Lost in Translation: The Economic Analysis of Law in the United States and Europe

In this essay, we examine the reasons why the economic analysis of law has not flourished in European countries as it has in the U.S. In particular, we focus on three European countries - the United Kingdom (U.K.), Germany, and France. We argue that differences in culture, the legal system and the academy have led to differing degrees of success of the law and economics movement in each country. We speculate that, although there is currently less interest in the economic analysis of the law in Europe than in the United States, European interest could dramatically increase if scholars adopt more communitarian analyses aimed at analyzing legislative polices rather than judicial decisions

The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith: NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co. and NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ International Union

This article discusses two classic Supreme Court cases from the 1950\u27s that explore the contours of the obligation to bargain in good faith: NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co. and NLRB v. Insurance Agents\u27 International Union. In the Truitt case, the Supreme Court held that the obligation to bargain in good faith requires an employer to open its books to the union when the employer refuses a request for a wage increase on the basis that such an increase will drive the employer out of business. In the Insurance Agents\u27 case, the Supreme Court held that union slow-down tactics were consistent with the union\u27s obligation to bargain in good faith even though these tactics were not protected by the NLRA. These two cases are considered together because their seemingly inconsistent holdings illustrate the tension in the NLRA between regulating the conduct of collective bargaining to promote the parties\u27 ability to bargain cooperatively in industrial peace, while still allowing the recourse to economic weapons that is necessary for the process of collective bargaining. This chapter offers the stories behind these two great cases, the arguments the lawyers made on behalf of their clients, how these cases were resolved by the Board and the courts, and some of the theory behind what it means to bargain in good faith

The Labor Market Transformed: Adapting Labor and Employment Law to the Rise of the Contingent Work Force

The American labor market has been at the forefront of change in adapting the new information technology and engaging in global trade. These changes have led to new and increased use of contingent employment relationships such as part-time, temporary and subcontracted work which do not neatly fall under the definition of employee in most American protective legislation. With the advent of increasing numbers of contingent workers, these labor and employment laws must be reevaluated. In expanding upon Dr Richard S. Belous\u27 previous critical analysis, this paper argues for a broader statutory definition of employee in current and future protective legislation based on economic realities of dependency and control

An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy

In this Article I provide an economic analysis of criminal law as a preference-shaping policy. I argue that in addition to creating disincentives for criminal activity, criminal punishment is intended to promote various social norms of individual behavior by shaping the preferences of criminals and the population at large. By taking into account this preference-shaping function, I explain many of the characteristics of criminal law that have heretofore escaped the logic of the economic model. It is also the preference-shaping function and the prerequisite ordering of preferences that distinguish criminal law from tort law. My analysis suggests that society will make an activity a crime whenever the social benefits of changing individual preferences through criminal punishment outweigh the social costs. However, since this weighing of social costs and benefits is conducted through a political process on the basis of ethical and moral standards and requires estimates of the costs of changing opportunities and preferences, I conclude that other disciplines can usefully inform the economic model of criminal law