The Logic of Idealization in Political Theory

The role of ideals and idealizations is amongst the most vigorously debated methodological questions in political theory. Yet the debate seems at an impasse. This paper argues that this reflects a fundamental ambiguity over idealization’s intended inferential logic: the precise way in which idealizations might yield normative knowledge. I identify two tacit understandings of idealization – a dominant ‘telic’ understanding, and a less overt ‘heuristic’ understanding – which, though importantly different, are rarely distinguished. I argue that delineating these understandings, and shifting from telic to heuristic idealization, recasts various unresolved methodological problems for political theorists, while productively connecting their discussions to work on idealization in political science and the practice and philosophy of science more broadly. I then provide a systematic account of how idealization might be used heuristically in normative reasoning and explicate the advantages of such approach for promoting rigorous, relevant, and inclusive methodologies in political theory

Manifestations of Xenophobia in AI Systems

Xenophobia is one of the key drivers of marginalisation, discrimination, and conflict, yet many prominent machine learning (ML) fairness frameworks fail to comprehensively measure or mitigate the resulting xenophobic harms. Here we aim to bridge this conceptual gap and help facilitate safe and ethical design of artificial intelligence (AI) solutions. We ground our analysis of the impact of xenophobia by first identifying distinct types of xenophobic harms, and then applying this framework across a number of prominent AI application domains, reviewing the potential interplay between AI and xenophobia on social media and recommendation systems, healthcare, immigration, employment, as well as biases in large pre-trained models. These help inform our recommendations towards an inclusive, xenophilic design of future AI systems

Ideology and armed conflict

A growing wave of scholarship suggests that ideology has demonstrable effects on various forms of armed conflict. But ideology remains a relative theoretical newcomer in conflict research, and scholars lack developed microfoundations for analyzing ideologies and their effects. Typically, existing research has primarily presented ideology as either an instrumental tool for conflict actors or a source of sincere political and normative commitments. But neither approach captures the diverse ways in which contemporary social science theorizes the causal connection between ideas and action, and both struggle to reconcile the apparently strong effects of ideology on conflict at the collective level with the relative rarity of ‘true believers’ at the individual level. This article addresses such problems by providing key microfoundations for conceptualizing ideologies, analyzing ideological change, and explaining ideologies’ influence over conflict behavior. I emphasize that ideology overlaps with other drivers of conflict such as strategic interests and group identities, show how ideologies can affect conflict behavior through four distinct mechanisms – commitment, adoption, conformity and instrumentalization – and clarify the role of both conflict pressures and preexisting ideological conditions in ideological change. These microfoundational claims integrate existing empirical findings and offer a foundation for building deeper explanations and middle-range theories of ideology’s role in armed conflict

Jonathan Leader Maynard

JONATHAN LEADER MAYNARD is a Lecturer in International Politics in the Department of Political Economy at King’s College London, and a research associate of the Centre for International Studies at the University of Oxford. His core research focuses on the role of ideology in political violence, mass atrocities and armed conflict, and he is currently in the final stages of writing a book, Ideology and Mass Killing: Rethinking the Role of Ideas in Genocides and Atrocities Against Civilians for Oxford University Press. He also has research interests in international political theory and international ethics, and in methodological debates in political science and political theory. He has published in scholarly journals including the Journal of Peace Research, Ethics, the British Journal of Political Science, Terrorism and Political Violence, and Genocide Studies and Prevention, as well as for news media including The Independent and The New Statesman.https://commons.erau.edu/genocide-bios/1012/thumbnail.jp

Ideologies and mass violence : the justificatory mechanics of deadly atrocities

This thesis seeks to provide an account of the role played by ideologies in acts of mass violence against civilians, such as genocides, murderous state repression, war crimes, and other ‘atrocities’. Mass violence of this kind has already received extensive study, with scholars frequently emphasising their belief that ideology is important. Until now, however, discussions of ideology have been held back by a lack of conceptual and theoretical development, leading to narrow portrayals of ideology’s role, vagueness over its relevance, and dubious assumptions about its theoretical implications. This thesis addresses these problems by building a more focused and integrative theoretical framework for analysing the ideological dynamics of atrocities. I engage in an extensive conceptual and methodological discussion, to establish the best way of defining and utilising the concept of ideology. In doing so, I emphasise how ideology can be important even for that majority of atrocity perpetrators who do not meet classic but misleading stereotypes of fanatical killers driven by burning hatred. I then detail my actual account of the ideological dynamics of deadly atrocities, which centres around the identification of six ‘justificatory mechanisms’: dehumanisation, guilt-attribution, threat-construction, deagentification, virtuetalk, and future-bias. These justificatory mechanisms describe sets of ideological processes that recur across different cases of violence against civilians, and which make that violence look permissible or even desirable to those who, in a variety of roles, carry it out. I then substantiate this account through three case studies: of Nazi atrocities, Stalinist oppression, and Allied area bombing in World War II. These cases demonstrate the cross-case applicability of the six justificatory mechanisms, and illustrate how the framework I offer allows us to construct more causally explicit, psychologically plausible, and comprehensive pictures of the way key ideologies feed in to the most destructive campaigns of violence against civilians.</p