Productivity and the Natural Rate of Unemployment

I propose an econometric model that improves upon existing methods of estimating the natural rate of unemployment (NAIRU) by using information contained in the trend of productivity growth. My approach enhances the recently proposed model of Staiger, Stock and Watson (1997) in several respects. Statistically speaking, the method substantially shrinks the width of the 95% confidence interval, performs better in an out-of-sample inflation forecasting exercise, and is more robust to alternativestatistical assumptions. In economic terms, the productivity-augmented model generates a more realistic time profile of the NAIRU, and implies estimates of the Phillipscurve slope and the sacrifice ratio that are more in line with conventional wisdom. I also test whether the natural rate is correlated with the level or with the change of the productivity growth trend. I find support for the "level" hypothesis in both the US and international data.Natural rate of unemployment; Productivity; Phillips curve; Time-varying parameters; Kalman filter

The American consumer: reforming, or just resting?

American households have received a triple dose of bad news since the beginning of the current recession: The greatest collapse in asset values since the Great Depression, a sharp tightening in credit availability, and a large increase in unemployment risk. We present measures of the size of these shocks and discuss what a benchmark theory says about their immediate and ultimate consequences. We then provide a forecast based on a simple empirical model that captures the effects of wealth shocks and unemployment fears. Our short-term forecast calls for somewhat weaker spending, and somewhat higher saving rates, than the Consensus survey of macroeconomic forecasters. Over the longer term, our best guess is that the personal saving rate will eventually approach the levels that preceded period of financial liberalization that began in the late 1970s. Classification: C61, D11, E2

What Drives Personal Consumption? The Role of Housing and Financial Wealth

I investigate the effect of wealth on consumption in a new dataset with financial and housing wealth from 16 countries. The baseline estimation method based on the sluggishness of consumption growth implies that the eventual (long-run) marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth is 5 cents (averaged across countries). While the wealth effects are quite strong—between 4 and 6 cents—in countries with more developed mortgage markets and in market-based, Anglo-Saxon and non euro area economies, consumption only barely reacts to wealth elsewhere. The effect of housing wealth is somewhat smaller than that of financial wealth for most countries, but not for the US and the UK. The housing wealth effect has risen substantially after 1988 as it has become easier to borrow against housing wealth. JEL Classification: E21, E32, C22Consumption Dynamics, housing prices, Portfolio Choice, wealth effect

Labor supply after transition: evidence from the Czech Republic

We extend the scarce evidence on labor supply in post-transition countries by estimating the wage elasticity of labor force participation in the Czech Republic. Using the household income survey data of 2002, we find that a one-percent rise in the gross wage increases the probability of working by 0.16 and 0.02 percentage points for women and men, respectively. Taking into account the tax and benefit system, these semi-elasticities fall to 0.06 for women and 0.01 for men. We interpret the difference between the estimates from the two specifications as a summary measure of the welfare system disincentives. The estimated wage elasticities lie at the lower end of the range of values reported for mature market economies. This finding is consistent with the stylized fact that the labor supply in countries with high labor force participation rates, such as in the Czech Republic, tends to be less sensitive to wages. JEL Classification: J22, J31, P30Labor supply, Transition, welfare system

Disagreement among Forecasters in G7 Countries

Using the Consensus Economics dataset with individual expert forecasts from G7 countries we investigate determinants of disagreement (crosssectional dispersion of forecasts) about six key economic indicators. Disagreement about real variables (GDP, consumption, investment and unemployment) has a distinct dynamic from disagreement about nominal variables (in ation and interest rate). Disagreement about real variables intensifes strongly during recessions, including the current one (by about 40 percent in terms of the interquartile range). Disagreement about nominal variables rises with their level, has fallen after 1998 or so (by 30 percent), and is considerably lower under independent central banks (by 35 percent). Cross-sectional dispersion for both groups increases with uncertainty about the underlying actual indicators, though to a lesser extent for nominal series. Countryby- country regressions for inflation and interest rates reveal that both the level of disagreement and its sensitivity to macroeconomic variables tend to be larger in Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom, where central banks became independent only around the mid-1990s. These findings suggest that more credible monetary policy can substantially contribute to anchoring of expectations about nominal variables; its eects on disagreement about real variables are moderate.disagreement, survey expectations, monetary policy, forecasting

Dissecting saving dynamics: measuring wealth, precautionary, and credit effects

We argue that the U.S. personal saving rate’s long stability (1960s–1980s), subsequent steady decline (1980s–2007), and recent substantial rise (2008–2011) can be interpreted using a parsimonious ‘buffer stock’ model of consumption in the presence of labor income uncertainty and credit constraints. Saving in the model is affected by the gap between ‘target’ and actual wealth, with the target determined by credit conditions and uncertainty. An estimated structural version of the model suggests that increased credit availability accounts for most of the long-term saving decline, while fluctuations in wealth and uncertainty capture the bulk of the business-cycle variation

Disagreement among forecasters in G7 countries

Using the Consensus Economics dataset with individual expert forecasts from G7 countries we investigate determinants of disagreement (crosssectional dispersion of forecasts) about six key economic indicators. Disagreement about real variables (GDP, consumption, investment and unemployment) has a distinct dynamic from disagreement about nominal variables (inflation and interest rate). Disagreement about real variables intensifies strongly during recessions, including the current one (by about 40 percent in terms of the interquartile range). Disagreement about nominal variables rises with their level, has fallen after 1998 or so (by 30 percent), and is considerably lower under independent central banks (by 35 percent). Cross-sectional dispersion for both groups increases with uncertainty about the underlying actual indicators, though to a lesser extent for nominal series. Country-by-country regressions for inflation and interest rates reveal that both the level of disagreement and its sensitivity to macroeconomic variables tend to be larger in Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom, where central banks became independent only around the mid-1990s. These findings suggest that more credible monetary policy can substantially contribute to anchoring of expectations about nominal variables; its effects on disagreement about real variables are moderate. JEL Classification: E31, E32, E37, E52, C53disagreement, forecasting, monetary policy, survey expectations

How large are housing and financial wealth effects? A new approach

This paper presents a simple new method for measuring `wealth effects' on aggregate consumption. The method exploits the stickiness of consumption growth (sometimes interpreted as reflecting consumption `habits') to distinguish between immediate and eventual wealth effects. In U.S. data, we estimate that the immediate (next-quarter) marginal propensity to consume from a change in housing wealth is about 2 cents, with a final eventual effect around 9 cents, substantially larger than the effect of shocks to financial wealth. We argue that our method is preferable to cointegration-based approaches, because neither theory nor evidence supports faith in the existence of a stable cointegrating vector. JEL Classification: E21, E32, C22asset prices, Consumption Dynamics, housing wealth, wealth effect

International Evidence On Sticky Consumption Growth

We estimate the degree of 'stickiness' in aggregate consumption growth (sometimes interpreted as reflecting consumption habits) for thirteen advanced economies. We find that, after controlling for measurement error, consumption growth has a high degree of autocorrelation, with a stickiness parameter of about 0.7 on average across countries. The sticky-consumption-growth model outperforms the random walk model of Hall (1978), and typically fits the data better than the popular Campbell and Mankiw (1989) model. In several countries, the sticky-consumption-growth and Campbell-Mankiw models work about equally well.

International evidence on sticky consumption growth.

We estimate the degree of ‘stickiness’ in aggregate consumption growth (sometimes interpreted as reflecting consumption habits) for thirteen advanced economies. We find that, after controlling for measurement error, consumption growth has a high degree of auto-correlation, with a stickiness parameter of about 0.7 on average across countries. The sticky-consumption-growth model outperforms the random walk model of Hall (1978), and typically fits the data better than the popular Campbell and Mankiw (1989) model. In several countries, the sticky-consumption-growth and Campbell–Mankiw models work about equally well. JEL Classification: C6, D9, E2Consumption Dynamics, Habit Formation, Sticky Expectations