3,721 research outputs found

    Kinky perceived demand curves and Keynes-Negishi equilibria

    Get PDF
    The label “Keynes-Negishi equiibria” is attached here to equilibria in a monetary economy with imperfectly competitive product and labor markets where business firms and labor unions hold demand perceptions with kinks - as posited in Negishi’s 1979 book Microeconomic Foundations of Keynesian Macroeconomics. Such equilibria are defined in a general equilibrium model, and shown to exist. Methodological implications are briefly discussed in a concluding section.Equilibrium, imperfect competition, perceived demands, kinky demand, princing rules, union wage model, union objectives, cash-in-advance

    Vountary matching grants can forestall social dumping

    Get PDF
    The European economic integration leads to increasing mobility of factors, thereby threatening the stability of social transfer programs. This paper investigates the possibility to achieve by means of voluntary matching grants both the optimal allocation of factors and the optimal level of redistribution in the presence of factor mobility. We use a fiscal competition model a la Wildasin (1991) in which states differ in their technologies and preferences for redistribution. We first investigate a simple process in which the regulatory authority progressively raises the matchning grants sto the district choosing the lowest transfer and all districts respond optimally to the resulting change in transfers all around. This process is shown to increase total production and the level of redistribution. However, it does not guarantee that all districts gain, nor that an efficient level of redistribution is attained. Assuming complete information among districts, we first derive the willingness of each district to match the contribution of other districts and we show that the aggregate willingness to pay for matching rates converges to zero when both the efficient level of redistribution and the efficient outcome and guarantee that everyone will gain.Fiscal federalism, Adjustment process, Matching grants

    Non-equilibrium heat capacity of polytetrafluoroethylene at room temperature

    Full text link
    Polytetrafluoroethylene can be considered as a model for calorimetric studies of complex systems with thermodynamics transitions at ambient temperature. This polymer exhibits two phase transitions of different nature at 292 K and 303 K. We show that sensitive ac-calorimetry measurements allow us to study the thermodynamic behaviour of polytetrafluoroethylene when it is brought out of thermodynamic equilibrium. Thanks to the thermal modelisation of our calorimetric device, the frequency dependent complex heat capacity of this polymer is extracted. The temperature and frequency variations of the real and imaginary parts of the complex heat capacity are obtained when polytetrafluoroethylene undergoes its first-order structural phase transition at 292 K

    Voluntary Matching Grants Can Forestall Social Dumping

    Get PDF
    The European economic integration leads to increasing mobility of factors, thereby threatening the stability of social transfer programs. This paper investigates the possibility to achieve by means of voluntary matching grants both the optimal allocation of factors and the optimal level of redistribution in the presence of factor mobility. We use a fiscal competition model a la Wildasin (1991) in which states differ in their technologies and preferences for redistribution. We first investigate a simple process in which the regulatory authority progressively raises the matching grants to the district choosing the lowest transfer and all districts respond optimally to the resulting change in transfers all around. This process is shown to increase total production and the level of redistribution. However it does not guarantee that all districts gain, nor that an efficient level of redistribution is attained. Assuming complete information among districts, we first derive the willingness of each district to match the contribution of other districts and we show that the aggregate willingness to pay for matching rates converges to zero when both the efficient level of redistribution and the efficient allocation of factors are achieved. We then describe the adjustment process for the matching rates that will lead districts to the efficient outcome and guarantee that everyone will gain.fiscal federalism, adjustment process, matching grants

    Sequentially complete Markets Remain Incomplete

    Get PDF
    We consider the well-known result of Arrow (1953) that the set of equilibria of an economy with complete markets coincides with the one of an economy with sequentially complete markets. We show by means of two examples that this results is problematic when there exist multiple equilibrium continuations to the initial-period component of an intertemporal equilibrium. Some consequences are drawn.microeconomics ;

    Pareto Improving Price Regulation When the Asset Market Is Incomplete

    Get PDF
    When the asset market is incomplete, competitive equilibria are constrained suboptimal, which provides scope for Pareto improving interventions. Price regulation can be such a Pareto improving policy, even when the welfare effects of rationing are taken into account. An appealing aspect of price regulation is that it operates anonymously on market variables. The welfare analysis of price regulation calls for an extension of the equilibrium theory of incomplete markets to fix-price equilibria.Fix-price equilibria exist under standard assumptions. There are robust examples, however, for which at regulated prices close to competitive prices, there are no fix-price equilibria close to competitive equilibria. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the local uniqueness of fix-price equilibria, and show that under these conditions Pareto improving price regulation is generically possible.microeconomics ;

    Tests of Non-Causality Under Markov Assumptions for Qualitative Panel Data

    Get PDF
    For many years, social scientists have been interested in obtaining testable definitions of causality [C. W. Granger (1969)]. Recent works include those of G. Chamberlain (1982) and J. P. Florens and M. Mouchart (1982). The present paper first clarifies the results of these latter papers by considering a unifying definition of non-causality. Then, log-likelihood ratio (LR) tests for non-causality are derived for qualitative panel data under the minimal assumption that one series is Markov. LR tests for the Markov property are also obtained. Both test statistics have closed forms. These tests thus provide a readily applicable procedure for testing non-causality on qualitative panel data. Finally, the tests are applied to French Business Survey data in order to test the hypothesis that price changes from period to period are strictly exogenous to disequilibria appearing within periods
    corecore