34 research outputs found
Chapter 7 Municipal control as incumbency advantage
This chapter explores whether and how the incumbent party in Turkey benefits electorally from its partisan ties at the sub-national level. This is an especially important question given the dominance of the nationally ruling party, Justice and Development Party, in Turkish electoral politics and growing concerns about the fairness of elections due to the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) incumbency advantage. The chapter investigates under what conditions and how national incumbent parties benefit electorally from their partisan ties with sub-national governments. It discusses the prevalence of patronage and clientelism referred to by many scholars, who have tried to understand the mechanisms of patron–client relationships in Turkey and their consequences for the party system, the representation of citizen interests, governability and democratic accountability. The chapter provides information about Turkish local governments and their budgetary opportunities, before discussing the possibilities for political manipulation that arise from intergovernmental fiscal ties. It argues that increased municipality healthcare spending brings votes for the AKP nationally
Intergovernmental politics of fiscal balance in a federal democracy: the experience of Brazil, 1996-2005
Distributive politics and electoral competition for the Kurdish vote
Competition for the Kurdish vote has been important in contemporary Turkish politics. Focusing on the non-contributory health insurance program in the early period of AKP rule, this article shows that this competition also affected the distribution of benefits. Kurdish citizens’ likelihood of holding a Green Card increased with the competitiveness of the district between the AKP and Kurdish-oriented parties. The number of Green Cards and social spending were also higher when a Kurdish-oriented party posed an electoral challenge. These findings reveal the electoral calculation behind AKP’s strategy of favoring Kurdish voters as well as the importance of political organization for the minority group’s access to benefits
Distributive politics and electoral competition for the Kurdish vote
Competition for the Kurdish vote has been important in contemporary Turkish politics. Focusing on the non-contributory health insurance program in the early period of AKP rule, this article shows that this competition also affected the distribution of benefits. Kurdish citizens’ likelihood of holding a Green Card increased with the competitiveness of the district between the AKP and Kurdish-oriented parties. The number of Green Cards and social spending were also higher when a Kurdish-oriented party posed an electoral challenge. These findings reveal the electoral calculation behind AKP’s strategy of favoring Kurdish voters as well as the importance of political organization for the minority group’s access to benefits
Democratic backsliding, conflict, and partisan mobilisation of ethnic groups: local government control and electoral participation in Turkey
Partisan mobilisation is critical for constituencies with low premobilisation participation, even in countries like Turkey with generally high levels of electoral turnout. We argue that parties appealing to ethnic minority constituencies benefit disproportionately from the symbolic and material resources that local government control provides. Central government’s exceptional decisions to intervene can, however, curtail access to these resources and affect electoral politics. Focusing on three Turkish elections and a referendum in 2015–2018, the article analyses how the political context of democratic backsliding and conflict affected the pro-Kurdish party’s control of municipalities, their mobilisation capacity, and hence turnout. Specifically, the previously higher rate of turnout in pro-Kurdish party-controlled municipalities compared to other municipalities disappeared following the elected mayors’ replacement by appointed trustees
Municipal control as incumbency advantage: an analysis of the AKP era
Political parties’ control over state resources clearly has an impact on the parties’ internal organization and the linkages that they form with voters. 1 An understudied dimension of how state control affects parties is the electoral consequence in national elections for the national incumbent party of holding local executive positions. In this chapter, we explore whether and how the incumbent party in Turkey benefits electorally from its partisan ties at the sub-national level. This is an especially important question given the dominance of the nationally ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP), in Turkish electoral politics and the growing concerns about the fairness of elections due to the AKP’s incumbency advantage. Within the constraints set by available data on municipal budgets, we explore whether the fiscal opportunities and choices of the AKP’s local affiliates further increase the party’s votes in national elections. We also compare the AKP’s incumbency with the experience of coalition governments during the 1990s