Strategically Planned Behavior in Public Good Experiments

Subjects submitted strategies for playing a public good game. The strategies interacted with each other in a computer simulation. They could be revised and resubmitted for a second and a third simulation round. The strategies' average contribution to the public good increased from one simulation to the next. The majority of the strategies submitted for the final simulation show the same pattern: In the first period, they signal their willingness to cooperate by contributing the entire endowment to the public good. Then, they reciprocate the others' average contribution in the previous period. In the final period(s), cooperation is given up, whatever the history of the game. Les participants à une expérience ont soumis des stratégies pour jouer à un jeu de biens publics. Les stratégies ont interagi dans une simulation par ordinateur. Les participants ont eu l'opportunité de réviser et de re-soumettre leurs stratégies pour une deuxième et une troisième simulation. La contribution moyenne des stratégies au bien public a augmenté d'une simulation à l'autre. La majorité des stratégies soumises montrent le même patron de comportement. Dans la première période le participant signale sa volonté à coopérer par une contribution totale au bien public. Puis il s'aligne sur la contribution moyenne faite par les autres dans la période précédente. Dans la (les) période(s) finale(s), la coopération est abandonnée indépendamment du développement du jeu.Public goods, experimental economics, strategy method, Biens publics, économie expérimentale, méthode stratégique

Trust and Reputation Building in E-Commerce

Transactions on online markets require a great deal of trust among anonymous trading partners. To mitigate some of the risks involved in anonymous transactions, several online market sites have implemented reputation management mechanisms that differ in structure and probably functionality. In a series of experiments, this study examines the impact of two simple reputation management mechanisms on the evolution of trust and trustworthiness in a repeated trust game among strangers. Les transactions par Internet exigent une confiance considérable entre les intervenants anonymes. Pour minimiser les risques associés à des opérations anonymes, les responsables de plusieurs marchés en ligne ont mis en place des mécanismes de gestion de réputation différant en structure et fonctionnalité. Dans une série d'expériences, cette étude évalue l'impact de deux mécanismes relativement simples sur la confiance et la coopération dans un jeu de confiance répété entre étrangers.Trust, Reputation, Experimental Economics, E-commerce, Mondialisation, commerce international, temps de travail, intégration économique

Cooperation in Public Goods Experiments (followed by a comment by Claude Montmarquette)

This text (Keser) is a survey and a discussion of experimental studies on cooperation in public goods experiments. It is followed by a comment (Montmarquette) suggesting some economic applications from these experimental studies. Ce texte (Keser) présente une revue et une discussion des écrits de la littérature en économie expérimentale sur la coopération dans la production de biens publics. Le texte est suivi d'un commentaire (Montmarquette) qui met l'accent sur les applications économiques que l'on peut tirer de ces études.Experimental economics, public goods, survey, Économie expérimentale, bien public, revue

Why Do Experimental Subjects Choose an Equilibrium which Is Neither Payoff Nor Risk Dominant?

In an experimental 2x2 coordination game with two strict equilibria we observe that, in contrast to equilibrium selection theory (Harsanyi and Selten 1988), only half of the subjects choose the strategy that relates to the payoff- and risk-dominant equilibrium. We propose modified risk dominance as an explanation for the observed deviations from payoff and risk dominance. Dans un jeu de coordination expérimental avec deux équilibres stricts nous observons que, contrairement à la théorie de sélection des équilibres (Harsanyi et Selten 1988), seulement la moitié des participants choisissent la stratégie reliée à l'équilibre qui est simultanément dominante par rapport au gain et dominante par rapport au risque. Nous proposons d'utiliser la dominance au risque modifiée comme explication des déviations observées par rapport à la dominance au gain et la dominance au risque.Equilibrium selection, modified risk dominance, prominence theory, experimental economics, Sélection des équilibres, dominance par rapport au risque modifiée, théorie de la proéminence des nombres, économie expérimentale

THEORIES OF BEHAVIOR IN PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS WITH HIDDEN ACTION.

In Keser and Willinger (IJIO, 2000) we found that many contracts offered by experimental subjects do not satisfy incentive compatibility. While the combination of incentive compatibility and a binding participation constraint would require that the agent incurs a net loss in the less favorable state for the principal, experimental subjects in the role of principals propose contracts in which the agent never risks to make a loss. We identified in the principals’ decision making three basic principles that, combined together, describe a fair offers area into which a large number of the observed contract offers falls. These principles imply that net expected surplus is more evenly allocated between the principal and the agent than agency theory predicts. The aim of the experiments presented in this paper is to test the robustness of these principles when the effort costs increase and the net expected surplus becomes smaller, and to compare their predictive success to the predictive success of agency theory under the assumption either of a risk-averse or a risk-neutral agent. The results show that the fair offers prediction describes the observed contract offers better than agency theory as long as an important net expected surplus is created. However, when the effort costs are so high that the net expected surplus is negligible, standard agency theory does better than the combination of the three principles in predicting the observed contract offers.

Voluntary Teaming and Effort

In a series of experimental games, each of two players may choose between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy to choose remuneration based on private effort, we frequently observe team remuneration chosen by both players. Team remuneration allows for high payoff for each player for cooperation, but at the same time provides individual incentives to take a free ride on the other player's effort. Due to significant cooperation we observe that in team remuneration participants make higher profits than in private remuneration. We also observe that, when participants are not given the option of private remuneration, they cooperate significantly less.Team effort, voluntary collaboration, experimental economics

Voluntary Contributions to Reduce Expected Public Losses

In this experimental study we examine behavior relating to voluntary contributions to reduce expected losses associated, for example, with the occurrence of natural disasters or major industrial accidents. We ask subjects to allocate tokens between a private investment and a public investment. The latter investment reduces, for all anonymous members of the group, the probability of a loss. Expected loss without public investment is constant across treatments in which the probability of loss and initial wealth vary. In some of these treatments, the participants play under incomplete information (ambiguity). Non-parametric statistical analyses and parametric regressions yield results that are reasonably consistent with classical studies on voluntary contributions to public goods. The Nash equilibrium, under the assumption of risk neutrality, cannot be construed as representative of typical behavior. The occurrence of a loss increases the probability of playing the Nash strategy at the individual level and decreases the voluntary contributions of the group (the gambler's fallacy), making the prospect of mobilizing the population after a natural disaster more difficult. Dans cette étude expérimentale, nous examinons les déterminants des contributions volontaires visant à réduire les pertes attendues associées à des désastres naturels ou des accidents industriels majeurs. Les sujets doivent allouer leurs jetons entre un investissement privé et un investissement public. Ce dernier investissement réduit, pour tous les membres de l'équipe, la probabilité d'une perte. La perte attendue sans investissement public est constante pour tous les traitements, mais la probabilité d'une perte et la dotation initiale des sujets varie selon les traitements. Dans certains cas, les sujets jouent en situation d'information incomplète (ambiguïté). Les analyses non-paramétriques et paramétriques des données donnent des résultats cohérents avec les études classiques sur les contributions volontaires dans les biens publics. En retenant l'hypothèse que les sujets sont neutres au risque, nous observons un comportement qui rejette, pour tous les traitements, la prédiction de l'équilibre de Nash de zéro contribution dans l'investissement public. L'occurrence d'une perte accroît dans la période suivante la probabilité de jouer Nash et réduit le niveau de contribution dans l'investissement public (gambler's fallacy). Cette situation rend plus difficile la mobilisation des personnes après un désastre naturel.Voluntary contributions, public losses, risk, ambiguity, experimental data, Contributions volontaires, pertes publiques, risque, ambiguïté, données expérimentales

Voluntary Teaming and Effort

In a series of experimental effort games each of two players may choose between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy to choose remuneration based on private effort, we frequently observe team remuneration chosen by both players. Team remuneration allows for high payoff for cooperation to each player, but at the same time provides individual incentives to take a free ride on the other player's effort. Due to significant cooperation we observe that in team remuneration participants make higher profits than in private remuneration. We also observe that when participants are not given the option of private remuneration they cooperate significantly less. Dans cette étude expérimentale, chaque paire de participants doit choisir entre une forme de rémunération d'équipe ou privée pour leurs efforts consentis. Même si le choix de la forme privée de rémunération est pour au moins un des deux joueurs une stratégie d'équilibre parfait en sous-jeu, nous observons que la rémunération d'équipe est fréquemment choisie par les deux joueurs. La rémunération d'équipe permet un profit élevé de collaboration pour chaque joueur, mais elle incite également au resquillage sur le niveau d'effort de l'autre participant. Fruit de cette collaboration, nous observons que les participants affichent des profits plus élevés relativement au choix de la structure privée de rémunération. Finalement, lorsque les participants sont soumis à la rémunération d'équipe, ils coopèrent moins que lorsque cette option est volontairement choisie.team effort, workforce management, experimental economics, effort d'équipe, gestion des ressources humaines, économie expérimentale

What does Bill Gates' call mean? A policy transfer analysis on creating an early warning system to prevent the next pandemic

Objectives The purpose of this study is to discuss the need for an early warning system in order to prevent a new epidemic that may occur in the future and, if necessary, which system will be and how this warning system will be designed. Methods A qualitative analysis through the World Health Organization (WHO) documents, an interview with a key expert, and a policy transfer analysis was conducted. Results An early warning system is needed for new outbreaks that may occur in the future. We have seen that the Early Warning Alert and Response system (EWARs), which is implemented by WHO as a policy transfer in Syria, is successful in this area and the system can be easily adapted and established. The implementation of the system in Syria and the successful performance of the early warning system can be systematically transferred to other regions of the world with the policy transfer approach as a public health policy and the implementation phases in the study. The successful transfer of EWARs from WHO to Syria provides a good sample for the integration of a system developed by international and/or non-governmental organizations into an administration system of a state under pandemic and crises conditions

The effect of sheltered load on reproduction in Solanum carolinense, a species with variable self-incompatibility

In previous studies, we have investigated the strength of self-incompatibility (SI) in Solanum carolinense, a highly successful weed with a fully functional SI system that inhabits early successional and other disturbed habitats. We have found that the SI response in S. carolinense is a plastic trait—its strength being affected by the age of the flowers, and the presence of developing fruits and that there are genetic differences among families in their self-fertility. However, in species with a fully functional SI response, selfing would not be that common. As a result, deleterious recessives scattered though the genome of horsenettle are only occasionally exposed to selection. It has been suggested that deleterious recessives accumulate near S-alleles in strong SI species because the S-locus is located in a non-recombining region of the genome and because strong S-alleles are never in the homozygous state, thus sheltering some of the genetic load near the S-locus from selection. We performed a series of laboratory and greenhouse experiments to determine the extent to which sheltered load adds to the overall magnitude of inbreeding depression in horsenettle. Specifically, we amplified and sequenced the S-alleles from 16 genets collected from a large population in Pennsylvania and performed a series of controlled self-pollinations. We then grew the selfed progeny in the greenhouse; recorded various measures of growth and reproductive output; and amplified and sequenced their S-allele(s). We found that the heterozygous progeny of self-pollinations produce more flowers and have a greater ability to set both self and cross seed than S-homozygous progeny. We also found evidence of variation in the magnitude of load among S-alleles. These results suggest that sheltered load might slow the fixation of weak (partially compatible) S-alleles in this population, thus adding to the maintenance of a mixed mating system rather than leading to the fixation of the selfing allele