LAW ENFORCEMENT UNDER INCOMPLETE LAW: Theory and Evidence from Financial Market Regulation

This paper studies the design of law-making and law enforcement institutions based on the premise that law is inherently incomplete. Under incomplete law, law enforcement by courts may suffer from deterrence failure, defined as the socialwelfare loss that results from the regime's inability to deter harmful actions. As a potential remedy a regulatory regime is introduced. The major functional difference between courts and regulators is that courts enforce law reactively, that is only once others have initiated law enforcement procedures, while regulators enforce law proactively, i.e. on their own initiative. Proactive law enforcement may be superior in preventing harm. However, it incurs high costs and may err in stopping potentially beneficial activities. We study optimal regime selection between a court and a regulatory regime and present evidence from the history of financial market regulationIncomplete law, law enforcement, financial market, regulation

Ideology and Institutions in the Evolution of Capital

In Capital and Ideology, Thomas Piketty poses the intriguing thesis that ideology, or ideas about how society should be governed, is a powerful determinant for how society will be governed-as long as we take advantage of historical switch points. In this review essay I challenge this thesis by pointing out that many powerful ideas have run aground because of countervailing institutional arrangements. Oftentimes, they are leftovers from earlier times that precede the change and are now strategically employed for reconstituting private wealth. Clearly, ideology and institutions are deeply intertwined. I credit Piketty for putting ideology on the map of institutionalists in history, political sciences, sociology, and law. I therefore call for more research on the interaction of ideas and institutions

The Challenge of Radical Reform in Pluralist Democracies

Martijn Hesselink proposes a new European charter of private law that would correct the deficiencies in private law identified by Katharina Pistor. While Hesselink aims to achieve radical reform by way of radical democracy, this article argues that radical democracy is unlikely to realise a radically progressive vision of private law. Citizens of wealthy, post-industrial democracies lack certainty about both the material consequences of reform and the demands of justice. Because their caution renders them averse to far-reaching, bundled reform packages, public discourse in post-industrial societies as we find them is more likely to produce incremental than radical substantive reform

Law and Finance in Transition Economies

This paper offers the first comprehensive analysis of legal change in the protection of shareholder and creditor rights in transition economies and its impact on the propensity of firms to raise external finance. Following La Porta et al. (1998), the paper constructs an expanded set of legal indices to capture a range of potential conflicts between different stakeholders of the firm. It supplements the analysis of the law on the books with an analysis of the effectiveness of legal institutions. Our main finding is that the effectiveness of legal institutions has a much stronger impact on external finance than does the law on the books, despite legal change that has substantially improved shareholder and creditor rights. This finding supports the proposition that legal transplants and extensive legal reforms are not sufficient for the evolution of effective legal and market institutions.shareholder and creditor rights, legal effectiveness, external finance, transition

Rethinking the Law and Finance Paradigm

The label Law and Finance stands for a body of literature that has dominated policy-making and academic debates for the past decade. The literature has its origin in a series of papers co-authored by Andrei Shleifer, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and a cohort of other researchers, including Robert Vishny, Simeon Djankov et al. (hereinafter referred to as LLS et al.). More than ten years after Law and Finance was first published, it seems appropriate to step back and consider the contribution this literature has made, but also to point out where it has gone astray and deviated attention from what the critical issues are for Law and Finance and, more broadly, for law and development. The lead authors of this literature have given their own assessment of theirs as well as of related work in a paper that has recently been published by the Journal of Economic Literature, which I will refer to throughout this essay. The second part of this essay will be devoted to a critique of the Law and Finance paradigm. The third part will sketch out alternative strategies for analyzing the role of law and legal institutions and the relation between legal and economic change in comparative perspective