Indignation: Psychology, Politics, Law

Moral intuitions operate in much the same way as other intuitions do; what makes the moral domain is distinctive is its foundations in the emotions, beliefs, and response tendencies that define indignation. The intuitive system of cognition, System I, is typically responsible for indignation; the more reflective system, System II, may or may not provide an override. Moral dumbfounding and moral numbness are often a product of moral intuitions that people are unable to justify. An understanding of indignation helps to explain the operation of the many phenomena of interest to law and politics: the outrage heuristic, the centrality of harm, the role of reference states, moral framing, and the act-omission distinction. Because of the operation of indignation, it is extremely difficult for people to achieve coherence in their moral intuitions. Legal and political institutions usually aspire to be deliberative, and to pay close attention to System II; but even in deliberative institutions, System I can make some compelling demands

Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?

This paper tests the question whether people favor optimal deterrence policies. More particularly, it asks whether people are willing to increase penalties when the probability of detection is low, or to decrease penalties when the probability of detection is high. Two experiments are reported, suggesting that people do not spontaneously think in terms of optimal deterrence, and that people would have objections to policies based on the goal of optimal deterrence. Institutional implications are briefly discussed

Assessing Punitive Damages...

This essay reports and discusses the implications of an experimental study involving punitive damage awards. The study finds that in products liability cases, people's normative judgments (about outrageousness and appropriate punishment) are relatively uniform, at least when measured on a bounded numerical scale (0 to 6). With the unbounded dollar scale, however, outcomes become extremely erratic and unpredictable. Various reform proposals, designed to overcome erratic awards, are discussed, including damage caps, compensatory judgment "multipliers," and conversion formulas based on jury judgments on a bounded numerical scale. Implications are also discussed for many other issues of law and economic valuation, including compensatory damages in such areas as pain and suffering, libel, sexual harassment and other civil rights violations, contingent valuation, and intentional infliction of emtional distress

Predictably Incoherent Judgments

When people make moral or legal judgments in isolation, they produce a pattern of outcomes that they would themselves reject, if only they could see that pattern as a whole. A major reason is that human thinking is category-bound. When people see a case in isolation, they spontaneously compare it to other cases that are mainly drawn from the same category of harms. When people are required to compare cases that involve different kinds of harms, judgments that appear sensible when the problems are considered separately often appear incoherent and arbitrary in the broader context. Another major source of incoherence is what we call the translation problem: The translation of moral judgments into the relevant metrics of dollars and years is not grounded in either principle or intuition, and produces large differences among people.. The incoherence produced by category-bound thinking is illustrated by an experimental study of punitive damages and contingent valuation. We also show how category-bound thinking and the translation problem combine to produce anomalies in administrative penalties. The underlying phenomena have large implications for many topics in law, including jury behavior, the valuation of public goods, punitive damages, criminal sentencing, and civil fines. We consider institutional reforms that might overcome the problem of predictably incoherent judgments. Connections are also drawn to several issues in legal theory, including valuation of life, incommensurability, and the aspiration to global coherence in adjudication

Evaluating a dual-proces model of risk: Affect and cognition as determinants of risky choice

In three studies we addressed the impact of perceived risk and negative affect on risky choice. In Study 1, we tested a model that included both perceived risk and negative affect as predictors of risky choice. Study 2 and Study 3 replicated these findings and examined the impact of affective versus cognitive processing modes. In all the three studies, both perceived risk and negative affect were shown to be significant predictors of risky choice. Furthermore, Study 2 and Study 3 showed that an affective processing mode strengthened the relation between negative affect and risky choice and that a cognitive processing mode strengthened the relation between perceived risk and risky choice. Together, these findings show support for the idea of a dual-process model of risky choice