The Democratic Ideal and Historical Experience

Autor smatra da je demokratsko načelo legitimeta odnijelo definitivnu pobjedu nad svim ostalim oblicima legitimnosti u 20. stoljeću, jer se jedino ono može uskladiti s uvjetima modernosti. Moderna počiva na individualnosti i racionalnosti i oni čine jezgru modernoga političkog poretka. Proces moderne rastvara uvjete stabilne nedemokratske vladavine, ali to ne znači da svuda nastaju pretpostavke stabilne demokracije. Među osnovne pretpostavke uspješnog demokratskog modusa politike ubraja autor rješavanje sukoba posredstvom konsenzusnih pravila, što znači rješavanje sukoba oblikom pravne regulacije. Tu počiva neotkloniva veza između ustavne države i demokracije. Svi pokušaji da se demokracija izuzme iz simbioze s ustavnom državom razorili bi samu demokraciju, i to je osnovno iskustvo 20. stoljeća u odnosu prema demokraciji.The author believes that the democratic principle of legitimacy has definetly won over all other forms of legitimization in the 20th century becuase it is the only one that can be coordinated with the conditions of modernity. The modern is based on individuality and rationality which constitute the core of the modern political set-up. The process of the modern dissolves the conditions for a stable democracy come into being everywhere. The solving of conflicts through consensual rules, which means solving conflicts through the form of legal regulation, is included by the author among the basic presuppositions of a successful democratic mode of political practice. This is where the unremovable link between the constitutional state and democracy resides. All attempts to exclude democracy from its symbiosis with the constitutional state would destroy democracy itself. This is the basic experience of the twentieth century concerning democracy

FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY

Autor analizira dvije teze: o kraju povijesti i kraju demokracije. Pokazuje se da stoji Fukuyamina teza da je načelo liberalne demokracije potisnulo konkurenciju, ali u trenutku kad su nestali uvjeti za demokratsku politiku što tvrdi Guéhenno. Guéhenno ne spori Fukuyaminu tezu, nego ju proglašava irelevantnom. Razloge za to pronalazi u deteritorijalizaciji politike, što znači da politika izmiče demokraciji. Time i država prestaje biti važna za politiku. Autor relativizira ovu tezu na dva načina. Prvo, pokazuje da i dalje postoje sfere na teritorijalno ograničenom prostoru gdje politika ima veliki utjecaj. Drugo, država ostaje temeljem za sve političke strukture koje se uspostavljaju na regionalnoj ili globalnoj razini. Iz ovog izvodi da država uza sve mijene ima budućnost pa tako i demokracija. Autor se zaključno poziva na Tatu Vanhanena koji tvrdi da se širenje demokracije povezuje s ravnopravnijom raspodjelom resursa moći.The author analyzes two hypotheses: about the end of history and the end of democracy. It has turned out that Fukuyama’s thesis that the principle of liberal democracy has outlasted its competition is valid, but only, as Guéhenno claims, when the conditions for democratic politics have disappeared Guéhenno does not refute Fukuyama’s thesis but only declares it irrelevant. He finds the rationale for this in the deterritorialization of politics i.e. politics is eluding democracy. This also means that the state is no longer important for politics. The author relativizes this thesis in two ways: first he shows that there are still the spheres in territorially limited spaces where politics is hugely influential. Second, the state remains the foundation for all political structures that are set up at the regional or the global level. He concludes that despite its vicissitudes the state, and consequently democracy, have a future. And finally, the author refers to Tata Vahnen who claims that the expansion of democracy is linked with a more equitable distribution of the resources of power

FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY

Autor analizira dvije teze: o kraju povijesti i kraju demokracije. Pokazuje se da stoji Fukuyamina teza da je načelo liberalne demokracije potisnulo konkurenciju, ali u trenutku kad su nestali uvjeti za demokratsku politiku što tvrdi Guéhenno. Guéhenno ne spori Fukuyaminu tezu, nego ju proglašava irelevantnom. Razloge za to pronalazi u deteritorijalizaciji politike, što znači da politika izmiče demokraciji. Time i država prestaje biti važna za politiku. Autor relativizira ovu tezu na dva načina. Prvo, pokazuje da i dalje postoje sfere na teritorijalno ograničenom prostoru gdje politika ima veliki utjecaj. Drugo, država ostaje temeljem za sve političke strukture koje se uspostavljaju na regionalnoj ili globalnoj razini. Iz ovog izvodi da država uza sve mijene ima budućnost pa tako i demokracija. Autor se zaključno poziva na Tatu Vanhanena koji tvrdi da se širenje demokracije povezuje s ravnopravnijom raspodjelom resursa moći.The author analyzes two hypotheses: about the end of history and the end of democracy. It has turned out that Fukuyama’s thesis that the principle of liberal democracy has outlasted its competition is valid, but only, as Guéhenno claims, when the conditions for democratic politics have disappeared Guéhenno does not refute Fukuyama’s thesis but only declares it irrelevant. He finds the rationale for this in the deterritorialization of politics i.e. politics is eluding democracy. This also means that the state is no longer important for politics. The author relativizes this thesis in two ways: first he shows that there are still the spheres in territorially limited spaces where politics is hugely influential. Second, the state remains the foundation for all political structures that are set up at the regional or the global level. He concludes that despite its vicissitudes the state, and consequently democracy, have a future. And finally, the author refers to Tata Vahnen who claims that the expansion of democracy is linked with a more equitable distribution of the resources of power

Legitimacy intermediation in the multilevel European polity and its collapse in the euro crisis

This essay re-examines the dual – republican and liberal – foundations of democratic legitimacy in the Western traditions of normative political theory. Considered in isolation, the European Union conforms to liberal standards but cannot satisfy republican criteria. Given these conflicting standards, debates on the alleged European democratic deficit have remained inconclusive. Moreover, they have failed to pay sufficient attention to the multilevel character of the European polity and to the normative potential of legitimacy intermediation in its two-step compliance and legitimating relationships. I argue, however, that the capacity of democratic member states to legitimate the exercise of European governing functions is being destroyed in the present euro crisis, and I briefly discuss the implications of this new constellation.In der westlichen Tradition der normativen politischen Theorie beruht demokratische Legitimität auf der doppelten Grundlage republikanischer und liberaler Prinzipien. Für sich betrachtet entspricht die Europäische Union zwar liberalen Kriterien, aber eben nicht den republikanischen Anforderungen. Angesichts so unterschiedlicher Kriterien konnte es auch im Streit über das angebliche europäische Demokratiedefizit keine Einigung geben. Überdies ignorierte diese Diskussion den Mehrebenen-Charakter der europäischen Politik und das normative Potenzial der Legitimationsvermittlung zwischen Union und Bürgern durch die demokratisch verfassten Mitgliedstaaten. Die gegenwärtige Eurokrise allerdings zerstört die Fähigkeit demokratischer Mitgliedstaaten, die Ausübung europäischer Herrschaftsfunktionen zu legitimieren. Der Aufsatz erörtert die Implikationen dieser neuen Konstellation.1 Introduction 2 Legitimacy discourses The republican discourse The liberal discourse Differences 3 Constitutional democracies – and the European Union? 4 Legitimacy intermediation in the multilevel European polity 5 The end of legitimacy intermediation in the euro crisis Monetary Union and the failure of output legitimacy Rescuing the euro through supranational intervention 6 Legitimate supranational government? Input-oriented European legitimacy? 7 Reducing the burden on European legitimacy Reference