7 research outputs found
Competition, collusion and spatial sales patterns : theory and evidence
We study competition in markets with significant transport costs and capacity constraints. We compare the cases of price competition and coordination in a theoretical model and find that when firms compete, they more often serve more distant customers that are closer to plants of competitors. By means of a rich micro-level data set of the cement industry in Germany, we provide empirical evidence in support
of this result. Controlling for other potentially confounding factors, such as the number of production plants and demand, we find that the transport distances between suppliers and customers were on average significantly lower in cartel years
than in non-cartel years
Themata Occasione Lib. I. Cap. XIV. & XV. Pufendorfii de Officio Hom. & Civ. Pro Materia Publicæ Disputationis Proposita, Præside Johanne Eberhardo Roeslero, Philos. Pract. Prof. Publico, Ducalis Stipendii Ephoro, Respondente Jo. Jacobo Laitenberger, Kircho-Tecc. Magisterii Candidato. Ad diem [] Iulii A. MDCCXVIII. In Auditorio Philosophorum æstivo
Introductions; Keynote; Enforcement of Competition Rules in the European Union: The Globalized Economy in the Digital Age
Introductions; Keynote; Enforcement of Competition Rules in the European Union: The Globalized Economy in the Digital Age
Competition, collusion and spatial sales patterns – theory and evidence
International audienceThis article studies competition in markets with transport costs and capacity constraints. Using a rich micro-level data set of the cement industry in Germany, we study a cartel breakdown to identify the effect of competition on transport distances. We find that when firms compete, they more often serve more distant customers. Moreover, the transport distance also varies in the ratio of capacity relative to demand, but only if firms compete and not when they coordinate their sales. We provide a theoretical model of spatial competition with capacity constraints that rationalizes the empirical results
Competition, collusion and spatial sales patterns : theory and evidence
We study competition in markets with significant transport costs and capacity constraints. We compare the cases of price competition and coordination in a theoretical model and find that when firms compete, they more often serve more distant customers that are closer to plants of competitors. By means of a rich micro-level data set of the cement industry in Germany, we provide empirical evidence in support
of this result. Controlling for other potentially confounding factors, such as the number of production plants and demand, we find that the transport distances between suppliers and customers were on average significantly lower in cartel years
than in non-cartel years