Behavioral modulation of the coexistence between Apis melifera and Varroa destructor: A defense against colony colapse disorder?

Colony Collapse Disorder has become a global problem for beekeepers and for the crops which depend on bee polination. Multiple factors are known to increase the risk of colony colapse, and the ectoparasitic mite Varroa destructor that parasitizes honey bees is among the main threats to colony health. Although this mite is unlikely to, by itself, cause the collapse of hives, it plays an important role as it is a vector for many viral diseases. Such diseases are among the likely causes for Colony Collapse Disorder. The effects of V. destructor infestation are disparate in different parts of the world. Greater morbidity - in the form of colony losses - has been reported in colonies of European honey bees (EHB) in Europe, Asia and North America. However, this mite has been present in Brasil for many years and yet there are no reports of Africanized honey bee (AHB) colonies losses. Studies carried out in Mexico showed that some resistance behaviors to the mite - especially grooming and hygienic behavior - appear to be different in each subspecies. Could those difference in behaviors explain why the AHB are less susceptible to Colony Collapse Disorder? In order to answer this question, we propose a mathematical model of the coexistence dynamics of these two species, the bee and the mite, to analyze the role of resistance behaviors in the overall health of the colony, and, as a consequence, its ability to face epidemiological challenges

Relational Human Rights Responsibility

When a private corporation cooperates with States as well as international organizations, and conduct stemming from this cooperation results in international human rights violations, who can be held legally responsible? This Article dissects systemic deficiencies in the traditionally state-centric human rights regime and challenges its inadequacies when dealing with contemporary forms of transnational cooperative governance. Transnational cooperative governance refers to modes of cooperation in which States, and different non- State actors work together in addressing transnational concerns that cannot be adequately regulated by any one of these actors alone. Using border management cooperation between HawkEye 360, the European Union, and its Member States as an illustration, this Article argues that in situations of cooperative governance— involving private corporations, international organizations, and States—legal responsibility for unlawful human rights conduct under the contemporary human rights regime cannot be apportioned effectively among the implicated parties. The diffusion of unlawful conduct between the implicated parties obfuscates whether primary human rights violations have occurred and how— if at all—secondary rules apply. This makes it hard to establish which actors committed a wrong capable of triggering an obligation of reparations for individual victims under international human rights law. For this reason, individual victims are ultimately left without an effective judicial remedy. To eliminate this gap in responsibility, the Article advances “Relational Human Rights Responsibility” as an alternative or complementary approach to the international human rights regime in apportioning responsibility between actors involved in transnational cooperative governance. This theoretically grounded but ultimately policy- and litigation-oriented alternative is applicable beyond the sphere of border management and designed to safeguard the relevance of international human rights law for other forms of transnational cooperative governance implicating private transnational corporations, international organizations, and States

VICS in Ethiopia

Nurse, Midwife, Clinic Supervisor Says Goodby