8 research outputs found
How do hospitals respond to price changes in emergency departments?
Little is known about how prospective provider payment affects the provision of services led by unpredictable demand. We investigate hospital responses to a 32% increase in price for two treatments in emergency departments in England in April 2011 using data on 11,532,304 attendances (79 hospitals) between 2009/2010 and 2013/2014. We compare changes in the volumes of these two treatments to a treatment not attracting additional reimbursement using a differenceâinâdifferences framework. Additional reimbursement led to 76% and 152% increases in the volumes of the two incentivised treatments. Hospitals received an additional ÂŁ64.4 M between April 2011 and March 2014 for providing these treatments, of which 40% (ÂŁ25.9 M) was attributable to the unanticipated hospital response to the price increase. We use time in treatment to distinguish real increases in treatment from reductions in undercoding or increases in upcoding. The association between the recorded receipt of these treatments and time spent in treatment was the same before and after the price increase, and there was no association between hospitalâspecific increases in recorded treatment volumes and changes in treatment times. The persistence of the treatment time increment suggests the increase in recorded treatment was a real increase in provision of treatments
A Patient Charter of Rights: How to Avoid a Toothless Tiger and Achieve System Improvement
Dishonesty in health care practice: A behavioral experiment on upcoding in neonatology
Dishonest behavior significantly increases the cost of medical care provision. Upcoding of patients is a common form of fraud to attract higher reimbursements. Imposing audit mechanisms including fines to curtail upcoding is widely discussed among health care policy-makers. How audits and fines affect individual health care providers' behavior is empirically not well understood. To provide new evidence on fraudulent behavior in health care, we analyze the effect of a random audit including fines on individuals' honesty by means of a novel controlled behavioral experiment framed in a neonatal care context. Prevalent dishonest behavior declines significantly when audits and fines are introduced. The effect is driven by a reduction in upcoding when being detectable. Yet upcoding increases when not being detectable as fraudulent. We find evidence that individual characteristics (gender, medical background, and integrity) are related to dishonest behavior. Policy implications are discussed