Mineral element concentrations (ppm) in soil and forage samples collected in the affected and unaffected areas.

a<p>Results between the affected and unaffected areas were significantly different (<i>P</i><0.01).</p

Mineral element concentrations in bones and teeth of Guizhou semi-fine wool sheep (The unit for Ca and P is in g/kg dry sample and others in ppm).

a<p>Results between affected and unaffected the Guizhou semi-fine wool sheep were significantly different (<i>P</i><0.01).</p

Serum protein concentrations (g/l) of Guizhou semi-fine wool sheep.

a<p>A =  albumin;G =  globulin.</p>b<p>Results between the affected and unaffected Guizhou semi-fine wool sheep were significantly different (<i>P</i><0.01).</p

Biochemical parameters in serum samples of Guizhou semi-fine wool sheep.

a<p>LDH  =  Lactate dehydrogenase; AKP  =  alkaline phosphatase; γ-GT  =  γ-glutamyl transferase; CRT =  creatinine; Ca  =  calcium; IP =  inorganic phosphorus.</p>b<p>Results between the affected and unaffected Guizhou semi-fine wool sheep were significantly different (<i>P</i><0.01).</p

The difference between moderate and excessive financialization.

The difference between moderate and excessive financialization.</p

Mechanism test.

Based on the perspective of performance pressure, we explore the influence of controlling shareholders’ share pledge on excessive financialization behavior of enterprises and its internal mechanism. The results show that the share pledge of controlling shareholders is positively correlated with the excessive financialization behavior of enterprises. After the controlling shareholder’s share pledge, the actual performance of the enterprise is lower than expected, causing the short-sighted behavior of the management, which makes the management willing to conspire with the controlling shareholder to cause the excessive financialization of the enterprise. The results are especially evident among the uncertainty of economic policy is low, the industry competition is not fierce and the executives have overseas experience.</div

Descriptive statistics of variables.

Based on the perspective of performance pressure, we explore the influence of controlling shareholders’ share pledge on excessive financialization behavior of enterprises and its internal mechanism. The results show that the share pledge of controlling shareholders is positively correlated with the excessive financialization behavior of enterprises. After the controlling shareholder’s share pledge, the actual performance of the enterprise is lower than expected, causing the short-sighted behavior of the management, which makes the management willing to conspire with the controlling shareholder to cause the excessive financialization of the enterprise. The results are especially evident among the uncertainty of economic policy is low, the industry competition is not fierce and the executives have overseas experience.</div

Impact of economic policy uncertainty.

Based on the perspective of performance pressure, we explore the influence of controlling shareholders’ share pledge on excessive financialization behavior of enterprises and its internal mechanism. The results show that the share pledge of controlling shareholders is positively correlated with the excessive financialization behavior of enterprises. After the controlling shareholder’s share pledge, the actual performance of the enterprise is lower than expected, causing the short-sighted behavior of the management, which makes the management willing to conspire with the controlling shareholder to cause the excessive financialization of the enterprise. The results are especially evident among the uncertainty of economic policy is low, the industry competition is not fierce and the executives have overseas experience.</div

Definition of main variables.

Based on the perspective of performance pressure, we explore the influence of controlling shareholders’ share pledge on excessive financialization behavior of enterprises and its internal mechanism. The results show that the share pledge of controlling shareholders is positively correlated with the excessive financialization behavior of enterprises. After the controlling shareholder’s share pledge, the actual performance of the enterprise is lower than expected, causing the short-sighted behavior of the management, which makes the management willing to conspire with the controlling shareholder to cause the excessive financialization of the enterprise. The results are especially evident among the uncertainty of economic policy is low, the industry competition is not fierce and the executives have overseas experience.</div

Other robustness tests.

Based on the perspective of performance pressure, we explore the influence of controlling shareholders’ share pledge on excessive financialization behavior of enterprises and its internal mechanism. The results show that the share pledge of controlling shareholders is positively correlated with the excessive financialization behavior of enterprises. After the controlling shareholder’s share pledge, the actual performance of the enterprise is lower than expected, causing the short-sighted behavior of the management, which makes the management willing to conspire with the controlling shareholder to cause the excessive financialization of the enterprise. The results are especially evident among the uncertainty of economic policy is low, the industry competition is not fierce and the executives have overseas experience.</div