Credit allocation based on journal impact factor and coauthorship contribution

Some research institutions demand researchers to distribute the incomes they earn from publishing papers to their researchers and/or co-authors. In this study, we deal with the Impact Factor-based ranking journal as a criteria for the correct distribution of these incomes. We also include the Authorship Credit factor for distribution of the incomes among authors, using the geometric progression of Cantor's theory and the Harmonic Credit Index. Depending on the ranking of the journal, the proposed model develops a proper publication credit allocation among all authors. Moreover, our tool can be deployed in the evaluation of an institution for a funding program, as well as calculating the amounts necessary to incentivize research among personnel.Comment: 9 pages; 3 figures; 2 table

Effectiveness of Different Kidney Exchange Mechanisms on Improving Living Donor Transplantation in Chile

Chile has a very low cadaveric organ donation rate; at the same time, living donor transplantation activity is low. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact on the number and quality of transplants of the potential application of different mechanisms for kidney exchange from living donors to patients on Chile’s waiting list.Organ Donation Rate, living kidney donation, kidney exchange mechanisms

Wavelet-Based Entropy Measures to Characterize Two-Dimensional Fractional Brownian Fields

The aim of this work was to extend the results of Perez et al. (Physica A (2006), 365 (2), 282–288) to the two-dimensional (2D) fractional Brownian field. In particular, we defined Shannon entropy using the wavelet spectrum from which the Hurst exponent is estimated by the regression of the logarithm of the square coefficients over the levels of resolutions. Using the same methodology. we also defined two other entropies in 2D: Tsallis and the Rényi entropies. A simulation study was performed for showing the ability of the method to characterize 2D (in this case, α = 2) self-similar processes

Can planners control competitive generators?

Consider an electricity market populated by competitive agents using thermal generating units. Generation often emits pollution which a planner may wish to constrain through regulation. Furthermore, generators’ ability to transmit energy may be naturally restricted by the grid’s facilities. The existence of both pollution standards and transmission constraints can impose several restrictions upon the joint strategy space of the agents. We propose a dynamic, game-theoretic model capable of analysing coupled constraints equilibria (also known as generalised Nash equilibria). Our equilibria arise as solutions to the planner’s problem of avoiding both network congestion and excessive pollution. The planner can use the coupled constraints’ Lagrange multipliers to compute the charges the players would pay if the constraints were violated. Once the players allow for the charges in their objective functions they will feel compelled to obey the constraints in equilibrium. However, a coupled constraints equilibrium needs to exist and be unique for this modification of the players’ objective functions ..[there was a “to” here, incorrect?].. induce the required behaviour. We extend the three-node dc model with transmission line constraints described in [10] and [2] to utilise a two-period load duration curve, and impose multi-period pollution constraints. We discuss the economic and environmental implications of the game’s solutions as we vary the planner’s preferences.

The invisible polluter: Can regulators save consumer surplus?

Consider an electricity market populated by competitive agents using thermal generating units. Such generation involves the emission of pollutants, on which a regulator might impose constraints. Transmission capacities for sending energy may naturally be restricted by the grid facilities. Both pollution standards and trans mission capacities can impose several constraints upon the joint strategy space of the agents. We propose a coupled constraints equilibrium as a solution to the regulator’s problem of avoiding both congestion and excessive pollution. Using the coupled constraints’ Lagrange multipliers as taxation coefficients the regulator can compel the agents to obey the multiple constraints. However, for this modification of the players’ payoffs to induce the required behaviour a coupled constraints equilibrium needs to exist and must also be unique. A three-node market example with a dc model of the transmission line constraints described in [8] and [2] possesses these properties. We extend it here to utilise a two-period load duration curve and, in result, obtain a two-period game. The implications of the game solutions obtained for several weights, which the regulator can use to vary the level of generators’ responsibilities for the constraints’ satisfaction, for consumer and producer surpluses will be discussed.