Event-Study Evidence of the Value of Relaxing Longstanding Regulatory Restraints on Banks, 1970-2000

In a partial-equilibrium model, removing a binding constraint creates value. However, in general equilibrium, the stakes of other parties in maintaining the constraint must be examined. In financial deregulation, the fear is that expanding the scope and geographic reach of very large institutions might unblock opportunities to build market power from informational advantages and size-related safety-net subsidies. This paper reviews and extends event-study evidence about the distribution of the benefits and costs of relaxing longstanding geographic and product-line restrictions on U.S. financial institutions. The evidence indicates that the new financial freedoms may have redistributed rather than created value. Event returns are positive for some sectors of the financial industry and negative for others. Perhaps surprisingly, where customer event returns have been investigated, they prove negative.

Winners and Losers from Enacting the Financial Modernization Statute

Previous studies of the announcement effects of relaxing administrative and legislative restraints show that signal events leading up to the enactment of the Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA) increased the prices of several classes of financial-institution stocks. An unsettled question is whether the gains observed for these stocks arise mainly from projected increases in efficiency or from reductions in customer or competitor bargaining power. This paper documents that the value increase came at the expense of customers and competitors. The stock prices of credit-constrained customers declined during FSMA event windows and experienced significant increases in beta in the wake of its enactment. These findings reinforce evidence in the literature on bank mergers that large-bank consolidation is adversely affecting access to credit for capital-constrained firms.

Mutual Holding Companies: Evidence of Conflicts of Interest through Disparate Dividends

The mutual holding company (MHC) structure establishes a dual-class stock that creates a unique opportunity to transfer wealth from thrift depositor-owners to new minority shareholders through the disparate payment of dividends. We show that MHCs are priced higher than comparable non-MHCs and dividend policy is a significant component of this valuation. We also show that MHC thrifts pay significantly higher dividends than non-MHC thrifts and that an Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) ruling reducing the potential for disparate dividends between the two classes of shareholders resulted in lower dividends. These results have policy implications of special significance given that the OTS reversed its position in 2000 and because of the current controversy over the use of the MHC structure in the financial service industry

Demutualization: Determinants and consequences of the mutual holding company choice

We investigate the determinants and consequences of the mutual holding company (MHC) structure that allows mutual thrifts to issue stock to outside shareholders while maintaining the mutual form. Capital constrained firms with greater profit opportunities are more likely to choose a full demutualization; demonstrating that the MHC choice can be used to control for over- and under-investment costs. During periods of greater regulatory constraints, MHC firms have lower offer-day returns than full demutualizations. MHC firms are also less likely to be acquired as the MHC structure provides protection from the market for corporate control. Demonstrating a clear preference by minority shareholders for the elimination of the MHC structure, the announcement of a second-stage conversion generates a 12 percent return

The Role of Insider Influence in Mutual-to-Stock Conversions

Using a sample of 347 demutualizing thrifts from 1991 to 2004, we show that the level of inside participation is not a traditional signal of firm performance. We conclude that unanticipated inside participation reflects the incentives of insiders to reduce the size of the offer to influence the level of expected IPO returns. We find unanticipated inside participation is related to lower offer size and higher initial returns, but we do not find a relationship between inside participation and post-IPO performance

Risk of Lower Extremity Injury in a Military Cadet Population After a Supervised Injury-Prevention Program

Specific movement patterns have been identified as possible risk factors for noncontact lower extremity injuries. The Dynamic Integrated Movement Enhancement (DIME) was developed to modify these movement patterns to decrease injury risk

Capital market reactions to the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999

Author's manuscript retrieved from SSRN.The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), removed most of the remaining barriers between financial companies. Stock market reactions to the passage of GLBA vary across financial sectors and company size. Specifically, we find negative returns for foreign banks, thrifts and finance companies; insignificant returns for banks; and positive returns for investment banks and insurance companies. Additionally, larger non-depository firms have higher returns. The return variation reflects resolution of uncertainty surrounding the final provisions of GLBA, competitive pressures, and expectations of future business combinations. Potential gains from business combinations may arise from economies of scope, market power, and/or from an implicit extension of government guarantees to banking affiliates.foreve