Does Cross-Listing in the US Foster Mergers and Acquisitions and Increase Target Shareholder Wealth?

We examine the role of cross-listing in alleviating domestic market constraint and facilitating cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Cross-listing appears to strengthen the bargaining power of target firms, allowing them to extract higher takeover premiums relative to their non-cross-listed peers. Moreover, shareholders of Sarbanes-Oxley-compliant targets seem to benefit from a higher premium. We also find that cross-listed firms are more likely to be acquisition targets. This evidence is consistent with the idea that cross-listing increases firms’ attractiveness and visibility on the market for corporate control. Our results are robust to various specifications and to the self-selection bias arising from the decision to cross-list.Cross-listing, mergers & acquisitions, governance, Sarbanes-Oxley Act

The Impact of Political Risk on the Volatility of Stock Returns: the Case of Canada

This paper examines the impact of political risk in Canada on the volatility of stock returns. Our results suggest that political news associated with a possible separation of Quebec from Canada plays an important role in the volatility of stock returns. We also show that the volatility of stock returns varies with the degree of a firm’s exposure to political risk, namely, the structure of assets and the extent of foreign involvement.

Liberalization, Corporate Governance, and the Performance of Newly Privatized Firms

This paper seeks to provide an answer to the following question, namely when and how does privatization work? Using a unique sample of 201 firms headquartered in 32 developing countries, we document a significant increase in profitability, efficiency, investment and output. Next, using univariate tests, we show that corporate governance mechanisms and economic reforms and environment have an effect on the changes in operating performance. For example, we find that privatization yields better results when stock market and trade liberalizations precede it. The results of a regression analysis, across a number of specifications, indicate that economic reforms and environment as well as corporate governance variables explain the post-privatization performance changes. In particular, economic growth, control relinquishment by the government and foreign ownership are key determinants of profitability changes. We also find higher improvements in efficiency and output for firms in countries in which stock markets are more developed and where property rights are better protected and enforced. Finally, our results suggest that trade openness is an important determinant of the post-privatization increase in investment.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39803/3/wp419.pd

Postprivatization Corporate Governance: the Role of Ownership Structure and Investor Protection

We investigate the role of ownership structure and investor protection in postprivatization corporate governance. We find that the government relinquishes control over time, mainly to the benefit of local institutions and foreign investors. We also show that private ownership tends to concentrate over time. In addition to firm-level variables, investor protection, political and social stability explain the cross-firm differences in ownership concentration. We find that the positive effect of ownership concentration on firm performance matters more in countries with weak investor protection and that private domestic ownership leads to higher performance.Corporate governance, privatization, performance

Do Political Institutions Affect the Choice of the U.S. Cross-Listing Venue?

We study the impact of political institutions on foreign firms’ choice of their U.S. cross-listing venue. Using two measures of political institutions (an index of political rights and a political constraint index) and controlling for various firm-level and country-level characteristics, we show that foreign firms from countries with weak political institutions are more likely to cross-list in the U.S. via the over-the-counter market and less likely to opt for an exchange-listed program (i.e., New York, Nasdaq, and AMEX).Cross-listing, Political institutions, Legal institutions

Corporate Risk-Taking in Privatized Firms: International Evidence on the Role of State and Foreign Owners

Using a unique database of 190 newly privatized firms from 36 countries, we investigate the impact of shareholders’ identify on corporate risk-taking behavior. We find strong and robust evidence that state (foreign) ownership is negatively (positively) related to corporate risk-taking. Moreover, we find that these relations depend on the level of government extraction. Our results suggest that relinquishment of government control, openness to foreign investment, and improvement of country-level governance institutions are key factors in the success of privatization reform.Privatization, risk-taking, corporate governance