Measuring and reducing the impact of corruption in infrastructure

This paper examines what we can say about the extent and impact of corruption in infrastructure in developing countries using existing evidence. It looks at different approaches to estimating the extent of corruption and reports on the results of such studies. It suggests that there is considerable evidence that most existing perceptions measures appear to be very weak proxies for the actual extent of corruption in the infrastructure sector, largely (but inaccurately) measuring petty rather than grand corruption. Existing survey evidence is more reliable, but limited in extent and still subject to sufficient uncertainty that it should not be used as a tool for differentiating countries in terms of access to infrastructure finance or appropriate policy models. The paper discusses evidence for the relative costs of corruption impacts and suggests that a focus on bribe payments as the indicator of the costs of corruption in infrastructure may be misplaced. It draws some conclusions regarding priorities for infrastructure anti-corruption research and activities in projects, in particular regarding disaggregated and actionable indicators of weak governance and corruption.Corruption&Anitcorruption Law,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,Poverty Monitoring&Analysis,Social Accountability,Government Diagnostic Capacity Building

Publishing Construction Contracts as a Tool for Efficiency and Good Governance - Working Paper 272

Construction is a $1.7 trillion industry worldwide, much of which is linked to publicly financed projects. Outcomes from this financing are frequently suboptimal. Cost and time escalation, as well as poor quality, are linked to weak governance and corruption, which are endemic in the sector. There is considerable evidence that transparency and oversight are potentially powerful tools to reduce the development impact of corruption. One comparatively cheap and potentially powerful tool to improve outcomes in public procurement is the regular publication of contract and implementation details. In particular, the publication of government contracts would considerably improve transparency. Publication would also provide a large stock of public intellectual capital which should (i) reduce legal costs of contracting; and (ii) help spread best practices and ease the process of learning lessons from failed approaches. The approach is feasible: some jurisdictions have already introduced it.economics & finance, procurement, public policy

The Internet and Economic Growth in Least Developed Countries

Internet, economic growth, developing countries

Reforming the posts : abandoning the monopoly-supported postal universal service obligation in developing countries

The monopoly-supported universal service obligation (USO) is usually defended on the grounds that the monopoly allows for cross-subsidy in letter services that in turn allows universal access to a service of great importance to all. The author argues that letter delivery (as opposed to other services that may be provided by post offices) is not in universal demand in poor countries, that the size of the market in developing countries is such that USOs could not be met under the monopoly model, and that the monopoly carries heavy costs for sector development and consumer welfare. He proposes in the place of the postal USO a competitive approach involving universal access to a range of services that poor people have a need to access. Regarding reform of the incumbent, the author takes a preliminary first cut at examining the statistical relationship between postal performance (as measured by letters per capita allowing for income per capita), trust in the postal service, and postal efficiency, and finds a significant link between the three. The results suggest that reforms that improve postal efficiency and trust in the postal network will improve the performance of the postal network. The author suggests that there may be better uses of cross-subsidy from within the sector and government subsidy from without than supporting the inefficient delivery of a service rarely used by poor people.Economic Theory&Research,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Governance Indicators,Environmental Economics&Policies,Postal Services

A Note on the Ethical Implications of the Stern Review

The Stern Review adopts two interesting elements in its calculation of the costs and benefits of climate change mitigation. First is a ‘global welfarist’ approach that values the utility of the World’s people (now and into the future) equally, and sets global utility maximization as the correct goal for policy. Second is an assumption of a declining marginal utility to income. Consistent application of the ‘global welfarist’ approach and the declining marginal utility of income together would demand an urgent process of global income redistribution. Over the long term, this might see the richest ten percent of the World’s population facing an average redistributive tax rate in the region of 82 percent.Stern Review; Climate Change; Welfare Economics

Construction, corruption, and developing countries

The construction industry accounts for about one-third of gross capital formation. Governments have major roles as clients, regulators, and owners of construction companies. The industry is consistently ranked as one of the most corrupt: large payments to gain or alter contracts and circumvent regulations are common. The impact of corruption goes beyond bribe payments to poor quality construction of infrastructure with low economic returns alongside low funding for maintenance-and this is where the major impact of corruption is felt. Regulation of the sector is necessary, but simplicity, transparency, enforcement, and a focus on the outcomes of poor construction are likely to have a larger impact than voluminous but poorly enforced regulation of theconstruction process. Where government is the client, attempts to counter corruption need to begin at the level of planning and budgeting. Output-based and community-driven approaches show some promise as tools to reduce corruption. At the same time they will need to be complimented by a range of other interventions including publication of procurement documents, independent and community oversight, physical audit, and public-private anticorruption partnerships.Governance Indicators,Poverty Monitoring&Analysis,Corruption&Anitcorruption Law,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,Social Accountability

More Money or More Development: What Have the MDGs Achieved- Working Paper 278

What have the MDGs achieved? And what might their achievements mean for any second generation of MDGs or MDGs 2.0? We argue that the MDGs may have played a role in increasing aid and that development policies beyond aid quantity have seen some limited improvement in rich countries (the evidence on policy change in poor countries is weaker). Further, there is some evidence of faster-than-expected progress improving quality of life in developing countries since the Millennium Declaration, but the contribution of the MDGs themselves in speeding that progress is—of course—difficult to demonstrate even assuming the MDGs induced policy changes after 2002. The paper concludes with reflections on what the experience of MDGs in terms of global goal setting has taught us and how things might be done differently if there were to be a new set of MDGs after 2015. Any MDGs 2.0 need targets that are set realistically and directly link aid flows to social policy change and to results.

'Red flags of corruption'in world bank projects : an analysis of infrastructure contracts

"Red flags"are indicators of potential issues regarding governance failure, collusion or corruption in projects. While some specific red flags can be powerful indicators of issues to be addressed, the hypothesis of this paper is that many proposed red flags are potentially too ubiquitous and randomly distributed to be useful as indicators of significant governance failure. The paper examines project documentation from a small sample of World Bank water and sanitation projects in an attempt to collect data on the presence or absence of 13 commonly accepted red flags. This paper finds that: (i) almost every contract reviewed raised at least one of 13 red flags analyzed; (ii) potentially tainted contracts did not exhibit notably more red flags than control contracts; and (iii) the occurrence of multiple red flags in the same contract was rare enough to suggest that joint occurrence was largely by chance, not as a result of a strongly causal inter-relationship between flags. The ubiquity and apparent randomness of these red flags suggests that their roll-out as a monitoring tool requires additional thought as to interpretation, context and use. The paper examines an alternate tool for uncovering potential problem projects -- supplier concentration. Across a very small sample, there does appear to be a relationship between such concentration and potential problem projects.Post Conflict Reconstruction,Debt Markets,Government Procurement,Investment and Investment Climate,Literature&Folklore

Grand Corruption in Utilities

This paper discusses mechanisms of grand corruption in private sector utility provision in developing countries. By the term "grand corruption," the authors abstract from the petty corruption that consumers experience -- for example, when firms and individuals pay bribes to get water delivery or an electricity connection. The paper focuses on decisions made at the government level involving private sector management, ownership, and provision of utility services. Corruption at that level may influence the pace and nature of private sector involvement and competition in utilities, as well as the level and form of investments, subsidies, and prices. On the basis of a literature review and interviews with firms and regulating authorities in two countries, Tanzania and the Philippines, this paper discusses the levels and determinants of grand corruption in utilities. The paper concludes by discussing a research program to extend this knowledge through a cross-country survey instrument.abuse; access to capital; access to finance; Access to information; accessibility; accountability; anti-corruption; Asian Development Bank; assets; asymmetric information; authority;

Leanin\u27 On The Ole Top Rail

Photograph of Dick Jurgens; Illustration of cowgirl leaning on wooden fence with sand and cactus in backgroundhttps://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/cht-sheet-music/7940/thumbnail.jp