41 research outputs found
An Introduction to Medieval Christian Philosophy
This paper surveys medieval Christian philosophy
Immune Logics ain't that Immune
Da RĂ© and Szmuc argue that while there is a symmetry between âinfectiousâ and âimmuneâ logics, this symmetry fails w.r.t. extending an algebra with an immune or an infectious element. In this paper, I show that the symmetry also fails w.r.t. defining a new logical operation from a given set of primitive (Boolean) operations. I use the case of the material conditional to illustrate this point
Bayesianism and the Idea of Scientific Rationality
Bayesianism has been dubbed as the most adequate and successful theory of scientific rationality. Its success mainly lies in its ability to combine two mutually exclusive elements involved in the process of theory-selection in science, viz.: the subjective and objective elements. My aim in this paper is to explain and evaluate Bayesianismâs account of scientific rationality by contrasting it with two other accounts
Dissolving the Is-Ought problem: An essay on moral reasoning
The debate concerning the proper way of understanding, and hence solving, the âis-ought problemâ produced two mutually exclusive positions. One position claims that it is entirely impossible to deduce an imperative statement from a set of factual statements. The other position holds a contrary view to the effect that one can naturally derive an imperative statement from a set of factual statements under certain conditions. Although these two positions have opposing views concerning the problem, it should be evident that they both accept that the âis-ought problemâ is concerned with the deducibility of imperative statements from factual statements. Later I will argue that this should not be our concern when we try to make sense of the way we reason about morality
Humberstone on Ayerâs Emotivism
In The Connectives, Lloyd Humberstone offers an interpretation of A. J. Ayerâs emotivism using W. S. Cooperâs semantics for ordinary logic. In this discussion note, I argue that this proposed interpretation fails to stay true to Ayerâs view
A Causal-Mentalist View of Propositions
In order to fulfil their essential roles as the bearers of truth and the relata of logical relations, propositions must be public and shareable. That requirement has favoured Platonist and other nonmental views of them, despite the well-known problems of Platonism in general. Views that propositions are mental entities have correspondingly fallen out of favour, as they have difficulty in explaining how propositions could have shareable, objective properties. We revive a mentalist view of propositions, inspired by Artificial Intelligence work on perceptual algorithms, which shows how perception causes persistent mental entities with shareable properties that allow them to fulfil the traditional roles of (one core kind of) propositions. The clustering algorithms implemented in perception produce outputs which are (implicit) atomic propositions in different minds.
Coordination of them across minds proceeds by game-theoretic processes of communication. The account does not rely on any unexplained notions such as mental content, representation, or correspondence (although those notions are applicable in philosophical analysis of the result)
Love and Fission
According to a traditional conception, romantic love is both constant - if someone loves another, they continue to love them - and exclusive - if someone loves another, they love only the other. In this paper, we argue that the essentiality of constancy and exclusivity is incompatible with the possibilities of fission - roughly speaking, of one person becoming two - and fusion - roughly speaking, of two people becoming one. Moreover, if fission or fusion are possible, then constancy and exclusivity are obligatory features of love only if there are moral dilemmas. We conclude by suggesting this casts doubt on the constancy and especially the exclusivity of love
The Nature of Truth
This article surveys different philosophical theories about the nature of truth. We give much importance to truth; some demand to know it, some fear it, and others would even die for it. But what exactly is truth? What is its nature? Does it even have a nature in the first place? When do we say that some truth-bearers are true? Philosophers offer varying answers to these questions. In this article, some of these answers are explored and some of the problems raised against them are presented
Personal identity and what matters
There are two general views about the nature of what matters, i.e. about the metaphysical ground of prudential concern, the ground of the concern we have for our own future welfare. On the one hand, the identity-is-what-matters view tells us that prudential concern is grounded on one\u27s continuing identity over time; I am concerned with my own future welfare because it is my own future welfare. On the other hand, the identity-is-not-what-matters view tells us that prudential concern is not grounded on such continuing identity; rather, it is grounded on some continuity relation, which only coincides with identity. In this paper, I explore a primary motivation for the latter view-viz., Parfit\u27s fission case-and show that there are interesting ways to resist it. © 2017 The Author