whether a perpetrator’s reported choice of agent could offer functional predictions for the likelihood of actual contamination in future incidents. Findings indicate that chemical agents alone are more likely to be associated with genuine contamination, while the claimed use of biological agents alone as well as chemical, biological and radionuclear (CBRN) agents combined are more often associated with empty threats. The utility of these findings will be discussed, as well as suggestions for future research

Sage Research Methods Case 2: Using unobtrusive data to study criminal behavior: Understanding malicious contamination incidents

Malicious contamination is a term used to describe a number of different types of criminal activity, from poisoning and product tampering to extortion and food terrorism. However, little is known about these types of crime as few empirical studies have been conducted to date. In particular, there is a lack of clear definitions in the literature for terms like “product tampering” and “poisoning.” To develop such definitions and to explore crimes of malicious contamination in more depth, a database was constructed consisting of all known incidents of malicious contamination worldwide occurring over a 40-year period. Out of necessity, this database was constructed using unobtrusive, open source data which was then content analyzed for the presence or absence of pertinent behavioral variables. The following case study highlights the advantages and disadvantages of working with unobtrusive data to study criminal behavior, including issues related to validity, reliability, and credibility. Specific examples have been included from the author’s own PhD work and subsequent publication, with an emphasis on how some of the abovementioned challenges were addressed. The importance of unobtrusive data to the study of forensic and investigative psychology is also discussed

Poison expertise and agent selection in cases of malicious contamination

While little research has been conducted in the past in regards to crimes of poisoning and product tampering, one common feature is that individuals who commit such crimes often have some prior knowledge of poisonous substances. This poison knowledge can take many different forms, from working in medical or scientific fields, to military training or personal research. Although some degree of poison knowledge may be required to commit an act of poisoning, this is not the case with acts of product tampering, in which desired goals may be achieved through the threat of contamination alone. Indeed, in the case of a threat of contamination the most concerning substances such as chemical and biological weapons can also be the most powerful, creating public fear without the requirement for the perpetrator to have any knowledge of how to obtain or use such agents. This research addresses the relationship between poison expertise and agent selection in incidents of malicious contamination. The results will show which agents are most likely to be associated with threats alone and with actual contamination for experts and non-experts, which can be of assistance not only to law enforcement, but also companies targeted during acts of malicious contamination

Criminal poisoning and product tampering: Toward an operational definition of malicious contamination

‘Malicious contamination’ encompasses multiple crimes which have received little previous academic attention, including poisoning and product tampering. While these acts may seem easy to distinguish, there are many areas of overlap, and so before these crimes and those who commit them can be understood clear definitions must be introduced. The presence or absence of 14 behavioural variables is proposed as a way of distinguishing product tamperings from poisonings, with the empirical definition then tested on 384 malicious contamination incidents. The operational definition successfully distinguishes 92.7% of the cases and allows for a comparison of the differences between poisoning and tampering

Behavioural Categories of Malicious Contaminators: Differentiating Between Poisoners, Product Tamperers, Extortionists, and Food Terrorists

Crimes in which a potentially dangerous poison is used or a food item is adulterated can take many different forms. Cases of product tampering can occur with the primary goal of receiving attention for a cause, damaging the reputation of a company, or in order to gain funds through an extortion attempt. Poisoning may be used to murder a family member or acquaintance, or to target a number of random victims to achieve some political goal. In addition, threats of action or cases of hoax tampering may also be used in order to fulfil one or more of the goals listed above. In order to better understand these different crimes and the motivations behind them, a multidimensional unfolding procedure was used on 384 cases of malicious contamination occurring since 1970, using variables indicative of poisoning and product tampering. From this analysis ten different criminal categories involving the use of poisonous agents were identified, each of which based on both the specificity involved in victim selection, as well as the personal or impersonal nature of the act. Each of these categories will be described along with their defining behavioural characteristics, and the implications for law enforcement agencies will be discussed

Poisoning expertise and outcomes in malicious contamination incidents

Purpose: It is often assumed that poisoners and product tamperers are likely to share an interest in or knowledge of poisonous substances. The purpose of this research is to determine whether perpetrators with existing poison knowledge will choose different contaminating agents than non-experts, as well as whether there is a link between poison expertise and outcomes in malicious contamination cases. Based on their expertise, it is expected that those perpetrators with some form of existing poison knowledge would select more concerning and difficult to obtain agents, and that attacks committed by experts would result in more harm than attacks by non-experts. Methodology: A content analysis was conducted on qualitative descriptions of malicious contamination events, with relevant behavioural variables identified as being present or absent for each individual case. Differences between experts and non-experts in agent choice and incident outcome were then explored using descriptive statistics, contingency tables and Mann-Whitney U tests. Findings: Agent choice was found to differ between experts and non-experts, with different agents chosen depending on whether the event was a threat or a genuine contamination incident. However, attacks by poison experts were found to be no more deadly than attacks perpetrated by non-experts. Value: This research provides the first known analysis comparing agent choice and outcomes in malicious contamination incidents as a factor of perpetrator knowledge. Investigative applications are discussed

Assessing the validity of product tampering threats

Product tampering is a type of crime which typically involves the deliberate contamination of a packaged product with the intent of harming consumers or corporate entities. In such cases empty threats and genuine acts of contaminations can be used to meet criminal goals, including extortion, sabotage, and political activism. Despite the utility of both empty threats and genuine tamperings in these scenarios, different outcomes are expected which range from economic damage for the victimized company, to widespread public fear and the potential for physical harm to the consumers. This paper will provide a detailed examination of both actualized and empty product tampering threats, highlighting some of the behavioral characteristics which may be useful in separating action from inaction. Applications of these findings for professionals will also be discussed

A definitional framework of poisoning crimes

This chapter proposes an empirically derived definitional framework that can both bring together poisoning crimes for comparison while distinguishing different forms of criminal activity based on three variables indicative of perpetrator intentions and motivations; the specificity of victim targeting, the motivational goal and the precipitating form of violence. Based on their classification on these variables, it presents eight broad forms of poisoning crimes, along with subordinate crimes, which can be used to facilitate comparison and differentiation. The first crime group involves highly specified victims targeted for personal reasons using instrumental violence. Such incidents may occur when a perpetrator attacks an individual known to them for some form of financial—or otherwise instrumental—gain. Assassinations and attempts most frequently involve one victim, although it is possible for attacks to result in multiple casualties. Of each of the groups defined, those involving low specificity victims for political means are perhaps the most difficult to distinguish according to whether they are instrumental or expressive

Cross-disorder analysis of bipolar risk genes: further evidence of DGKH as a risk gene for bipolar disorder, but also unipolar depression and adult ADHD

Recently, several genome-wide association studies (GWAS) on bipolar disorder (BPD) suggested novel risk genes. However, only few of them were followed up and further, the specificity of these genes is even more elusive. To address these issues, we genotyped SNPs in ANK3, CACNA1C, CMTM8, DGKH, EGFR, and NPAS3, which were significantly associated with BPD in previous GWAS, in a sample of 380 BPD patients. Replicated SNPs were then followed up in patients suffering from unipolar depression (UPD; n=387) or adult attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (aADHD; n=535). While we could not confirm an association of ANK3, CACNA1C, and EGFR with BPD, 10 SNPs in DGKH, CMTM8, and NPAS3 were nominally associated with disease, with two DGKH markers surviving correction for multiple testing. When these were followed up in UPD and aADHD, seven DGKH SNPs were also associated with UPD, while one SNP each in NPAS3 and CMTM8 and four in DGKH were linked to aADHD. Furthermore, a DGKH haplotype consisting of rs994856/rs9525580/rs9525584 GAT was associated with all disorders tested, while the complementary AGC haplotype was protective. The corresponding haploblock spans a 27-kb region covering exons coding for amino acids 65–243, and thus might include functional variants yet to be identified. We demonstrate an association of DGKH with BPD, UPD, and aADHD by applying a two-stage design. These disorders share the feature of mood instability, so that this phenotype might be associated with genetic variation in DGKH.Heike Weber, Sarah Kittel-Schneider, Alexandra Gessner, Katharina Domschke, Maria Neuner, Christian P Jacob, Henriette N Buttenschon, Andrea Boreatti-Hümmer, Julia Volkert, Sabine Herterich, Bernhard T Baune, Silke Gross-Lesch, Juliane Kopf, Susanne Kreiker, Thuy Trang Nguyen, Lena Weissflog, Volker Arolt, Ole Mors, Jürgen Deckert, Klaus-Peter Lesch and Andreas Rei