The Status of Women Economists in the U.S. — and the World

This paper gives an overview of the current (and recent past) status of women economists in the United States and describes what American economists have done to promote gender equality in the economics profession. Initiatives include in large part what the American Economic Association, through its Committee on the Status of Women in the Economics Profession has done. It also discusses the creation and subsequent activities of the International Association for Feminist Economics and the activities of several other groups and committees recently formed in other parts of the world. It closes by considering what needs to be done worldwide to improve the status and increase the participation of women in the economics profession.academic labor markets, economics profession, women in economics

Do Women and Non-economists Add Diversity to Research in Industrial Relations and Labor Economics?

We examine whether interdisciplinary collaboration and the gender diversity of a profession affect scholarly research practices. Our analysis of four industrial relations and labor economics journals shows that decisions to exclude women and minorities, and to use gender or race as explanatory variables, are influenced by authors' gender and disciplinary training. Woman authors are less likely to exclude women from their sample, and non-economists are less likely to exclude women and minorities. While noneconomists are generally less likely to model gender and race explicitly in their empirical work, their statistical methods become more elaborate when they collaborate with economists.Economics Journals; Economics; Economists; Gender; Journals; Labor Economics; Minorities; Women

Affirmative Action in America: Procedures and Outcomes

Paper Prepared for the International Conference for Promoting Equal Employment Opportunity for Women. April 23, 2008

Revisiting The Bell Curve Debate Regarding the Effects of Cognitive Ability on Wages

In The Bell Curve, Herrnstein and Murray (1994) claim, based on evidence from cross-sectional regressions, that differences in wages in the U.S. labor market are predominantly explained by general intelligence. Cawley, Heckman, and Vytlacil (1999), using evidence from random effects panel regressions, reject this claim, in part because returns to general intelligence vary by racial and gender subgroups in their results. In this article, we examine the regression methods used by both sides of the debate and conclude that neither is the appropriate method to analyze the NLSY data that both use. We introduce the Hausman-Taylor estimator to obtain consistent estimated coefficients on the time-invariant general intelligence-related variables and also extend the analysis up through 2002. While many additional socio-economic factors are important explanatory variables in determining the wage rate, the effect of general intelligence on wages is larger in the Hausman-Taylor specification for the 1979-1994 panel than in either the cross-sectional or random effects models, though it becomes statistically insignificant for the 1994-2002 panel. The Hausman-Taylor analysis also indicates no significantly different returns to intelligence by race or gender group.wages, cognitive ability, education

Earnings Inequality Within and Across Gender, Racial, and Ethnic Groups in Latin America

Latin American countries are generally characterized as displaying high income and earnings inequality overall along with high inequality by gender, race, and ethnicity. However, the latter phenomenon is not a major contributor to the former phenomenon. Using household survey data from four Latin American countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, and Guyana), we demonstrate (using Theil index decompositions as well as Gini indices, and 90/10 and 50/10 percentile comparisons) that within-group inequality rather than betweengroup inequality is the main contributor to overall inequality. Mlti-stage simulations in which the relatively disadvantaged gender and/or racial/ethnic group is treated more and more as if it were the relatively advantaged group tend to reduce overall inequality measures only slightly and in some cases have the effect of increasing inequality measures.earnings inequality, income inequality, gender, race, and ethnicity differences

Earnings inequality within and across gender, racial, and ethnic groups in four Latin American Countries

Latin American countries are generally characterized as displaying highincome and earnings inequality overall along with high inequality by gender, race, and ethnicity. However, the latter phenomenon is not a major contributor to the former phenomenon. Using household survey data from four Latin American countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, and Guyana) for which stratification by race or ethnicity is possible, this paper demonstrates (using Theil index decompositions as well as Gini indices, and 90/10 and 50/10 percentile comparisons) that within-group earnings inequality rather than between-group earnings inequality is the main contributor to overall earnings inequality. Simulations in which the relatively disadvantaged gender and/or racial/ethnic group is treated as if it were the relatively advantaged group tend to reduce overall earnings inequality measures only slightly and in some cases have the effect of increasing earnings inequality measures.Access to Finance,,Gender and Development,Inequality,Gender and Law

Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor

A customary gender division of labor is one in which women and men are directed towards certain tasks and/or explicitly prohibited from performing others. We offer an explanation as to why the gender division of labor is so often enforced by custom, and why customary gender divisions of labor generally involve both direction and prohibition. Our model builds on the literature on the marital hold-up problem, and considers both problems in choice of specialty and human capital acquisition in a framework in which agents learn a variety of skills and must search for a marriage partner on the marriage market. We show that wasteful behavior may emerge due to strategic incentives in career choice and human capital acquisition, and that both problems may be mitigated through the customary gender division of labor. We find, however, that a gender division of labor is not Pareto-improving; one gender is made worse off. Both the distributional effects and welfare gains to a customary gender division of labor decrease as opportunities to exchange in markets increase.

A Human Capital-Based Theory of Post Marital Residence Rules

In pre-modern societies the residence of a newly-wedded couple is often decided by custom. We formulate a theory of optimal post-marital residence rules based on contracting problems created by the nature of pre-marriage human capital investments. We argue that a fixed post-marital residence rule may mitigate a hold-up problem by specifying marriage terms and limiting possibilities for renegotiation; the trade-off is that the rule may prohibit beneficial renegotiation of post-marital location. A point of interest of our approach is that the magnitude and direction of transfers accompanying marriage are endogenous. We apply our theoretical results to understanding cross-cultural post-marital residence patters. We find some predictive ability in variables related to outside options, control over the environment, and potential degree of social control.Marriage, Bargaining, Hold-up Problem, Dowry, Bride-Price

A Human Capital-Based Theory of Post-Marital Residence Rules

In pre-modern societies the residence of a newly-wedded couple is often decided by custom. While researchers have analyzed factors leading to particular post-marital residence patterns, no one has explained why a society should have a customary rule in the first place. Our theory stems from contracting problems created by the nature of pre-marriage human capital investments. We argue that a fixed post-marital residence rule may solve a hold-up problem by specifying marriage terms and limiting possibilities for renegotiation; the trade-off is the rule may prohibit beneficial renegotiation of post-marital location. We compare alternative residence rules (or lack thereof) under different degrees of location specificity of human capital and environmental uncertainty. We apply our theoretical results to Murdock's (1967) 862-society data set, augmented with climate data. We find some predictive ability in variables related to outside options, control over the environment, and potential degree of social control.

Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor

A customary gender division of labor is one in which women and men are directed towards certain tasks and/or explicitly prohibited from performing others. We offer an explanation as to why the gender division of labor is so often enforced by custom, and why customary gender divisions of labor generally involve both direction and prohibition. Our model builds on the literature on the marital hold-up problem, and considers both problems in choice of specialty and human capital acquisition in a framework in which agents learn a variety of skills and then enter the marriage market. We show that wasteful behavior may emerge due to strategic incentives in career choice and human capital acquisition, and that both problems may be mitigated through the customary gender division of labor. We find, however, that a gender division of labor is not Pareto-improving; one gender is made worse off. Both the distributional effects and welfare gains of a customary gender division of labor decrease as opportunities to exchange in markets increase.earnings inequality, income inequality, gender, race, and ethnicity differences