Tauberian theorem for value functions

For two-person dynamic zero-sum games (both discrete and continuous settings), we investigate the limit of value functions of finite horizon games with long run average cost as the time horizon tends to infinity and the limit of value functions of $\lambda$-discounted games as the discount tends to zero. We prove that the Dynamic Programming Principle for value functions directly leads to the Tauberian Theorem---that the existence of a uniform limit of the value functions for one of the families implies that the other one also uniformly converges to the same limit. No assumptions on strategies are necessary. To this end, we consider a mapping that takes each payoff to the corresponding value function and preserves the sub- and super- optimality principles (the Dynamic Programming Principle). With their aid, we obtain certain inequalities on asymptotics of sub- and super- solutions, which lead to the Tauberian Theorem. In particular, we consider the case of differential games without relying on the existence of the saddle point; a very simple stochastic game model is also considered

On asymptotic value for dynamic games with saddle point

The paper is concerned with two-person games with saddle point. We investigate the limits of value functions for long-time-average payoff, discounted average payoff, and the payoff that follows a probability density. Most of our assumptions restrict the dynamics of games. In particular, we assume the closedness of strategies under concatenation. It is also necessary for the value function to satisfy Bellman's optimality principle, even if in a weakened, asymptotic sense. We provide two results. The first one is a uniform Tauber result for games: if the value functions for long-time-average payoff converge uniformly, then there exists the uniform limit for probability densities from a sufficiently broad set; moreover, these limits coincide. The second one is the uniform Abel result: if a uniform limit for self-similar densities exists, then the uniform limit for long-time average payoff also exists, and they coincide.Comment: for SIAM CT1

Necessity of vanishing shadow price in infinite horizon control problems

This paper investigates the necessary optimality conditions for uniformly overtaking optimal control on infinite horizon in the free end case. %with free right endpoint. In the papers of S.M.Aseev, A.V.Kryazhimskii, V.M.Veliov, K.O.Besov there was suggested the boundary condition for equations of the Pontryagin Maximum Principle. Each optimal process corresponds to a unique solution satisfying the boundary condition. Following A.Seierstad's idea, in this paper we prove a more general geometric variety of that boundary condition. We show that this condition is necessary for uniformly overtaking optimal control on infinite horizon in the free end case. A number of assumptions under which this condition selects a unique Lagrange multiplier is obtained. The results are applicable to general non-stationary systems and the optimal objective value is not necessarily finite. Some examples are discussed