International Trade, Union Wage Premia, and Welfare in General Equilibrium

We study how two distinct forms of globalisation, trade cost reductions and opening up of trade in previously shielded sectors, affect sector-specific wages, employment levels and aggregate welfare in a two-country model of general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) with partly unionised labour markets. We find that both forms of globalisation increase union coverage, and they also lead to a lower union wage premium in shielded sectors. In contrast, the union wage premium in open sectors and aggregate welfare are affected differently by the two types of globalisation. Trade cost reductions in open sectors always lead to higher union wage premia and to lower aggregate welfare, while an increased number of open sectors lowers the union wage premium, and it may also increase welfare

European Competition Policy in International Markets

International audienceChanges in the institutional, technological and economic environment raise new challenges to the European competition policy. In this context, it is timely for European authorities to appraise the external dimension of the European competition policy as well as its articulation with current internal reforms. Globalisation can increase the costs of monitoring and seriously reduce the ability of European authorities to tackle cross-border anti-competitive conducts. In addition, conflicts are exacerbated by industrial policy motivations. As it is unlikely that the sole application of the territoriality and extraterritoriality principles to competition rules could yield an optimal international competition system, globalisation calls for higher levels and types of cooperation. Given that bilateral cooperation and especially the implementation of comity principles could be of no value when laws or interests are sources of international conflicts, three main paths could be therefore encouraged: The continuous harmonization of rules through the joint action of OECD and ICN; the higher cooperation in the confidential information exchange; the establishment of global anti-trust institutions. Although WTO is legitimate in judging questions related market access and entry barriers, it is less equipped to assess international hard core cartels or M&A reviews. As a substitute for WTO, a multilevel system, like the EU system, could be promoted. For political and pragmatic reasons, it could be composed in a first step of a hard core of countries like the EU, Japan and the U.S. It could be associated with the creation of an international Court of Justice for competition. In addition to these external reforms, some internal reforms could be required. Competition authorities have to develop further competition advocacy to give a higher priority to competition issues in other EU policies and national regulation. A parallel and complementary reform could consist in making the European competition agency independent from State Members' interference

Comparison Wage in Trade Union Decision Making

The starting point of this paper is the idea that trade unions and individual workers pay attention to wage settlements in similar sectors of the economy. The foundations of this concept can be found in other social sciences and also in the literature of psychological economics. However, it has not received much attention in connection to union decision making. This comparison or reference wage enters the decision making of the union (i.e. the union utility function). In this paper, we employ a union utility function which incorporates this concept. The analysis is conducted in a bargaining framework and the results show the effects on the optimal wage of important variables like comparison wage, unemployment benefit, union power and of the weight that the union places on the comparison wag