The Ripple Effects of Gideon: Recognizing the Human Right to Counsel in Civil Adversarial Proceedings

Procedural fairness and equal protection were the core of Gideon’s reasoning for a right to counsel for indigent criminal defendants. Under the same constitutional values, there should be a right to legal assistance of counsel for indigent civil litigants, especially in adversarial proceedings. This Article outlines the constitutional basis for a civil right to counsel. Further, it stresses the need for legislation to address the massive shortfall in legal representation available to indigent persons in the United States. Recognition of civil Gideon as part of the Constitution’s promise of justice accommodates a moral revolution. It exemplifies a shift in consciousness, rippling beyond the scope of the law and encompassing interpersonal relations

A Demographic Snapshot of America\u27s Federal Judiciary: A Prima Facie Case for Change

Nearly a decade ago, then judge Sonia Sotomayer gave a speech at the U.C. Berkeley Law School and asked a simple question: “What it all will mean to have more women and people of color on the bench?” This article places Justice Sotomayer’s perceptive question in historical context by providing a demographic profile of the gender and race of federal judges confirmed to the bench from September 24, 1789 through January 13, 2011. The paper focuses principally upon federal courts of general jurisdiction, specifically, the Supreme Court, the various Courts of Appeal and the federal district courts. After presenting historical data, the article summarizes some reasons why the Executive Branch and the Senate should conscientiously cooperate to create a more diverse federal judiciary

Reflections on a Law Teaching Career as the Curtain Closes Only to Open Again

Grandmother once said to me, Johnny boy, it ain\u27t as long as it has been. Stated another way, Grandma was telling me that there were not as many years to come in her life as had already passed. In some respects, that\u27s the way it is with one\u27s teaching career. There is a beginning, a middle, and then a something else. I write to briefly share a few personal comments regarding how I am thinking about what happens next in my evolving career. [..

Implications of a Uniracial Worldview: Race and Rights in a New Era

This article begins by asking, What is Race: Some Modem Western Perspectives? Section I surveys race from various vantage points, including views associated with social and natural scientists, jurists, and members of the general public. In short, Section I grapples with what we currently mean when we use the term race. Many people, especially westerners, believe that the human family consists of multiple races. Such thinking flows from and reinforces multi-racial worldviews. Thus, Section II asks: What Does a Multi-racial Worldview Look Like? Here, using graphic symbols we attempt to communicate some sense of what a multi- racial perspective involves. Further, Section II introduces a uniracial worldview and contrasts that worldview with multi-racial worldviews. In preliminary fashion, Section III attempts to point a way out of difficulties generated from many people\u27s adoption of multi-racial worldviews. Specifically, Section III urges jurists and other policy makers (especially in the United States but also in sister nation states) to adopt a uniracial analysis in their decision making processes. Section III also outlines transformative possibilities of a uniracial worldview in the context of majoritarian public policy decision making, concerns about international human rights (including the innocuous subject of affirmative action), and interpersonal communications. Section IV furnishes concluding thoughts on the historic challenges and opportunities presented by a uniracial approach

Modern Sappers and Miners: The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts and the Civil Rights Act of 1964

this article is organized as follows. To orient readers on what is at stake, Section I provides a brief overview of the substantive provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section II considers reasons why the Act was premised on Congress\u27 Commerce Clause authority rather than the enforcement power that the Constitution confers upon Congress under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Section III evaluates several recent Supreme Court decisions that give the Commerce Clause a restrictive interpretation. For illustrative purposes, this section explores the impact on Title Two of the Act. Finally, the article closes with a few observations of the implications of the Roberts\u27 Court jurisprudential approach in the ACA case