30 research outputs found
Mass Additivity and A Priori Entailment
The principle of mass additivity states that the mass of a composite object
is the sum of the masses of its elementary components. Mass additivity is true
in Newtonian mechanics but false in special relativity. Physicists have
explained why mass additivity is true in Newtonian mechanics by reducing it to
Newton's microphysical laws. This reductive explanation does not fit well with
deducibility theories of reductive explanation such as the modern Nagelian
theory of reduction, and the a priori entailment theory of reduction that is
prominent in the philosophy of mind. Nonetheless, I argue that a reconstruction
of the explanation that incorporates distinctively philosophical concepts in
fact fits both theories. I discuss the implications of this result for both
theories and for the reductive explanation of consciousness
Illusionist Integrated Information Theory
The integrated information theory (IIT) is a promising theory of consciousness. However, there are several problems with IIT\u27s axioms and postulates. Moreover, IIT entails that some twodimensional grids of identical logic gates have more consciousness than humans. Many have found this prediction to be implausible, and as will be argued here, this prediction also exacerbates the so-called \u27hard problem of consciousness\u27. Recently, it has been argued that if we treat the phenomenological aspects of consciousness as an illusion (illusionism), we can avoid the hard problem altogether by replacing it with the more tractable illusion problem: the problem of explaining how introspection systematically misrepresents experiences as having phenomenology. IIT is intended to be a theory of the phenomenological aspects of consciousness. However, it is possible to reformulate the axioms and postulates of IIT consistently with illusionism. Here it is argued that the resulting theory -- illusionist integrated information theory -- removes several problems for IIT including the hard problem and the logic gate problem, and also enables meaningful progress for illusionists on solving the illusion problem
Four Tails Problems for Dynamical Collapse Theories
The primary quantum mechanical equation of motion entails that measurements typically do not have determinate outcomes, but result in superpositions of all possible outcomes. Dynamical collapse theories (e.g. GRW) supplement this equation with a stochastic Gaussian collapse function, intended to collapse the superposition of outcomes into one outcome. But the Gaussian collapses are imperfect in a way that leaves the superpositions intact. This is the tails problem. There are several ways of making this problem more precise. But many authors dismiss the problem without considering the more severe formulations. Here I distinguish four distinct tails problems. The first (bare tails problem) and second (structured tails problem) exist in the literature. I argue that while the first is a pseudo-problem, the second has not been adequately addressed. The third (multiverse tails problem) reformulates the second to account for recently discovered dynamical consequences of collapse. Finally the fourth (tails problem dilemma) shows that solving the third by replacing the Gaussian with a non-Gaussian collapse function introduces new conflict with relativity theory
Reformulating Bell's Theorem: The Search for a Truly Local Quantum Theory
The apparent nonlocality of quantum theory has been a persistent concern. Einstein et. al. (1935) and Bell (1964) emphasized the apparent nonlocality arising from entanglement correlations. While some interpretations embrace this nonlocality, modern variations of the Everett-inspired many worlds interpretation try to circumvent it. In this paper, we review Bell's "no-go" theorem and explain how it rests on three axioms, local causality, no superdeterminism, and one world. Although Bell is often taken to have shown that local causality is ruled out by the experimentally confirmed entanglement correlations, we make clear that it is the conjunction of the three axioms that is ruled out by these correlations. We then show that by assuming local causality and no superdeterminism, we can give a direct proof of many worlds. The remainder of the paper searches for a consistent, local, formulation of many worlds. We show that prominent formulations whose ontology is given by the wave function violate local causality, and we critically evaluate claims in the literature to the contrary. We ultimately identify a local many worlds interpretation that replaces the wave function with a separable Lorentz-invariant wave-field. We conclude with discussions of the Born rule, and other interpretations of quantum mechanics
When Do Parts Form Wholes? Integrated Information as the Restriction on Mereological Composition
Under what conditions are material objects, such as particles, parts of a whole object? This is the composition question and is a longstanding open question in philosophy. Existing attempts to specify a non-trivial restriction on composition tend to be vague and face serious counterexamples. Consequently, two extreme answers have become mainstream: composition (the forming of a whole by its parts) happens under no or all conditions. In this paper, we provide a self-contained introduction to the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. We show that IIT specifies a non-trivial restriction on composition: composition happens when integrated information is maximized. We compare the IIT restriction to existing proposals and argue that the IIT restriction has significant advantages, especially in response to the problems of vagueness and counterexamples. An appendix provides an introduction to calculating parts and wholes with a simple system
Have underground radiation measurements refuted the Orch OR theory?
In [1] it is claimed that, based on radiation emission measurements described in [2], a certain “variant” of the Orch OR theory has been refuted. I agree with this claim. However, the significance of this result for Orch OR per se is unclear. After all, the refuted “variant” was never advocated by anyone, and it contradicts the views of Hameroff and Penrose (hereafter: HP) who invented Orch OR [3]. My aim is to get clear on this situation. I argue that it is indeed reasonable to speak of “variants” here. Orch OR is not a complete model of reality but a work in progress. At its core, it claims that wavefunction collapse is a real physical event that has something to do with gravity (“OR”) and that consciousness depends on orchestrated collapses in microtubules (“Orch”). There are many ways one could make these base ideas precise hence many “variants”. Furthermore, the ways that HP aim to make these ideas precise are radical and incomplete. If they don’t work out, Orch OR will need to fall back on another variant. Thus, I believe the significance of [1-2] for Orch OR is that it cuts out a small class of possible variants and leaves behind questions and challenges for the rest, including the variant preferred by HP
The Generative Programs Framework
Recently there has been significant interest in using causal modelling
techniques to understand the structure of physical theories. However, the
notion of `causation' is limiting - insisting that a physical theory must
involve causal structure already places significant constraints on the form
that theory may take. Thus in this paper, we aim to set out a more general
structural framework. We argue that any quantitative physical theory can be
represented in the form of a generative program, i.e. a list of instructions
showing how to generate the empirical data; the information-processing
structure associated with this program can be represented by a directed acyclic
graph (DAG). We suggest that these graphs can be interpreted as encoding
relations of `ontological priority,' and that ontological priority is a
suitable generalisation of causation which applies even to theories that don't
have a natural causal structure. We discuss some applications of our framework
to philosophical questions about realism, operationalism, free will, locality
and fine-tuning.Comment: 42 pages, 15 figures, 19 pages of supplementary materia
How the Many Worlds Interpretation brings Common Sense to Paradoxical Quantum Experiments
The many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) states that the world we live in is just one among many parallel worlds. It is widely believed that because of this commitment to parallel worlds, the MWI violates common sense. Some go so far as to reject the MWI on this basis. This is despite its myriad of advantages to physics (e.g. consistency with relativity theory, mathematical simplicity, realism, determinism, etc.). Here, we make the case that common sense in fact favors the MWI. We argue that causal explanations are commonsensical only when they are local causal explanations. We present several quantum mechanical experiments that seem to exhibit nonlocal “action at a distance”. Under the assumption that only one world exists, these experiments seem immune to local causal explanation. However, we show that the MWI, by taking all worlds together, can provide local causal explanations of the experiments. The MWI therefore restores common sense to physical explanation
Building a quantum superposition of conscious states with integrated information theory
Could there be a quantum superposition of consciousness, as in the Wigner's
friend thought experiment? The integrated information theory (IIT) of
consciousness has turned this into a well-defined question. According to IIT,
consciousness is a measurable physical quantity given by integrated information
(), such that the amount of consciousness in a system corresponds to its
amount of . We use the most recent IIT formalism (IIT4.0) to analyze the
simplest non-zero system known as a feedback dyad. We then propose a
circuit that puts the dyad into a superposition of states which, according to
IIT, would correspond to a superposition of conscious states. We refer to this
as "Schr\"odinger's dyad". We therefore show that either IIT is false or the
simple dyad is conscious and can easily be put into a superposition of
conscious states. We then identify the simplest possible consciousness-collapse
model, which predicts that this superposition is unstable and collapses at a
rate determined by a measure of difference between the superposed conscious
states. Our analysis will enable us to make a number of key observations about
the general structure of integrated information theory (IIT2.0, IIT3.0, IIT4.0,
and QIIT) and the general structure of consciousness-collapse models
In defence of the self-location uncertainty account of probability in the many-worlds interpretation
We defend the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) against the objection that it cannot explain why measurement outcomes are predicted by the Born probability rule. We understand quantum probabilities in terms of an observer's self-location probabilities. We formulate a probability postulate for the MWI: the probability of self-location in a world with a given set of outcomes is the absolute square of that world's amplitude. We provide a proof of this postulate, which assumes the quantum formalism and two principles concerning symmetry and locality. We also show how a structurally similar proof of the Born rule is available for collapse theories. We conclude by comparing our account to the recent account offered by Sebens and Carroll