Is Barbero's Hamiltonian formulation a Gauge Theory of Lorentzian Gravity?

This letter is a critique of Barbero's constrained Hamiltonian formulation of General Relativity on which current work in Loop Quantum Gravity is based. While we do not dispute the correctness of Barbero's formulation of general relativity, we offer some criticisms of an aesthetic nature. We point out that unlike Ashtekar's complex SU(2) connection, Barbero's real SO(3) connection does not admit an interpretation as a space-time gauge field. We show that if one tries to interpret Barbero's real SO(3) connection as a space-time gauge field, the theory is not diffeomorphism invariant. We conclude that Barbero's formulation is not a gauge theory of gravity in the sense that Ashtekar's Hamiltonian formulation is. The advantages of Barbero's real connection formulation have been bought at the price of giving up the description of gravity as a gauge field.Comment: 12 pages, no figures, revised in the light of referee's comments, accepted for publication in Classical and Quantum Gravit

Varieties of Capitalism and the Learning Firm: Contemporary Developments in EU and German Company Law - A Comment on the Strine-Bainbridge Debate About Shared Values of Corporate Management and Labor

Research in corporate governance and in labour law has been characterized by a disjuncture in the way that scholars in each field are addressing organizational questions related to the business enterprise. While labour has eventually begun to shift perspectives from aspirations to direct employee involvement in firm management, as has been the case in Germany, to a combination of \u27exit\u27 and \u27voice\u27 strategies involving pension fund management and securities litigation, it remains to be seen whether this new stream will unfold as a viable challenge to an otherwise exclusionary shareholder value paradigm. At the same time, recent suggestions made by Delaware Chancery Court Vice Chancellor Strine, to dare think about potentially shared commitments between management and labor - and UCLA\u27s Stephen Bainbridge\u27s response - underline the viability - and, the contestedness - of attempts at moving the corporate governance debate beyond the confines of corporate law proper. While such a wider view had already famously been encouraged by Dean Clarke in his 1986 treatise on Corporate Law (p. 32), mainstream corporate law does not seem to have endorsed this perspective. This paper takes the questionable divide between management and labor within the framework of a limiting corporate governance concept as starting point to explore the institutional dynamics of the corporation, hereby building on the theory of the innovative enterprise, as developed by management theorists Mary O\u27Sullivan and William Lazonick. Largely due to the sustained distance between corporate and labour law scholars, neither group has effectively addressed their common blind spot: a better understanding of the business enterprise itself. In midst of an unceasing flow of affirmations of the finance paradigm of the corporation on the one hand and \u27voice\u27 strategies by labour on the other, it seems to fall to management theorists to draw lessons from the continuing co-existence of different forms of market organization, in which companies appear to thrive. Exploring the conundrum of \u27risky\u27 business decisions within the firm, management theorists have been arguing for the need to adopt a more sophisticated organizational perspective on companies operating on locally, regionally and transnationally shaped, often highly volatile market segments. Research by comparative political economists has revealed a high degree of connectivity between corporate governance and economic performance without, however, arriving at such favourable results only for shareholder value regimes. Such findings support the view that corporate governance regimes are embedded in differently shaped regulatory frameworks, characterized by distinct institutions, both formal and informal, and enforcement processes. As a result of these findings, arguments to disassociate issues of corporate governance from those of the firm\u27s (social) responsibility [CSR] have been losing ground. Instead, CSR can be taken to be an essential part of understanding a particular business enterprise. It is the merging of a comparative political economy perspective on the corporation with one on the organizational features, structures and processes of the corporation, which can help us better understand the distribution of power and knowledge within the \u27learning firm\u27

Climate Change Meets the Law of the Horse

The climate change policy debate has only recently turned its full attention to adaptation - how to address the impacts of climate change we have already begun to experience and that will likely increase over time. Legal scholars have in turn begun to explore how the many different fields of law will and should respond. During this nascent period, one overarching question has gone unexamined: how will the legal system as a whole organize around climate change adaptation? Will a new distinct field of climate change adaptation law and policy emerge, or will legal institutions simply work away at the problem through unrelated, duly self-contained fields, as in the famous Law of the Horse? This Article is the first to examine that question comprehensively, to move beyond thinking about the law and climate change adaptation to consider the law of climate change adaptation. Part I of the Article lays out our methodological premises and approach. Using a model we call Stationarity Assessment, Part I explores how legal fields are structured and sustained based on assumptions about the variability of natural, social, and economic conditions, and how disruptions to that regime of variability can lead to the emergence of new fields of law and policy. Case studies of environmental law and environmental justice demonstrate the model’s predictive power for the formation of new distinct legal regimes. Part II applies the Stationarity Assessment model to the topic of climate change adaptation, using a case study of a hypothetical coastal region and the potential for climate change impacts to disrupt relevant legal doctrines and institutions. We find that most fields of law appear capable of adapting effectively to climate change. In other words, without some active intervention, we expect the law and policy of climate change adaptation to follow the path of the Law of the Horse - a collection of fields independently adapting to climate change - rather than organically coalescing into a new distinct field. Part III explores why, notwithstanding this conclusion, it may still be desirable to seek a different trajectory. Focusing on the likelihood of systemic adaptation decisions with perverse, harmful results, we identify the potential benefits offered by intervening to shape a new and distinct field of climate change adaptation law and policy. Part IV then identifies the contours of such a field, exploring the distinct purposes of reducing vulnerability, ensuring resiliency, and safeguarding equity. These features provide the normative policy components for a law of climate change adaptation that would be more than just a Law of the Horse. This new field would not replace or supplant any existing field, however, as environmental law did with regard to nuisance law, and it would not be dominated by substantive doctrine. Rather, like the field of environmental justice, this new legal regime would serve as a holistic overlay across other fields to ensure more efficient, effective, and just climate change adaptation solutions

Of Bounces, Branes and Bounds

Some recent studies have considered a Randall-Sundrum-like brane world evolving in the background of an anti-de Sitter Reissner-Nordstrom black hole. For this scenario, it has been shown that, when the bulk charge is non-vanishing, a singularity-free ``bounce'' universe will always be obtained. However, for the physically relevant case of a de Sitter brane world, we have recently argued that, from a holographic (c-theorem) perspective, such brane worlds may not be physically viable. In the current paper, we reconsider the validity of such models by appealing to the so-called ``causal entropy bound''. In this framework, a paradoxical outcome is obtained: these brane worlds are indeed holographically viable, provided that the bulk charge is not too small. We go on to argue that this new finding is likely the more reliable one.Comment: 15 pages, Revtex; references added and very minor change