307 research outputs found
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The ability of analysts’ recommendations to predict optimistic and pessimistic forecasts
Previous researches show that buy (growth) companies conduct income increasing earnings management in order to meet forecasts and generate positive forecast Errors (FEs). This behavior however, is not inherent in sell (non-growth) companies. Using the aforementioned background, this research hypothesizes that since sell companies are pressured to avoid income increasing earnings management, they are capable, and in fact more inclined, to pursue income decreasing Forecast Management (FM) with the purpose of generating positive FEs. Using a sample of 6553 firm-years of companies that are listed in the NYSE between the years 2005–2010, the study determines that sell companies conduct income decreasing FM to generate positive FEs. However, the frequency of positive FEs of sell companies does not exceed that of buy companies. Using the efficiency perspective, the study suggests that even though buy and sell companies have immense motivation in avoiding negative FEs, they exploit different but efficient strategies, respectively, in order to meet forecasts. Furthermore, the findings illuminated the complexities behind informative and opportunistic forecasts that falls under the efficiency
versus opportunistic theories in literature
Fair Value Accounting, Earnings Management and the use of Available-for-Sale Instruments by Bank Managers
Fair value accounting in banking has been criticized for the increased volatility that it generates in some accounting variables. One of its advantages, however, is that it reduces the possibility of discretionary earnings management, given that all gains and losses are immediately recognized. In this paper we qualify both considerations. The accounting regime of available-for-sale (AFS) securities allows for some degree of earnings and capital management: an AFS asset is reported at fair value but gains and losses over historical cost go into net income and measures of regulatory capital only when the asset is sold and the gain or loss realized. We use comprehensive data from US commercial banks and bank holding companies and provide evidence that fair value gains in AFS assets have consistently been used for earnings and capital management and that the holdings of AFS assets are related to the intensity of this activity. Our results show that the earnings management behavior is present both in listed and non-listed banks, suggesting that the motivations go beyond the incentives provided by capital markets. We also uncover significant differences in earnings management behavior over the years of the financial crisis
The integrity of financial analysts:Evidence from asymmetric responses to earnings surprises
This paper investigates the integrity of financial analysts by examining their recommendation responses to large quarterly earnings surprises. Although there is no significant difference in recommendation changes between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts in response to positive earnings surprises, affiliated analysts are more reluctant than unaffiliated analysts to downgrade stock recommendations in response to negative earnings surprises. The evidence implies that conflicts of interest undermine the integrity of financial analysts. We further examine the effects of reputation concern and the Global Research Analyst Settlement as informal and formal mechanisms, on restoring analysts’ integrity. The results show that the positive bias in recommendations remains prevalent for affiliated analysts from reputable investment banks and for the postreform period. Finally, evidence from market reactions suggests that investors fail to notice that analysts’ integrity is compromised by conflicts of interest and are misled by affiliated analysts
Do board secretaries influence management earnings forecasts?
The role of board secretaries is a unique institutional
feature in China. Individuals in this senior executive
role are responsible for coordinating information
disclosure. We study the impact of board secretaries on
management earnings forecasts and find that their legal
expertise, accounting expertise and foreign experience help
improve management earnings forecast quality. The quality
of forecasts, as indicated by their occurrence, frequency,
precision and accuracy, is also positively associated with
the role duality (e.g. board director, CFO or other senior
executive role) and equity holdings of board secretaries and
negatively associated with their political connection. The
quality of forecasts is found to increase the compensation
of board secretaries. Finally, we show that the equity
holding of board secretaries reduces litigation risks and
increases corporate philanthropic giving
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