Higher-Order Memory Schema and Conscious Experience

In the interesting and thought-provoking article Grazziano and colleagues argue for their Attention Schema Theory (AST) of consciousness. They present AST as a unification of Global Workspace Theory (GWT), Illusionism, and the Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory. We argue it is a mistake to equate 'subjective experience,' ad related terms, with dualism. They simply denote experience. Also, as presented, AST does not accurately capture the essence of HOT for two reasons. HOT is presented as a version of strong illusionism, which it isn't, and HOT requires that one be aware of one's mental life, and postulates that his consists in a re-representation of what is occurring at at the lower-order levels. However, the authors deny that AST involves re-representing visual stimuli. We close by proposing an alternative unification: GWT and AST provide crucial accounts of how lower-order states are assembled and maintained, but higher-order theory provides the account of subjective experience

A Higher-Order Theory of Emotional Consciousness

Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. On this view, what differs in emotional and non-emotional states is the kind of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide non-conscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness

Developmental changes in foraging-predator avoidance trade-offs in larval lumpfish Cyclopterus lumpus

The 5-12 wk old larvae increased time spent clinging to a surface in the presence of a predator, trading-off time available for foraging in order to reduce the probability of attack. Overall, fewer fish fed in the presence of a predator, and of the fish that did feed, 12 wk old lumpfish also showed a significant decrease in feeding rate (bites per minute swimming) in the presence of a predator. -from Author

Two fault tolerant toggle-hook release

A coupling device is disclosed which is mechanically two fault tolerant for release. The device comprises a fastener plate and fastener body, each of which is attachable to a different one of a pair of structures to be joined. The fastener plate and body are coupled by an elongate toggle mounted at one end in a socket on the fastener plate for universal pivotal movement thereon. The other end of the toggle is received in an opening in the fastener body and adapted for limited pivotal movement therein. The toggle is adapted to be restrained by three latch hooks arranged in symmetrical equiangular spacing about the axis of the toggle, each hook being mounted on the fastener body for pivotal movement between an unlatching non-contact position with respect to the toggle and a latching position in engagement with a latching surface of the toggle. The device includes releasable lock means for locking each latch hook in its latching position whereby the toggle couples the fastener plate to the fastener body and means for releasing the lock means to unlock each said latch hook from the latch position whereby the unlocking of at least one of the latch hooks from its latching position results in the decoupling of the fastener plate from the fastener body

Understanding the Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness

Critics have often misunderstood the higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness. Here we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views such as the global The higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness has often been misunderstood by critics. Here we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views such as the global workspace theory (GWT) and early sensory models (e.g. first-order local recurrency theories). For example, HOT has been criticized for over-intellectualizing consciousness. We show that while higher-order states are cognitively assembled, the requirements are actually considerably less than often presumed. In this sense HOT may be viewed as an intermediate position between GWT and early sensory views. Also, we clarify that most proponents of HOT do not stipulate consciousness as equivalent to metacognition or confidence. Further, compared to other existing theories, HOT can arguably account better for complex everyday experiences, such as of emotions and episodic memories. This makes HOT particularly useful as a framework for conceptualizing pathological mental states