Developing countries and the future of the Kyoto Protocol

Developing countries will need to be involved if a future international agreement is to be effective in slowing climate change. Under the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period (2008-12), developing countries have not got emissions targets, and the United States have opted out. Whether the Kyoto Protocol will live and have ‘teeth’ in future depends on negotiations which are due to formally begin in 2005. Current conflicting positions between developing countries, the United States, and Europe appear entrenched, but progress could be made towards cooperation if developing countries’ interests are paid heed and a balance on equity issues is achieved. This paper interprets some of the politics and economics surrounding developing country participation in international climate policy, including future emissions targets, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and adaptation to climate change.Climate policy, Kyoto Protocol, international environmental negotiations, developing countries.

Comparing the Copenhagen emissions targets

Following the Copenhagen climate Accord, developed and developing countries have pledged to cut their greenhouse gas emissions, emissions intensity or emissions relative to baseline. This analysis puts the targets for the major countries on a common footing, and compares them across different metrics. Targeted changes in absolute emissions differ markedly between countries, with continued strong increases in some developing countries but significant decreases in others including Indonesia, Brazil and South Africa, provided reasonable baseline projections are used. Differences are smaller when emissions are expressed in per capita terms. Reductions in emissions intensity of economies implicit in the targets are remarkably similar across developed and developing countries, with China's emissions intensity target spanning almost the same range as the implicit intensity reductions in the United States, EU, Japan, Australia and Canada. Targeted deviations from business-as-usual are also remarkably similar across countries, and the majority of total global reductions relative to baselines may originate from China and other developing countries. The findings suggest that targets for most major countries are broadly compatible in important metrics, and that while the overall global ambition falls short of a two degree trajectory, the targets by key developing countries including China can be considered commensurate in the context of what developed countries have pledged.Copenhagen Accord, emissions targets, emissions intensity, business-as-usual, cross-country comparison., Environmental Economics and Policy, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Quantifying uncertainties for emission targets

What is the magnitude of uncertainties about future greenhouse gas emissions, GDP and emissions intensity of economies? Is there a link between fluctuations in economic activity and fluctuations in emissions? These questions are crucial to understand the extent and composition of cost uncertainty under emissions trading schemes, the degree to which it can be reduced by mechanism design options such asintensity targets, and for calibrating models of emissions trading under uncertainty.This paper provides empirical analyses, using historical emissions data in forecast models and in country-level analysis over time. The results indicate that uncertainty about future energy sector CO2 emissions and emissions intensity is greater than uncertainty about future GDP; that uncertainties are greater in non-OECD than in OECD countries; and that there is a strong positive correlation between fluctuations in GDP and fluctuations in CO2 emissions, but not in all cases and not outside the energy sector.Uncertainty; greenhouse gas emissions; GDP; emissions intensity; intensity targets; forecasting.Uncertainty; greenhouse gas emissions; GDP; emissions intensity; intensity

Electricity Generation in Fiji: Assessing the Impact of Renewable Technologies on Costs and Financial Risk

In recent years, renewable energy technologies have been advocated in Fiji on the basis that they improve energy security and serve as a risk-mitigation measure against oil price volatility. Despite this, there have been few attempts to measure the impact of renewable technologies on energy security. That analysis is important if the benefits of renewable energy technologies in Fiji are to be adequately evaluated. This paper develops and applies a method for assessing the potential contribution of renewable technologies to the security of electricity supply in Fiji. The method is based on an application of portfolio theory, traditionally used in financial markets, to the electricity generation mix in Fiji. The results demonstrate the impact of different renewable technologies on both portfolio generation cost and risk for Fijian electricity grids.renewable energy technologies, energy policy, electricity sector, Fiji, oil prices, portfolio analysis, Pacific islands, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Price Floors for Emissions Trading

Price floors in greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes can have advantages for technological innovation, price volatility, and management of cost uncertainty, but implementation has potential pitfalls. We argue that the best mechanism for implementing a price floor is to have firms pay an extra fee or tax. This has budgetary advantages and is more compatible with international permit trading than alternative approaches that dominate the academic and policy debate. The fee approach can also be used to implement more general hybrid approaches to emissions pricing.Price Floor, Price Ceiling, Carbon Tax, Emissions Trading, Carbon Pricing, Price and Quantity Controls, Waxman-Markey Bill

The Asian currency crises: lessons for an early warning system

No abstract provide

A better Kyoto: options for flexible commitments

A 'new Kyoto', called for by the Australian government, may well be based on cap-and-trade, but with significant changes. Under the old Kyoto, broad participation and meaningful commitments were difficult to achieve - in part because of uncertainty about compliance costs and the dichotomy between countries with targets and those without. This policy brief examines options for making greenhouse gas commitments under a 'New Kyoto' more flexible: intensity targets, sectoral targets, non-binding targets, permit price caps, and linking targets with commitments for technology development. We also touch on market-based options outside the target-based paradigm.new Kyoto, compliance costs, greenhouse gas commitments

Adaptor of last resort? An economic perspective on the government’s role in adaptation to climate change

Abstract Individuals and societies have always adapted to change, whether catastrophic or slow onset. Over the last two centuries, however, governments have significantly extended their role as ultimate social manager of risk.  It is as yet unclear whether, how, or to what extent governments will add adaptation to climate change to their portfolio of responsibilities.  This report investigates this question on the basis of review and analysis of economic and policy thinking on the issues, and by using a new dataset on the 2011 Brisbane flood. Uncertainties about the future impacts of climate change obviate definitive conclusions about future adaptation actions and insights for specific situations cannot be generalised.  Economic precepts suggest that governments should limit intervention to cases of genuine market failure, such as the provision of information on likely impacts of climate change including at the local level, or to support for people affected by uninsurable events.  But any role as ‘insurer of last resort’ needs to be circumscribed by rigorous social cost-benefit analysis to ensure that government intervention is beneficial, in the context of the need to adapt to climatic changes.  Although the phenomenon of ‘government failure’ is generally ignored in the adaptation literature (and often by policy makers), it too can stymie efficient adaptation.  A standard justification for government intervention is market failure, including misperception of risk by individuals and businesses.  We use Brisbane property prices before and after the January 2011 flood, as well as property-level flood risk information to test the hypothesis that buyers do not accurately perceive the risk of riverine flooding.  The results indicate that buyers do take risk into account, and even discriminate between zones of differing flood risk.  The concepts of ‘government as insurer of last resort’ and ‘government as insurer of first resort’ as alternative forms of intervention in markets are examined with a view to disambiguation.  In contrast to much current thinking in academic and government circles, we conclude that the government should not act as an ‘adaptor of first or last resort’.  Rather, government can best contribute to efficient adaptation by reducing the economic costs and institutional barriers to adaptation faced by individuals and organisations.Comprehensive micro-economic reform, and the promotion of institutional flexibility are potential ‘no regrets’ strategies because they will also promote economic growth and welfare.Please cite as: Dobes, L, Jotzo, F, Doupé, P 2013 Adaptor of last resort? An economic perspective on the Government’s role in adaptation to climate change, National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility, Gold Coast, pp. 81.Individuals and societies have always adapted to change, whether catastrophic or slow onset. Over the last two centuries, however, governments have significantly extended their role as ultimate social manager of risk.  It is as yet unclear whether, how, or to what extent governments will add adaptation to climate change to their portfolio of responsibilities.  This report investigates this question on the basis of review and analysis of economic and policy thinking on the issues, and by using a new dataset on the 2011 Brisbane flood. Uncertainties about the future impacts of climate change obviate definitive conclusions about future adaptation actions and insights for specific situations cannot be generalised.  Economic precepts suggest that governments should limit intervention to cases of genuine market failure, such as the provision of information on likely impacts of climate change including at the local level, or to support for people affected by uninsurable events.  But any role as ‘insurer of last resort’ needs to be circumscribed by rigorous social cost-benefit analysis to ensure that government intervention is beneficial, in the context of the need to adapt to climatic changes.  Although the phenomenon of ‘government failure’ is generally ignored in the adaptation literature (and often by policy makers), it too can stymie efficient adaptation.  A standard justification for government intervention is market failure, including misperception of risk by individuals and businesses.  We use Brisbane property prices before and after the January 2011 flood, as well as property-level flood risk information to test the hypothesis that buyers do not accurately perceive the risk of riverine flooding.  The results indicate that buyers do take risk into account, and even discriminate between zones of differing flood risk.  The concepts of ‘government as insurer of last resort’ and ‘government as insurer of first resort’ as alternative forms of intervention in markets are examined with a view to disambiguation.  In contrast to much current thinking in academic and government circles, we conclude that the government should not act as an ‘adaptor of first or last resort’. Rather, government can best contribute to efficient adaptation by reducing the economic costs and institutional barriers to adaptation faced by individuals and organisations.Comprehensive micro-economic reform, and the promotion of institutional flexibility are potential ‘no regrets’ strategies because they will also promote economic growth and welfare.Please cite as: Dobes, L, Jotzo, F, Doupé, P 2013 Adaptor of last resort? An economic perspective on the Government’s role in adaptation to climate change, National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility, Gold Coast, pp. 81.&nbsp

Mechanisms for Abating Global Emissions Under Uncertainty

We give theoretical, partial equilibrium comparisons of a tax with thresholds, tradable targets ('emissions trading' or ET), and non-tradable targets, as mechanisms to abate well-mixed ('global') emissions from many parties, under independent uncertainties in both future business-as-usual emissions and marginal abatement costs. All three mechanisms are revenue-neutral, and use flexible thresholds or targets indexed continuously to parties' activity levels. We analyse both risk-neutral or risk-averse behaviour. Key theoretical results are that because of emissions uncertainty, there is no simple Weitzman (1974) rule for choosing between 'prices' (a tax) to 'quantities' (ET); under ET, marginal abatement cost uncertainty is a benefit, compared to certainty; and under risk aversion, any mechanism with more expected welfare also gives more expected abatement. We apply our theory to global greenhouse gas abatement in 2020, using an 18-region numerical simulation model with new uncertainty estimates. Key global, empirical results are that under either risk behaviour, a tax dominates ET, which hugely dominates non-tradable targets; and under risk aversion, an optimally indexed tax gives about 60% more welfare and 30% more abatement than unindexed ET, while optimally indexed ET achieves about two-fifths of these improvements.emissions trading, global abatement, greenhouse gases, risk aversion, tax, uncertainty

Australia’s rejection of carbon pricing would be a blow for EU efforts to link Europe’s emissions trading scheme with other parts of the world.

The EU has attempted to tackle climate change through an emissions trading scheme, and has hoped for its scheme to become the core of an international system of linked-up carbon markets. Frank Jotzo writes on developments in Australia following the country’s recent election. He notes that the new government, led by Tony Abbot, is committed to repealing Australia’s carbon pricing scheme. This has the potential to impact on the EU’s efforts to link up its emissions trading scheme with other systems, and could spillover into the approaches of other countries across the world