History and Computerization of the Kent State University Herbarium

Author Institution: Department of Biological Sciences, Kent State UniversityHerbarium specimens are useful resources in documenting the botanical component of the earth's biological diversity. The Kent State University Herbarium (KE) contains 63,000 specimens of vascular plants. Ohio specimens, most collected since I960, constitute 80% of the total. The herbarium is currently being computerized in order to facilitate retrieval of information from the specimens and from their labels and to realize other advantages in herbarium-related work. Specimen data are being stored in a computer information retrieval system using dBASE HI PLUS. The data are assembled in individual family database files, each file record comprising 24 fields of information. A program has been designed so that the printout of the fields resembles an herbarium specimen label. At present, data for all the pteridophytes, gymnosperms, and monocotyledons have been entered into 63 family files. When computerization of the dicotyledons is completed later in the decade, the database will consist of ca. 220 family files. The database provides an itemized inventory of the collection as well as ready, organized data for a variety of research areas, especially those focused on environmental change and on the preservation of biological diversity

Marcus Plant

A Tribute to Marcus Plan

Farnsworth: Introduction to the Legal System of the United States

A Review of Introduction to the Legal System of the United States By Allan Farnsworth

The Court, The Legislature, and Governmental Tort Liability in Michigan

In 1961, when Justice Edwards of the Michigan supreme court said, From this date forward the judicial doctrine of governmental immunity from ordinary torts no longer exists in Michigan, he went on to say that he was eliminating from the law of Michigan an ancient rule inherited from the days of absolute monarchy, a whim of long-dead kings. Justice Carr, dissenting, agreed that the doctrine in question came to us as a part of the common law, for which reason he thought it was protected by the reception clause of the Constitution of 1850 from the overruling action of the court. If the learned justices had looked more closely, they would have discovered that their statements were not historically accurate. The doctrine of governmental immunity, as it has been known in recent years that is, the rule that governmental entities are immune from tort liability for the acts of their employees whenever the injury--causing activity is governmental in nature or involves the performance of a governmental function --is not, so far as the law of Michigan is concerned, ancient. It did not exist in 1850 and therefore can scarcely have come to us as part of the common law or by inheritance from monarchs, absolute or otherwise. Rather it was imported into the law of Michigan in the first two decades of the twentieth century by a generation of judges and lawyers who found it easier to read about the law in Judge Dillon\u27s treatise on municipal corporations than to track down their own legal heritage. The instruments with which the justices of the Michigan supreme court in its salad days operated upon problems of municipal tort liability were products of their own environment and experience, bore little resemblance to the blunt instrument of later years-- governmental function -- and had almost nothing to do with the divine right of kings

Llewellyn: The Common Law Tradition- Deciding Appeals

A Review of The Common Law Tradition- Deciding Appeals. By Karl N. Llewellyn

CORPORATIONS-DERIVATIVE STOCKHOLDERS\u27 SUITS-STANDING OF SUBSEQUENT TRANSFEREE OF TAINTED SHARES

In a derivative suit the plaintiff, a minority stockholder, sought an accounting by officers and directors for salaries he alleged they had illegally caused the corporation to pay to themselves. The defendants\u27 answer averred that all the alleged wrongful acts complained of occurred before the plaintiff acquired his stock, and that his vendor had acquiesced. It appeared from the record that the plaintiff\u27s vendor had been an officer in the corporation prior to the time when the payments complained of occurred; that during his incumbency he had himself received payments similar to those in question, and that at a stockholders\u27 meeting, subsequent to the payments to the defendants, but prior to the assignment of his stock to the plaintiff, he had suggested that the directors\u27 salaries be increased. The trial court dismissed the case for want of equity. On appeal, held, affirmed. Russell v. Louis Melind Co., (Ill. App. Ct. 1947) 72 N.E. (2d) 869

The Rule of Law and the Judicial Process

An anecdote which I believe I recall from one of Professor Brogan\u27s ·writings concerns a conversation between the archbishop and the chief justice about the relative importance of their respective powers. After the conversation had continued for some time the archbishop sought to administer the coup de grâce. I have the advantage of you, your lordship, because you see, in the long run, the most you can say to a man is, \u27You shall be hanged!\u27 whereas it is within the functions of my office to say, \u27You shall be damned!\u27 To this, after a moment of thought, the chief justice replied, Yes, your worship, your point is persuasive. But you overlook one matter. In the long run, if, I say \u27You shall be hanged,- you will be hanged

WILLS--MERGER OF ANNUITY FOR LIFE IN RESIDUE WHICH PASSED BY INTESTACY

Testator made several pecuniary bequests, including an annuity to his daughter of $25 per month for life. The residue was bequeathed to charity, but this gift failed, and it went instead, by intestacy, to the daughter and a granddaughter. The latter, objecting to a plan of distribution proposed by the auditor, petitioned for immediate payment to herself of one-half of the entire estate, contending that the daughter\u27s annuity merged in her intestate share. The Orphans\u27 Court dismissed the petition, and decreed that$12,831.44 of the estate of $32,831.44 be retained to carry out the testator\u27s delayed bequests, including the annuity, and that the balance of$20,000 be paid to the two distributees in equal shares. On appeal, held, affirmed. In re Yeisley\u27s Estate, (Pa. 1948) 56 A. (2d) 205

TAXATION-TRUST INCOME-TAXABILITY TO PERSON OTHER THAN SETTLOR ON BASIS OF UNFETTERED COMMAND

Petitioner\u27s father, who owned the entire capital stock of a manufacturing corporation, bequeathed a controlling interest therein to his wife and son, in equal shares. The widow transferred her shares in trust to a corporate trustee, the evident purpose being to vest in the son, petitioner here, the power to control the corporation. According to the terms of the trust the income was to be accumulated and added to the corpus for the joint lives of the settlor and petitioner, and after death of settlor to be disposed of according to the directions of petitioner. The shares were to be retained and voting control maintained in the family after petitioner\u27s death, but this clause he later changed to provide for distribution at his death. Overriding all these provisions were the following powers given to the petitioner: (1) absolute power to modify or amend, including power to change beneficiaries and appoint to himself; (2) power to withdraw any part or all of the corpus, or revoke the trust and appropriate the trust property to himself; (3) control over all dealings in the stock by the trustee, and over the voting of the stock by the trustee; (4) power to remove the trustee. At no time during the existence of the trust had any of the income or principal been distributed to any person, and the income tax had been paid by the trustee on a fiduciary return. The Tax Court sustained the commissioner\u27s contention that the income was taxable to petitioner under section 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code, the theory being that his powers over the trust property amounted to ownership of the income. The facts that the purpose of the settlor had been to preserve management of the family corporation rather than to bestow economic benefits on petitioner, and that the latter had exercised none of his powers over the income, were not significant. On appeal, held, affirmed. Bunting v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 6th, 1947) 164 F. (2d) 443