Kant, Morality, and Hell

In this paper I argue that, although Kant argues that morality is independent of God (and hence, agrees with the Euthyphro), and rejects Divine Command Theory (or Theological Voluntarism), he believes that all moral duties are also the commands of God, who is a moral being, and who is morally required to punish those who transgress the moral law: "God’s justice is the precise allocation of punishments and rewards in accordance with men’s good or bad behavior." However, since we lack a strict proof of God's existence, we can still fulfill our duties from the motive of duty. if we did know that God exists, then this would undermine our pure moral motivation to do our duty, since we would have an even stronger interest in pleasing God through our good conduct. The effect of undermining our pure moral motivation would be to make us less eligible for divine reward, since God rewards us for doing our duty from the motive of duty

Orientation-Constrained Rectangular Layouts

We construct partitions of rectangles into smaller rectangles from an input consisting of a planar dual graph of the layout together with restrictions on the orientations of edges and junctions of the layout. Such an orientation-constrained layout, if it exists, may be constructed in polynomial time, and all orientation-constrained layouts may be listed in polynomial time per layout.Comment: To appear at Algorithms and Data Structures Symposium, Banff, Canada, August 2009. 12 pages, 5 figure

The Critical Project in Schelling, Tillich and Goodchild

2 Altizer and Tillich repeat a Cartesian trope that lies at the kernel of modernity: beginnings must be destructive; they ... The Critical Project in Schelling, Tillich, and Goodchild Daniel Whistler Radical Apologetics: Paul Tillich and Radical ..

Frege on the Generality of Logical Laws

Frege claims that the laws of logic are characterized by their “generality,” but it is hard to see how this could identify a special feature of those laws. I argue that we must understand this talk of generality in normative terms, but that what Frege says provides a normative demarcation of the logical laws only once we connect it with his thinking about truth and science. He means to be identifying the laws of logic as those that appear in every one of the scientific systems whose construction is the ultimate aim of science, and in which all truths have a place. Though an account of logic in terms of scientific systems might seem hopelessly antiquated, I argue that it is not: a basically Fregean account of the nature of logic still looks quite promising