Continuous-variable quantum process tomography with squeezed-state probes

We propose a procedure for tomographic characterization of continuous variable quantum operations which employs homodyne detection and single-mode squeezed probe states with a fixed degree of squeezing and anti-squeezing and a variable displacement and orientation of squeezing ellipse. Density matrix elements of a quantum process matrix in Fock basis can be estimated by averaging well behaved pattern functions over the homodyne data. We show that this approach can be straightforwardly extended to characterization of quantum measurement devices. The probe states can be mixed, which makes the proposed procedure feasible with current technology.Comment: 6 pages, 2 figures, RevTeX

TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE POLISH-GERMAN-CZECH BORDER AREA IN 1938-1945 IN THE LOCAL COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND SOCIAL AWARENESS OF THE INHABITANTS OF BIELAWA AND THE OWL MOUNTAINS AREA

Th e local community of Bielawa and the areas in the region of the Owl Mountains is an interesting object for studies of sites of memory represented in local consciousness. Like most of similar communities on the so-called Recovered Territories, it started to form aft er 1945 on “raw roots” aft er the German inhabitants of the area were removed. Th ey were replaced with people moved from the former eastern provinces of the Second Republic, among others from Kołomyja, but also from regions of central Poland. Also Poles returning from Germany, France and Romania sett led there. Th e area taken over by new sett lers had not been a cultural desert. The remains of material culture, mainly German, and the traditions of weaving and textile industry, reaching back to the Middle Ages, formed a huge potential for creating a vision of local cultural heritage for the newly forming community. Th ey also brought, however, their own notions of cultural heritage to the new area and, in addition, became subject to political pressure of recognising its “Piast” character as the “Recovered Territories”. Th e present research is an att empt to fi nd out to what extent that potential was utilised by new sett lers, who were carriers of various regional (or even national) cultures, for their creation of visions of the future, as well as how the dynamics of those transformations evolved

Belief Formation and Evolution in Public Good Games.

We analyze first-order beliefs in a variation of the Public Good Game. We show that (1) the role that belief elicitation plays in the experiment affects both the contribution behavior and beliefs, and (2) framing influences stated beliefs, as much as contribution behavior. In the second part of the paper, we study the role of heterogeneity in the formation of initial beliefs, and provide an empirical model of the belief up-dating process. Subjects use the past experience, stressing the role of experience that comes from situations similar to the current ones.Beliefs, Public Good, Framing, Experiment, (Belief) Learning

Social Preferences - Literature Survey

This paper surveys the theories of social preferences. Social preferences are based on that people not only care about their own well-being, but they have a certain concern with payoffs and/or actions of others. We classify two approaches: distributional and intention-based models, and later discuss models that combine both theories. In order to provide a better illustration of the discussed models, we derive predictions of these models for two classic experimental protocols: ultimatum game and public good game with punishment. These predictions are compared with the stylized facts of these two games.

Giving it now or later: altruism and discounting

We experimentally study the e¤ect of time on altruism. By postponing payments in a standard Dictator game, subjects allocate a future payment between themselves and others. Since both the payoffs of the Dictator and the Receiver are delayed until the same time, standard intertemporal utility maximization would predict that waiting time should not affect the Dictator's choice. In this respect, we observe that Dictators' decisions are not affected, as long as the time interval between the decision and payment is not large. On the other hand, for large time gaps, subjectsbecome more self-interested.Altruism, Discounting, Dictator game, Intertemporal choice.