Environmental Research Joint Ventures under Emission Taxes

[[abstract]]The effect of environmentalpolicy depends crucially on the strategicbehavior of firms. Firms can undertakepollution abatement innovation cooperativelythrough environmental R&D joint ventures(RJVs). Environmental RJVs have not onlyenvironmental but also economic impacts. Threetypes of environmental RJV are discussed inthis paper: R&D cartelization in which firmschoose R&D efforts to maximize the jointprofit, RJV competition in which firms sharethe R&D fruits to maximize their own profits,and RJV cartelization in which firms share R&Dfruits and maximize the joint profit. An R&Dcartelization minimizes output quantities,maximizes the total emission, and minimizes thesocial surplus. An RJV cartelization with asufficiently high spillover coefficientmaximizes R&D efforts, minimizes the totalemission, and maximizes the social surplus.[[notice]]補正完畢[[journaltype]]國

Technological Upgrading under Tariffs and Equivalent Quotas

This paper compares the effect of tariffs and that of equivalent quotas on the domestic firm's production technology choice when it competes with a foreign firm in the domestic market. It is shown that under Bertrand price competition, the ranking of technology under tariff protection and quota protection is ambiguous, as it depends on the relative strength of the strategic vs output effects. The equivalent quota regime can generate a higher-technology (implying a lower production cost) choice than the tariff regime if the strategic effect dominates the output effect. In contrast, the technology level is necessarily higher under the tariff regime than under the equivalent quota regime when the firms engage in Cournot quantity competition. Copyright � 2006 The Authors; Journal compilation � 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

The Carbon Benefit of Thinned Wood for Bioenergy in Taiwan

Forest thinning is a way to make room for the growth of remaining trees, and the thinned wood can serve as a fuel for bioenergy in order to combat climate change. Using thinned wood for bioenergy can substitute for fossil fuel energy, resulting in potential carbon benefit. Since not all thinned wood can be transported out of the forest for processing, the extraction ratio (extraction volume/thinning volume) is an important variable for determining the net carbon benefit. This study investigated 52 forest-thinning sites in Taiwan. The extraction ratio was estimated to explore the benefit of thinned wood used as bioenergy. Cross analysis was adopted to find the relationships between site/species attributes and extraction ratio. The factors included age class, thinning method, land use classification, and species. Key variables included thinning volume, extraction volume, and extraction ratio. Statistical analysis was then applied to identify the significant differences. The analysis shows that the extraction ratio of thinned wood is 57.12%. The research outcomes could provide valuable information for green-energy policy making in Taiwan

The Carbon Benefit of Thinned Wood for Bioenergy in Taiwan

Forest thinning is a way to make room for the growth of remaining trees, and the thinned wood can serve as a fuel for bioenergy in order to combat climate change. Using thinned wood for bioenergy can substitute for fossil fuel energy, resulting in potential carbon benefit. Since not all thinned wood can be transported out of the forest for processing, the extraction ratio (extraction volume/thinning volume) is an important variable for determining the net carbon benefit. This study investigated 52 forest-thinning sites in Taiwan. The extraction ratio was estimated to explore the benefit of thinned wood used as bioenergy. Cross analysis was adopted to find the relationships between site/species attributes and extraction ratio. The factors included age class, thinning method, land use classification, and species. Key variables included thinning volume, extraction volume, and extraction ratio. Statistical analysis was then applied to identify the significant differences. The analysis shows that the extraction ratio of thinned wood is 57.12%. The research outcomes could provide valuable information for green-energy policy making in Taiwan

A welfare analysis of tariffs and equivalent quotas under demand uncertainty: Implications for tariffication

Under market demand uncertainty, we show that quotas can result in a welfare advantage over tariffs for an importing country despite that its government does not capture any quota rents. Specifically, the conditions under which an equivalent quota yields higher expected welfare than a tariff are shown to depend on a set of economic variables. These variables include the initial tariff rate, the relative efficiency in production between home and foreign firms, the probability distribution of random demand shocks that make the quota binding or non-binding under uncertainty, as well as the variance of the stochastic market demand. The analysis of this paper has welfare implications for tariffication.Tariffs Equivalent quotas Market demand uncertainty Welfare ranking

“Buy Domestic” Campaigns and Optimal Tariffs

product differentiation, ‘buy domestic’ campaigns, optimal tariffs, strategic trade policy, F12, F13, D11,

A Model of Counterfeiting: A Duopoly Approach

[[abstract]]This paper establishes a duopoly model, which considers consumers’ preference exhibits the horizontal differentiation and vertical differentiation simultaneously, to investigate how counterfeiting affects firms’ market power and consumer's purchasing behavior. The effects of government enforcement on counterfeiting are also concerned. The findings tell that (1) the market power of the firms is higher than the one when consumers with only the characteristic of horizontal differentiation or vertical differentiation; (2) when the production cost of a genuine product increases, the consumers who originally purchased this genuine product may continue to purchase the genuine one, purchase the genuine of the other brand, or, quite interestingly, purchase the counterfeiting product of the other brand; (3) If government imposes a (stricter) enforcement on counterfeiting, the consumers who do not have a strong preference on a particular brand of product but originally purchased the counterfeit of this brand of product may instead purchase the genuine one or purchase nothing; the consumers who originally purchased its genuine may instead purchase the genuine of the other brand or purchase nothing.[[notice]]補正完畢[[journaltype]]國外[[incitationindex]]SSCI[[ispeerreviewed]]Y[[booktype]]電子版[[countrycodes]]NL