Political Economy of East Asian Regional Integration and Cooperation

In the last decade, East Asia has engaged in constructing numerous mechanisms to enhance regional cooperation in the areas of trade and finance. However' the region's economic architecture exhibits certain idiosyncrasies such as an eclectic institutional structure and a limited level of commitment shown by its members. These idiosyncrasies seem to prevent regional cooperation from becoming deeper and more coherent. This paper focuses on the political factors that have thus far shaped the institutional form of East Asian regional trade and financial cooperation' particularly in the three essential aspects of regionalism derived from the theories of regional institution building. The first aspect is the level at which governments are willing to compromise sovereignty and political autonomy for the sake of regional cooperation. The second is the progress in creating mechanisms through which the “losers” and the “weak” within a country or region can be compensated. The third is the clear definition of which members can benefit from such mechanisms. These three elements are useful in furthering regional cooperation and institution building by removing resistance and obstacles that work against functional spillovers. The paper argues that East Asia's economic institutions established through the cooperation efforts of the last ten years exhibit different qualities from those that have emerged in Europe' and thus fall far short of overcoming unexpected political tensions in the region. These deficiencies' however' contrast in two important fields of regional integration. In finance' the clearly defined member governments have difficulty compromising their respective national macroeconomic policy autonomy' while in the field of regional trade cooperation' the challenge is in redistributing the economic gains to those who stand to lose during the process of integration' or to the countries that have a long distance to catch up within a relatively well-defined group.east asian regional integration; asia regional trade cooperation; asia institutional regional cooperation

Grants and debt forgiveness in Africa : a descriptive analysis

The authors analyze the effects of bilateral debt forgiveness on 32 low-income countries in Africa (1984-93). Asking whether it makes a difference for recipient countries to receive pure grants rather that official development assistance (ODA) debt relief, they focus on how one form of aid or the other affects the countries'import capacity. They conclude that: a) grants allowed recipient countries to significantly expand their import capacity for 1984-93 as grants and import capacity have been increasing since 1984. But the increasing share of concessional lending and debt relief in recent years has not allowed these countries to reduce total indebtedness nor solve debt overhang. b) the biggest recipients of debt relief also received the lion's share of the pure grants increase. Debt forgiveness and pure grants were allocated not entirely consistent with standard economic hierarchies. c) bilateral ODA debt forgiveness appears to be neutral in the sense of not having any significant impact on import capacity. During 1989-93, multilateral lending replaced the bilateral lending decrease caused by an increase in grants. d) private creditors have typically withdrawn money as grants increased. And debt relief has had a crowding-out effect on new lending. Bilateral donors are switching their development finance to Africa from concessional and non-concessional lending to a combination of pure grants and ODA relief.Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Banks&Banking Reform,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Municipal Financial Management,Public&Municipal Finance,Urban Economics,Municipal Financial Management,Banks&Banking Reform,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Public&Municipal Finance

Political economy of East Asian regional integration and cooperation

In the last decade, East Asia has engaged in constructing numerous mechanisms to enhance regional cooperation in the areas of trade and finance. However, the region's economic architecture exhibits certain idiosyncrasies such as an eclectic institutional structure and a limited level of commitment shown by its members. These idiosyncrasies seem to prevent regional cooperation from becoming deeper and more coherent. This paper focuses on the political factors that have thus far shaped the institutional form of East Asian regional trade and financial cooperation, particularly in the three essential aspects of regionalism derived from the theories of regional institution building. The first aspect is the level at which governments are willing to compromise sovereignty and political autonomy for the sake of regional cooperation. The second is the progress in creating mechanisms through which the losers and the weak within a country or region can be compensated. The third is the clear definition of which members can benefit from such mechanisms. These three elements are useful in furthering regional cooperation and institution building by removing resistance and obstacles that work against functional spillovers. The paper argues that East Asia's economic institutions established through the cooperation efforts of the last ten years exhibit different qualities from those that have emerged in Europe, and thus fall far short of overcoming unexpected political tensions in the region. These deficiencies, however, contrast in two important fields of regional integration. In finance, the clearly defined member governments have difficulty compromising their respective national macroeconomic policy autonomy, while in the field of regional trade cooperation, the challenge is in redistributing the economic gains to those who stand to lose during the process of integration, or to the countries that have a long distance to catch up within a relatively well-defined group

At the crossroads : the TPP, AIIB, and Japan's foreign economic strategy

For more about the East-West Center, see http://www.eastwestcenter.org/In 2015, two mega-initiatives took shape that will affect economic relations in the Asia-Pacific region: the US-promoted Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement and the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Although they address different needs, both are expected to have profound effects on Asia's economic governance in the near future, and will shape economic norms in the Asia Pacific and beyond. Japan has joined the TPP but stayed out of the AIIB, decisions that might seem counterintuitive considering its history of resisting trade liberalization and of promoting infrastructure investment. Is Japan simply favoring its US ally over rival China? Or is it that Japan's position on the TPP and AIIB aligns with its own economic priorities, and enhances its geoeconomic advantage? With a US-China competition over economic ideas and regional strategies, Japan occupies a unique position that may allow it to influence the direction of Asia-Pacific economic governance, which is now being battled out by the two "titans.

Political Economy of East Asian Regional Integration and Cooperation

In the last decade, East Asia has engaged in constructing numerous mechanisms to enhance regional cooperation in the areas of trade and finance. However, the region’s economic architecture exhibits certain idiosyncrasies such as an eclectic institutional structure and a limited level of commitment shown by its members. These idiosyncrasies seem to prevent regional cooperation from becoming deeper and more coherent. This paper focuses on the political factors that have thus far shaped the institutional form of East Asian regional trade and financial cooperation, particularly in the three essential aspects of regionalism derived from the theories of regional institution building. The first aspect is the level at which governments are willing to compromise sovereignty and political autonomy for the sake of regional cooperation. [ADBI Working Paper 170]East Asia, cooperation, idiosyncrasies, financial, autonomy