Constructing regionalism in South America: the cases of sectoral cooperation on transport infrastructure and energy

First online: 29 January 2018This article contributes to the study of South American regionalism focusing on the emergence of sectoral cooperation starting in 2000. To do so, the article analyses two policy areas transport infrastructure and energy integration-addressing two questions: Why has regional cooperation emerged despite the absence of economic interdependence and market driven demand for economic integration? And why are policy outcomes evident in some areas (i.e. transport infrastructure) while limited in others (i.e. energy)? It is argued that the emergence of regional cooperation as well as the variation in policy outcomes between areas can be explained largely by the articulation of a regional leadership and its effect on the convergence of state preferences. The article shows how the Brazilian leadership, incentivised by the effects of the US-led Free Trade Area of the Americas negotiations and the financial crises that hit the region in the late 1990s, made state preferences converge towards a regionalist project encompassing all South American countries by making visible the mutual benefits of cooperation on transport infrastructure and energy. In the case of energy, however, the emergence of a second regional leadership project - pursued by Chavez's Venezuela- and deep preference divergence led sectoral cooperation into a gridlock

Money for Nothing: Everyday Actors and Monetary Crises

Why do monetary unions fail? Structural approaches that focus on shifts in the distribution of capabilities ascribe non-elites limited agency to influence large-scale political and economic change. Existing agent-centred approaches tend to simplify the social dynamics of the everyday politics of money by concentrating on how elites determine formal changes within monetary systems. Answers to this question from a material-based perspective often point to a breakdown in elite political support, driven by actors’ material incentives to cheat on their multilateral commitments rather than cooperate to overcome the collective action problem that a monetary union entails. Recent ideational perspectives have focused on the role of shared economic ideas among elites, as well as elite struggles over national identity, as crucial ingredients in the construction, maintenance, or failure of a monetary union. While drawing on the insights of rationalist and constructivist theories, this article uses a historical sociology approach to argue that the everyday actions taken by non-elites as survival strategies in a monetary crisis provide an important additional ingredient for understanding monetary system change. This approach is illustrated through a case study of the collapse of the ruble zone monetary union over 1991–1993

Power beyond conditionality: European organisations and the Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia

The article addresses the power of three international organisations, the Council of Europe (CoE), the European Union (EU) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) regarding the Hungarian minority policies of Romania, Slovakia and Hungary. It is argued that most of the academic literature within the field misses the point when relying on a rather limited conceptualisation of power as something which one actor uses to get another actor to do what it otherwise would not have done. Using a broader conceptualistion of power, including the power to interpret norms and their application, leads to a better understanding of the roles of the CoE and the HCNM. Analysing the three organisations' approaches to the Hungarian minority education policy in Romania and Slovakia, as well as the Hungarian Status Law, reveals how the CoE and the HCNM interpreted norms of national minority policy and their application to the addressed policies. These interpretations shaped EU policy on the subject, and Romania, Slovakia and Hungary had to take the EU policy seriously due to their desire to join the EU. The three organisations engaged in an exchange of power, in which the CoE and the OSCE High Commissioner bestowed legitimacy on the EU, which in return could provide them with increased leverage over the accession states. Journal of International Relations and Development (2011) 14, 440-468. doi:10.1057/jird.2011.1; published online 22 July 201