Understanding Rules of Origin

This paper surveys recent work on the economic effects, both theoretical and empirical, of Rules of Origin (RoO) in a Free Trade Area (FTA).

Conceptually Based Measures of Structural Adaptability

This paper provides definitions and measures of the extent of adaptability of an economy to exogenous changes in product prices, factor availability and technological change. It is argued that flexibility can in general only be defined relative to the exogenous changes that occur. Using a dual approach, measures of flexibility in response to the particular exogenous shock are developed. In addition, a decomposition of the total change in National Income into its component parts including gains due to flexibility or losses due to inflexibility is developed.

Conditional Policies in General Equilibrium

Obtaining lower generalized system of preferences (GSP) tariffs requires meeting costly Rules of Origin (ROOs). Growing coffee in the shade is more costly, but yields a price premium. This paper analyzes the effects of such restrictions in a general equilibrium setting and shows that such policies may have unanticipated effects. It is shown that in a world with capital mobility, the GSP could result in capital outflows rather than inflows and consumer preferences for shade grown coffee end up hurting labor in developing countries. Even small subsidies that are contingent on the use of domestic intermediates can result in specialization in the targeted good. Value added contingent policies can easily lead to multiple equilibria despite the absence of externalities or market imperfections.

Tariffs vs. Quotas with Endogenous Quality

This paper analyzes some aspects of the effects of trade restrictions (such as tariffs, quotas and quality controls) and their desirability when the quantity of the imported good is endogenous, and the foreign producer is a monopolist. It uses a fairly general model based on the work of Spence and Sheshinski. A crucial determinant of the direction of these effects is shown to be the valuation of increments in quality by marginal consumers,relative to that of all consumers on average. A way of comparing infinitesimal equivalent policies is developed and used to compare import equivalent policies. For reasonable characterizations of demand - tariffs are shown to dominate quotas on the basis of their revenue effects alone, while quotas are shown to dominate tariffs on the basis of their quality effects alone. Also, quality controls are shown to dominate both tariffs and quotas on the basis of revenue effects alone for reasonable characterizations of demand. Some special cases are also analyzed, including the case where demand is modelled along the lines of Swan - and only services of the good produced matter to consumers.

The Case of the Vanishing Revenues: Auction Quotas With Oligopoly

This paper examines the effects of auctioning quota licenses when market power exists. The overall conclusion is that with oligopolistic markets, quotas, even when set optimally and with quota licenses auctioned off, are - unlikely to dominate free trade. Moreover, auction quotas only strictly dominate giving away licenses which are competitively traded if the quota is quite restrictive. When there is a foreign duopoly or oligopoly and domestic competition it is shown that such sales of licenses does not raise revenues unless they are quite restrictive. An oligopoly example is explored to study the role of product differentiation, demand conditions and market conditions in determining the value of a license and the welfare effects of auctioning quotas. In this example, auction quotas are always worse than free trade. Finally, when there is a home duopoly and foreign competition, the price of a quota license is shown to be positive when the home and foreign goods are substitutes but to be zero when they are complements.

Protection and the Product Line: Monopoly and Product Quality

Thereare three points made in this paper. The first is that the question concerning choice of a product line by a monopolist is similar in structure to other adverse selection problems -- and can be analyzed in an elementary way by adapting techniques recently developed for such problems. Such an analysis is developed in the first section. The second is that when a foreign monopolist produces a product line, protection will change the composition of the entire product line.The nature of such effects is studied in the second section and this analysis is greatly simplified by the results of the first sectton. In line with empirical work on the subject, quotas are shown to raise the average quality of imports, while the effects of tariffs are ambiguous.The third concerns the possibility of profit shifting protection which is welfare increasing. The welfare consequences of protection are analyzed in the third section, and are shown to depend crucially on the distribution of consumers.

Affirmative Action: One Size Does Not Fit All

This paper identifies a new reason for giving preferences to the disadvantaged using a model of contests. There are two forces at work: the effort effect working against giving preferences and the selection e¤ect working for them. When education is costly and easy to obtain (as in the U.S.), the selection effect dominates. When education is heavily subsidized and limited in supply (as in India), preferences are welfare reducing. The model also shows that unequal treatment of identical agents can be welfare improving, providing insights into when the counterintuitive policy of rationing educational access to some subgroups is welfare improving

Skill Acquisition, Credit Constraints, and Trade

This paper looks at the effect of credit constraints on skill acquisition when agents have heterogeneous abilities and wealth. We use a two factor general equilibrium model and assume credit markets are absent. We explore the effects of trade on factor earnings as well as the evolution of the distribution of income in small and large economies. Our work suggests that developed countries need to ensure access to education when liberalizing trade to ensure they reap the potential gains from trade.

Content Protection and Oligopolistic Interactions

In oligopolistic situations content protection can have unexpected effects as it changes the nature of interactions between input suppliers. With a duoply, it does so in a manner that makes the foreign firm wish to match price increases and decreases of the domestic firm. Domestic input suppliers can therefore lose from such policies, even when set at free trade levels. The relation between input demands, the form of protection, and the degree of substitution between inputs is shown to define the effects of content protection and to provide the basis for understanding who might lobby for protection in different environments.