Sensations and the identity theory

Chapter One presents one formulation of the problem which different versions of the identity theory attempt to solve. The attempted solutions offered by other versions of the identity theory are evaluated. Chapter Two is a statement of the identity theory. It restricts the discussion to the identity of sensations and brain processes. It tries to clarity what is to count as a sensation and what as a brain process. Some introductory remarks are made in it about the nature of the concept of identity. Chapter Three is concerned with distinguishing the factual and logical (in the widest sense of these terms) components of the identity theory. It is argued that they cannot be treated in isolation of each other. The independent identification of sensations through nonverbal behaviour, and of brain processes through brain-readings is discussed. Chapters Four and Five are devoted to a discussion of avowals. It is argued that sensations can be identified through avowals as well. The nature of avowals is discussed; it is argued that the typical avowal is corrigible, and that avowals have grounds. Alternative analyses of avowals are discussed. Chapter Six takes up the question whether or not sensations can be said to have spatial location. It is argued that an affirmative answer can be given if we recognize that sensations, like all processes, can be said to have spatial location only in a derivative sense. Chapter Seven examines the nature of the identity between sensations and brain processes. Identity is argued to be an empirical, extensional, heterogeneons, reductive identity of properties. The task of Chapter Eight is twofold: first, to meet the objection that the identity proposed is too weak-and thus compatible with the distinctness of sensations and brain processes; and second, to compare the identity theory with dualism and with the oriteriological view

Estimation of CT-derived abdominal visceral and subcutaneous adipose tissue depots from anthropometry in Europeans, South Asians and African Caribbeans

Background South Asians and African Caribbeans experience more cardiometabolic disease than Europeans. Risk factors include visceral (VAT) and subcutaneous abdominal (SAT) adipose tissue, which vary with ethnicity and are difficult to quantify using anthropometry. Objective We developed and cross-validated ethnicity and gender-specific equations using anthropometrics to predict VAT and SAT. Design 669 Europeans, 514 South Asians and 227 African Caribbeans (70±7 years) underwent anthropometric measurement and abdominal CT scanning. South Asian and African Caribbean participants were first-generation migrants living in London. Prediction equations were derived for CT-measured VAT and SAT using stepwise regression, then cross-validated by comparing actual and predicted means. Results South Asians had more and African Caribbeans less VAT than Europeans. For basic VAT prediction equations (age and waist circumference), model fit was better in men (R2 range 0.59-0.71) than women (range 0.35-0.59). Expanded equations (+ weight, height, hip and thigh circumference) improved fit for South Asian and African Caribbean women (R2 0.35 to 0.55, and 0.43 to 0.56 respectively). For basic SAT equations, R2 was 0.69-0.77, and for expanded equations it was 0.72-0.86. Cross-validation showed differences between actual and estimated VAT of <7%, and SAT of <8% in all groups, apart from VAT in South Asian women which disagreed by 16%. Conclusion We provide ethnicity- and gender-specific VAT and SAT prediction equations, derived from a large tri-ethnic sample. Model fit was reasonable for SAT and VAT in men, while basic VAT models should be used cautiously in South Asian and African Caribbean women. These equations will aid studies of mechanisms of cardiometabolic disease in later life, where imaging data are not available

Bionic bodies, posthuman violence and the disembodied criminal subject

This article examines how the so-called disembodied criminal subject is given structure and form through the law of homicide and assault. By analysing how the body is materialised through the criminal law’s enactment of death and injury, this article suggests that the biological positioning of these harms of violence as uncontroversial, natural, and universal conditions of being ‘human’ cannot fully appreciate what makes violence wrongful for us, as embodied entities. Absent a theory of the body, and a consideration of corporeality, the criminal law risks marginalising, or altogether eliding, experiences of violence that do not align with its paradigmatic vision of what bodies can and must do when suffering its effects. Here I consider how the bionic body disrupts the criminal law’s understanding of human violence by being a body that is both organic and inorganic, and capable of experiencing and performing violence in unexpected ways. I propose that a criminal law that is more receptive to the changing, technologically mediated conditions of human existence would be one that takes the corporeal dimensions of violence more seriously and, as an extension of this, adopts an embodied, embedded, and relational understanding of human vulnerability to violence