A false promise of political stability in Nepal?

Contrary to the Left Alliance's campaign pledge, it is unlikely that the new government will deliver a new level of political stability to Nepal. There are four reasons why, writes Julia Strasheim

A looming credibility crisis? assessing the EU’s role as a peacebuilding power in the aftermath of Covid-19

The Covid-19 outbreak has put many of the EU’s foreign policy objectives on hold. However, as Julia Strasheim writes, the pandemic is not the only obstacle to boosting the European Union’s role as a global peacebuilding power. The bigger structural hurdle is democratic decline within its own borders, and the implications this has for the EU’s credibility abroad

No 'end of the peace process': Federalism and ethnic violence in Nepal

How does the reform of territorial state structures shape prospects for peace after war? Existing research on the institutional causes of peace often focuses on how institutional designs, as the outcomes of reform processes, reduce post-war violence and promote peace. The literature does less frequently address how the politics that characterise reform processes affect the legitimacy of institutions and whether or not violent protest ultimately takes place: this risks omitting key explanations of how institutional reforms contribute to peace and the mechanisms by which this occurs. By examining the case of Nepal, where clashes between protesters and security forces over constitutional provisions for federalism have killed more than 60 people since August 2015, this study shows that three factors of the territorial reform process contributed to the onset of post-war ethnic violence. These included: (1) elite control of decision-making; (2) tight deadlines that promoted backtracking on previous commitments; and (3) the embedding of single territorial reforms in a 'concert' of institutional reforms that, as a whole, sparked fear of discrimination among ethnic minorities

A looming credibility crisis? Assessing the EU’s role as a peacebuilding power after COVID-19

The COVID-19 outbreak has put many of the EU’s foreign policy objectives on hold. However, as Julia Strasheim writes, the pandemic is not the only obstacle to boosting the European Union’s role as a global peacebuilding power. The bigger structural hurdle is democratic decline within its own borders, and the implications this has for the EU’s credibility abroad

Interim Governments: Short-Lived Institutions for Long-Lasting Peace

After the uprising against President Yanukovych, Ukraine’s opposition convened an interim government to pave the way for elections in May 2014. This year also saw interim governments put in place in the Central African Republic and Thailand. Meanwhile, peace talks in South Sudan came to a standstill in October 2014 because parties were unable to agree on the role of the prime minister in an interim government. Interim governments are often installed during peace processes, and policy makers tend to portray them as magic bullets that are capable of resolving all forms of violent conflict and promoting postconflict democracy. Their record, however, is mixed. This is partly because policy makers focus on distributing interim government seats among conflict parties. It is just as vital, though, to ensure that interim governments implement crucial reforms and integrate civil society in decision-making processes. Postconflict interim governments are set up to organize elections, conduct institutional reforms, and facilitate conflict resolution. They are particularly common in sub-Saharan Africa, where they have been installed after over 60 percent of armed conflicts. The record shows that power-sharing interim governments, such as in Liberia, and international interim governments, such as in Kosovo, are most successful in advancing peace and democracy. Among the most vital reforms interim governments need to implement is the integration of the parallel institutions that warring parties maintain during armed conflict. As long as parties retain control over military structures or shadow administrations, they will possess the resources to return to fighting. How interim governments are perceived by the broader public is also important. Including civil society in decision making, such as when drafting a new electoral law, increases the acceptance of reforms

Nepal's quest for federalism: a driver of new violence

EU and German policymakers often promote federalism as a means to strengthen peace in societies emerging from civil war. In Nepal, however, the 2015 constitution which restructured the country to make it a federal republic has become a driver of new violence. This contribution argues that it is not only the substance of the federalist law that has inspired unrest, but also the manner in which it was introduced. Constitutional provisions stipulating geography-based federalism in Nepal sparked protests among Madhesis and Tharus that killed 57 people and stalled imports of petroleum and earthquake relief material from India from September 2015 to February 2016. The Madhesis and Tharus feel that the federalist law further discriminates against them and are demanding the delineation of federal units according to identity. While the constitution was initially perceived as a major breakthrough in the frequently stalled peace process with former Maoist rebels, the Madhesi and Tharu protests represent a new escalation in a long-polarised debate. Three factors have contributed to the violent escalation of the protests: (1) the dominance in the public debate of hill-upper-caste groups at the expense of marginalised groups; (2) the concurrence of the federalist reform with other institutional reforms that, as a whole, have sparked fears of discrimination among Madhesis and Tharus; and (3) increasing involvement on the part of China and India, which is further polarising the government and the marginalised groups. The example of Nepal reflects and accentuates the recent debate on post-war institutional reform – that is, that reforms have joint effects on peace rather than working in isolation. Policy Implications Policymakers must ensure that a future solution to minority demands in Nepal is identified based on dialogue that includes minorities to a larger extent; any elite proposition could lead to new unrest. Nepal also demonstrates that subnational and national institutional reforms as a whole can ease or exacerbate minority fears. Donors should pay attention to such interaction rather than limiting projects to one policy field

Interim Governments and the Stability of Peace

After intrastate armed conflict, what properties of interim governments increase the stability of post-interim peace? Previous research on interim governments has often relied on evidence gathered through under-theorized and non-comparative case studies, making findings difficult to generalize. The literature also tends to concentrate on studying the institutional designs of interim governments as explanatory variables, while neglecting the variety of reforms such governments implement. To address these shortcomings, this dissertation develops a bargaining model on how interim governments increase the stability of post-interim peace by mitigating credible commitment problems of warring parties. This bargaining model theorizes that both the institutional designs of interim governments – whether or not they include power-sharing arrangements for the warring parties, as well as whether or not international actors assume political authority during interim rule – as well as their reform processes affect the stability of post-interim peace. It argues for two reform processes in particular. First, it holds that interim governments that implement reforms to integrate the parallel political and military institutions of warring parties (such as shadow governments and non-statutory armed forces) should increase the stability of peace. Second, it argues that interim governments that allow for the participation of unarmed actors in reform processes – such as civil society representatives – should increase the stability of post-interim peace. The dissertation tests these hypotheses by using a mixed-method research design that combines statistical survival analysis with process-tracing in and a comparative analysis of three case studies. In the quantitative analysis, it relies on a novel data set of a sample of all interim governments that followed at least one year of intrastate armed conflict since 1989, and that terminated by 2012. The qualitative case studies, selected under a most-similar system design, include the interim governments of Nepal (2006-2008), Angola (1991-1992), and Cambodia (1991-1993). In sum, results from both quantitative and qualitative analyses show that the reforms implemented by interim governments provide for a better explanation for long-term peace as compared to the institutional designs of such governments. In particular, the dissertation finds strongest support for hypothesis H3 on the integration of parallel political and military institutions into the authority of interim governments. The dissertation concludes by discussing policy implications and avenues for future research

Fleeing the peace: emigration after civil war

Flight and emigration often continue despite the formal termination of war and significant international peace-building efforts because the international community often fails to address the root causes of flight and migration. Donors primarily aim at mitigating the direct consequences of war and pacifying elite groups rather than delivering peace dividends that benefit the broader population. The decision to flee during peacetime often closely relates to structural problems. Where peace is reduced to the mere absence of war and is of low quality, it is difficult to overcome major social cleavages. Thus the reasons for emigration persist. Three factors shape the quality of peace across specific contexts: (i) the level of violence beyond the recurrence of war, (ii) the degree of access to justice and political participation beyond a formal change of the political regime, and (iii) the generation of social and economic prospects and social mobi lity. Nepal and El Salvador are illustrative examples of the interplay of these factors at the interface between state and society. In these countries, state repression and other forms of violence persist, the political system is dominated by traditional elites or those that fought the war, and youths and former combatants lack prospects for the future. Policy Implications International actors need to adapt their strategies in post-war societies in a way that they support the broader population and not just the interests of the elite. While the termination of war and the introduction of democratisation might be first steps in this direction, they alone do not automatically lead to sustainable quality peace

Provincial autonomy: the territorial dimension of peace in Mozambique

A year after the 2014 national elections Mozambican security forces began increasing the pressure on Renamo, the main opposition party and former guerrilla movement, to disarm. Following several attacks on his entourage since September, Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama has gone into hiding. On 19 November the Mozambican president and leader of the ruling Frelimo party, Filipe Nyusi, called for "restraint" in disarming Renamo – thereby exposing an unusual degree of friction between the more radical wing and the moderates within Frelimo. The resurgence of violent conflict in Mozambique in 2013/14 raised new doubts about the country’s peace and democratisation process. After a strong showing at the 2014 national elections, Renamo began demanding autonomy for those provinces in which it won majorities. The governing Frelimo party has rejected these demands. Renamo presidential candidate and former civil war combatant Afonso Dhlakama won 37 against Filipe Nyusi’s 57 per cent of the popular vote – to the surprise of many and amid allegations of fraud. Governing Frelimo have since been in negotiations with Renamo but have rejected calls for Renamo’s participation in government. Since Filipe Nyusi took presidential office in January 2015, Renamo has repeatedly called for subnational autonomy in six provinces with significant opposition support. Although Mozambican provinces are administered by centrally nominated governors, direct elections in 53 mostly urban municipalities allow for some degree of subnational autonomy. A donor-funded decentralisation process since the late 1990s has also contributed to both the deconcentration of power and some devolution. Comparative research on territorial autonomy arrangements suggests that such pacts can be a tool for sustainable peace, but that territorial deals should be embedded in broader institutional reforms in order to be a viable so lution to conflict