Pork Versus Public Goods: An Experimental Study of Public Good Provision Within a Legislative Bargaining Framework

We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and particularistic goods. Consistent with the qualitative implications of the model: There is near exclusive public good provision in the pure public good region, in the pure private good region minimum winning coalitions sharing private goods predominate, and in the ‘mixed’ region proposers generally take some particularistic goods for themselves, allocating the remainder to public goods. As in past experiments, proposer ower is not nearly as strong as predicted, resulting in public good provision decreasing in the mixed region as its relative value increases, which is inconsistent with the theory.Legislative Bargaining, Public Goods, Efficiency

Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules

We investigate the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) noncooperative game theoretic bargaining model of legislative equilibrium. Legislative outcomes are sensitive to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be voted on. With a random proposal recognition rule and a closed amendment rule (proposals are voted up or down with no room for amendments) the model predicts no delays in benefit allocation, that benefits will be allocated to a minimal winning coalition, and that benefits within the coalition will be strongly skewed in favor of the proposer. In contrast, with a random proposal recognition rule and an open amendment rule (proposals may be amended before they are voted on) the model predicts delays in benefit allocation, that benefits will be more evenly spread among winning coalition members, and that coalitions need not be restricted to a minimal majority. With experience we find strong qualitative support for the model's predictions: All proposals are passed without delay with the closed rule versus 81% of all proposals with the open rule. Minimal winning coalitions are effectively proposed in 67% of all cases with the closed rule versus 4% with the open rule, and benefits are more evenly distributed with open rule. Quantitative predictions of the model fail however: Most importantly, proposers consistently fail to allocate themselves anything close to what the theory predicts. Further, the probability of immediate acceptance is much higher than predicted in the open rule as proposers consistently expand the winning coalition beyond the model's prediction in attempts to limit amendments. The evolution of play over time is reported (outcomes under both treatments are much more similar early on then later). Tests show that subjects' votes in favor of a proposed allocation are significantly affected by their own share (in the expected direction) but that the distribution of shares across all voters has no significant effect.

Pork Versus Public Goods: An Experimental Study of Public Good Provision Within a Legislative Bargaining Framework

We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and particularistic goods. Consistent with the qualitative implications of the model: there is near exclusive public good provision in the pure public good region, in the pure private good region minimum winning coalitions sharing private goods predominate, and in the "mixed" region proposers generally take some particularistic goods for themselves, allocating the remainder to public goods. As in past experiments, proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted, resulting in public good provision decreasing in the mixed region as its relative value increases, which is inconsistent with the theory

Nonaqueous Gel for the Transdermal Delivery of a DTPA Penta-ethyl Ester Prodrug

Diethylenetriamine pentaacetic acid penta-ethyl ester, designated as C2E5, was successfully incorporated into a nonaqueous gel for transdermal delivery. The thermal and rheological properties of a formulation containing 40% C2E5, 20% ethyl cellulose, and 40% Miglyol 840® prepared using the solvent evaporation method demonstrated that the gel had acceptable content uniformity and flow properties. In vitro studies showed that C2E5 was steadily released from the gel at a rate suitable for transdermal delivery. Topical application of the gel at a 200 mg C2E5/kg dose level in rats achieved significantly higher plasma exposures of several active metabolites compared with neat C2E5 oil at the same dose level. The results suggest that transdermal delivery of a chelator prodrug is an effective radionuclide decorporation strategy by delivering chelators to the circulation with a pharmacokinetic profile that is more consistent with the biokinetic profile of transuranic elements in contaminated individuals

Economics, Psychology, and Social Dynamics of Consumer Bidding in Auctions

With increasing numbers of consumers in auction marketplaces, we highlight some recent approaches that bring additional economic, social, and psychological factors to bear on existing economic theory to better understand and explain consumers' behavior in auctions. We also highlight specific research streams that could contribute towards enriching existing economic models of bidding behavior in emerging market mechanisms.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/47034/1/11002_2005_Article_5901.pd