How Love and Lust Change People’s Perception of Partners and Relationships

Because love is related to thoughts in the distant future and sex triggers thoughts related to the present, based on construal level theory, we propose a link between love and a global processing style as well as a link between lust and a local processing style. These processing styles should further expand to partnership evaluations, partially explaining halo phenomena. In Study 1, college students and senior participants were primed by either imagining a walk with a person they were in love with, or a one-night stand. In Study 2, love and lust were primed subliminally. In all studies, love priming enhanced global, holistic processing and halos, whereas lust priming enhanced local, detail oriented processing and reduced halos. Moreover, in Study 1, temporal distance mediated the effects. Implications for research of moods on processing styles, partner perception, and the distinction between love and lust are discussed

Should I have been more careful or less careless? The comparative nature of counterfactual thoughts alters judgments of their impact

Counterfactual thoughts inherently imply a comparison of a given reality to an alternative state of affairs. Previous research mainly considered consequences of different counterfactual types, namely focus (other vs. self), structure (additive vs. subtractive), and direction (upward vs. downward). The current work investigates whether a ‘more-than’ versus ‘less-than’ comparative nature of counterfactual thoughts alters judgments of their impact. Four experiments demonstrated that self-generated other- (Studies 1 and 3) and self-focused (Study 2) upward counterfactuals are judged more impactful when they entail ‘more-than’ rather than ‘less-than’ comparisons. Judgments include plausibility and persuasiveness, as well as counterfactuals' likelihood to change future behavior and feelings. Self-reported ease of thought generation and (dis)fluency gauged by difficulty in thought generation was similarly affected. This more-less asymmetry reversed in Study 3 for downward counterfactual thoughts, with ‘less-than’ counterfactuals being judged more impactful and easier to generate. Further attesting to the role of ease, when spontaneously generating comparative counterfactuals, participants correctly provided more ‘more-than’ upward counterfactuals, but more ‘less-than’ downward counterfactuals (Study 4). These findings delineate one of the to date few conditions for a reversal of the more-less asymmetry and provide support for a correspondence principle, the simulation heuristic, and thus the role of ease in counterfactual thinking. They suggest that especially ‘more-than’ counterfactuals following negative events, and ‘less-than’ counterfactuals following positive events, are likely to have an important impact on people

When Ignoring Negative Feedback Is Functional:Presenting a Model of Motivated Feedback Disengagement

Contrary to popular belief, negative feedback occasionally hinders performance improvements. Investigations targeting this feedback-performance gap usually rest on two assumptions: (a) Feedback recipients want to improve their performance (have an improvement goal), and (b) feedback recipients engage with the negative feedback. We argue that people sometimes disengage from negative feedback for hedonic-goal attainment (to feel good). To explain such functional feedback disengagement, we conceptualize feedback processing from an emotion-regulation perspective, the model of motivated feedback disengagement. We posit that feedback-induced negative affect may render hedonic goals more salient than improvement goals, motivating emotion regulation. After forming the intention to regulate their emotions, feedback recipients select and implement an emotion-regulation strategy. We consider two common engagement strategies (reappraisal and feedback focus) and two common disengagement strategies (distraction and feedback removal). These strategies differentially impact recipients’ affect and feedback processing. Strategy-, person-, and situation-related factors influence strategy choice. Feedback processing is cyclical and dynamically unfolds over time. The model provides novel directions for future investigations and practical implications for stakeholders in negative-feedback contexts

Having pity on our victims to save ourselves:Compassion reduces self-critical emotions and self-blame about past harmful behavior among those who highly identify with their past self

Previous research has shown that people often separate the present self from past selves. Applying knowledge gained from intergroup research to the interpersonal domain, we argue that the degree to which people identify with their past self (self-identification) influences their reaction when recalling a past event during which they harmed another person. Because they feel close to their past self, we expected this to be threatening for high self-identifiers, and expected them to be motivated to avoid self-critical emotions and blame. Using four meta-analyses, conducted on a set of seven experimental studies, we investigated four ways in which high self-identifiers can distance themselves from the event: by feeling compassion, by taking a third-person rather than first-person perspective, by emphasizing ways in which their present self is different to their past self, and by disidentifying with the past self altogether. We found the strongest interaction effects for compassion: whereas a compassion manipulation increased self-critical emotions and self-blame about the past event for low self-identifiers, it decreased them for high self-identifiers. We argue that this occurs because the other-focused nature of compassion allows high self-identifiers subtly to shift the focus away from their harmful behavior. Our concept of past self-identification had stronger effects than a measure of self-continuity beliefs. It also correlated only moderately with the latter, suggesting they are distinct concepts. Our findings suggest that, ironically, the most effective way to protect the self against reminders of an undesirable past, may be to have compassion for our victims

Face masks reduce emotion-recognition accuracy and perceived closeness

Face masks became the symbol of the global fight against the coronavirus. While face masks’ medical benefits are clear, little is known about their psychological consequences. Drawing on theories of the social functions of emotions and rapid trait impressions, we tested hypotheses on face masks’ effects on emotion-recognition accuracy and social judgments (perceived trustworthiness, likability, and closeness). Our preregistered study with 191 German adults revealed that face masks diminish people’s ability to accurately categorize an emotion expression and make target persons appear less close. Exploratory analyses further revealed that face masks buffered the negative effect of negative (vs. non-negative) emotion expressions on perceptions of trustworthiness, likability, and closeness. Associating face masks with the coronavirus’ dangers predicted higher perceptions of closeness for masked but not for unmasked faces. By highlighting face masks’ effects on social functioning, our findings inform policymaking and point at contexts where alternatives to face masks are needed

Grandiose narcissism shapes counterfactual thinking (and regret):Direct and indirect evidence

Little is known about how individuals high in grandiose narcissism think about what could have been. Across four studies (three online surveys and one online experiment; N = 801), we addressed this gap by examining the relationship between grandiose narcissism, its admiration and rivalry dimensions, and counterfactual thinking and regret. Unlike anticipated, high rivalry was associated with more rather than fewer upward counterfactuals in Study 1. Yet, high rivalry predicted an increased likelihood of generating a downward (vs. upward) counterfactual in a feedback situation (Study 3). Moreover, grandiose narcissism (preliminary study) and admiration (Study 2) negatively correlated with regret. Collectively, our findings stress the importance of considering grandiose narcissism’s dimensions separately and highlight a novel dispositional moderator of counterfactual thinking

Do episodic counterfactual thoughts focus on personally controllable action?:The role of self-initiation

Counterfactual thoughts refer to alternatives to the past. Episodic counterfactual thoughts have in past research been shown to be primarily goal-directed and to engender performance improvement. Some past research supports this perspective with the observation that episodic counterfactuals center mostly on controllable action, whereas other research does not show this. We offer a theoretical resolution for these discrepant findings centering on the role of self-initiation, such that counterfactuals more often focus on internally controllable action to the extent that the circumstance is one that was self-initiated rather than initiated by others. In doing so, we disambiguate two dimensions of causal explanation: locus (self vs. other) and controllability (high vs. low) that previous studies conflated, demonstrating that variation as a function of self-initiation in the content of episodic counterfactuals occurs primarily along the former but not the latter dimension. These results support the functional theory of counterfactual thinking

Empathising with masked targets:Limited side effects of face masks on empathy for dynamic, context-rich stimuli

Multiple studies revealed detrimental effects of face masks on communication, including reduced empathic accuracy and enhanced listening effort. Yet, extant research relied on artificial, decontextualised stimuli, which prevented assessing empathy under more ecologically valid conditions. In this preregistered online experiment (N = 272), we used film clips featuring targets reporting autobiographical events to address motivational mechanisms underlying face mask effects on cognitive (empathic accuracy) and emotional facets (emotional congruence, sympathy) of empathy. Surprisingly, targets whose faces were covered by a mask (or a black bar) elicited the same level of empathy motives (affiliation, cognitive effort), and accordingly, the same level of cognitive and emotional empathy compared to targets with uncovered faces. We only found a negative direct effect of face coverings on sympathy. Additional analyses revealed that older (compared to young) adults showed higher empathy, but age did not moderate face mask effects. Our findings speak against strong negative face mask effects on empathy when using dynamic, context-rich stimuli, yet support motivational mechanisms of empathy