Not so random after all? – revisiting committee assignments in Dáil Éireann

In this paper, I analyse the allocation of legislators to specialised committees in Dáil Éireann. Committees are privileged decision-making arenas: Committee members have, once assigned, the right and duty to work on issues within their jurisdiction. It is, therefore, important to understand which factors influence the assignment process. In what has been the most thorough analysis hitherto, Hansen [(2011). A random process? Committee assignments in Dail Eireann. Irish Political Studies, 26(3), 345–360] has found very little patterns explaining this process in the Dáil. The study uses the congressional theories of legislative organisation as heuristic devices to deduce several rationales of the assignment process. The role of parliamentary party groups in the assignment process is highlighted. The hypotheses are tested by means of a multiple-membership multilevel model on committee assignments across multiple legislative periods (1992–2011). The results are backed up with evidence from 22 interviews I conducted with Irish legislators. Contradicting earlier assessments of the assignment process, several factors increase the likelihood of being assigned to a committee. There is strong evidence for a reassignment pattern. Additionally, a legislator's occupational background matters in the assignment process. For the ongoing discussion about the applicability of the congressional theories outside of the U.S., my study provides evidence for the usefulness of the U.S. theories.The Institutions of Politics; Design, Workings, and implications ( do not use, ended 1-1-2020

Registration Fees for Same-Sex Unions, Local Party Politics and Societal Demand

This article addresses registration fees for same-sex unions and the number of registered gay couples in the German state of Baden-Württemberg. In contrast to the other 15 German states, in Baden-Württemberg each administrative district decides independently about the level of registration fees. Consequently, there is not only considerable variation of the number of registered gay couples across the individual administrative units, but also among the registration fees, which we seek to explain by relying on theories of public administration, policy analysis and political economy. Our findings show that the varying levels of registration fees for same-sex unions are primarily determined by the preferences of parties in the regional legislative committees. In this way, we can demonstrate that the definition of registration fees is politicised, which contradicts the legal principles of equivalency and cost recovery