Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games

We propose a new cost allocation rule for minimum cost spanning tree games. The new rule is a core selection and also satisfies cost monotonicity. We also give characterization theorems for the new rule as well as the much-studied Bird allocation. We show that the principal difference between these two rules is in terms of their consistency properties

OBLIGATION RULES

We provide a characterization of the obligation rules in the context of minimum cost spanning tree games. We also explore the relation between obligation rules and random order values of the irreducible cost game - it is shown that the later is a subset of the obligation rules. Moreover we provide a necessary and sucient condition on obligation function such that the corresponding obligation rule coincides with a random order value.

Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games

We propose a new cost allocation rule for minimum cost Spanning tree games. The new rule is a core selection and also satisfices cost monotonicity. We also give charqcterization theorems for the new rule as well as the much-studied Bird allocation. We show that the principal difference between these two rules is interms of their consistency properties.spanning tree, cost allocation, core selection, cost monotonicity, consistency

Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equilibrium distribution from this class does not satisfy the Maskin monotonicity condition and therefore can not be fully implemented in Nash equilibriu

MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AS A DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING CORRELATED DISTRIBUTIONS

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equilibrium distribution from this class does not satisfy the Maskin monotonicity condition and therefore can not be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium

Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equilibrium distribution from this class does not satisfy the Maskin monotonicity condition and therefore can not be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium.correlated equilibrium distribution; implementation; monotonicity

On the coincidence of the Prenucleolus and the Shapley Value

We identify a sufficient class of coalitional form games with transferable utility for which prenucleolus coincides with the Shapley value. We then apply our result to simple games and to generalized queueing games.

Everyone wants a chance : initial positions and fairness in ultimatum games

Fairness emerges as a relevant factor in redistributive preferences in surveys and experiments. We study experimentally the impact of varying the probability with which players are assigned to initial positions in Ultimatum Games (UGs). In the baseline case players have equal opportunities of being assigned the proposer position ñ arguably the more advantaged one in UGs. Chances become increasingly unequal across three treatments. We also manipulate the inter-temporal allocation of opportunities over rounds. We Önd that: (1) The more initial chances are distributed unequally, the lower the acceptance rates of a given o§er; consequently, o§ers increase; (2) Being assigned a mere 1% chance of occupying the proposer role compared to none, signiÖcantly increases acceptance rates and decreases o§ers; (3) Players accept even extreme amounts of unequal chances within each round in exchange for overall equality of opportunities across rounds. Procedural fairness ñboth static and dynamic - has clear relevance for individual