Descartes, pionir prosvjetiteljstva

The article addresses the fundamental elements of Descartes’ embeddedness in the mediaeval and ancient tradition. The more elaborate explication of the common elements, shared by Descartes and his predecessors, enables us to reveal more clearly the rupture point in Descartes’ thought, and shows clearly in the direction of his undisputed legacy for the later times, including French Materialism. Special attention is paid to M. Heidegger’s claim, based on his specific understanding of the history of philosophy, that Descartes represents the paradigmatic shift in the self-understanding of man, which crucially marks the latter development of philosophy, both idealistic and materialistic. Yet another author worthy of explicating in this context is M. A. Gillespie, who clearly adopts Heidegger’s view and further corroborates Descartes’ ontological shift to be read from his markedly different theology.Članak se bavi osnovnim elementima Descartesove uklopljenosti u srednjovjekovnu i antičku tradiciju. Opširnije objašnjenje zajedničkih elemenata koje je Descartes dijelio sa svojim prethodnicima omogućuje nam da preciznije odredimo točku raskida u Descartesovoj misli te jasno ukazuje na njegovo neosporno naslijeđe za kasnija razdoblja, uključujući i francuski materijalizam. Posebna pažnja posvećena je tvrdnji M. Heideggera, koja se temelji na njegovom specifičnom shvaćanju povijesti filozofije, da Descartes predstavlja paradigmatski pomak u samoshvaćanju čovjeka, koja je značajno obilježila kasniji razvoj filozofije, kako one idealističke tako i materijalističke. Još jedan autor kojega vrijedi spomenuti u ovom kontekstu je M. A. Gillespie, koji jasno prihvaća Heideggerov stav te nadalje potvrđuje kako bi se Descartesov ontološki pomak trebao sagledati sa stajališta njegove izrazito drukčije teologije

Boredom with Husserl and Beyond

The present treatise tackles the phenomenon of boredom by first providing reasons for evading the dualistic approach to the phenomenon addressed. Based on the Cartesian criticism of the oversimplified dualist approach of neuroscience, the paper delves into the phenomenological approach to the phenomenon of boredom, as could be only indirectly surmised from Husserl’s (basically Cartesian) transcendental phenomenology of time consciousness. The next chapter deals with Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology as implicated in his compelling and as of yet unsurpassed analysis of the phenomenon of boredom. Through approaching the phenomenon of boredom via Husserl and Heidegger, the basic discontinuity between Husserl’s transcendental and Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology comes clearly to the fore

Suspension of Phenomenological Judgement of Scientific Naivety

The article addresses the negative judgements on natural sciences, however persistent and frequent they may be, found scattered in the philosophical texts of the two founding fathers of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. It first presents these harsh views and then, by assuming the phenomenological method, advocated by both philosophers, endeavours to suspend these judgements in favour of a phenomenologically more adequate description of the scientific comportment, trying to do justice to its non-philosophical excellence. The basic claim of the treatise is that Husserl’s and Heidegger’s criticisms should only be understood in the defensive sense of procuring a firm and safe ground for theoretical comportment, \u27bios theoretikos\u27. Such an approach, however, begs for a phenomenological description of the intrinsic excellence of science, which might be phenomenologically most accurately understood as most rigorous practical comportment, as \u27bios praktikos\u27

Philosophy of Religion: Between Onto-Theology and Onto-Cosmology

Članak obrađuje složeni odnos između filozofije i teologije, posebice s obzirom na Heideggerovu kritiku onto-teologije. Posebna je pažnja posvećena Heideggerovu spisu »Fenomenologija i teologija«, u kojemu se između filozofije i teologije postavlja oštra podjela, pri čemu se potonja treba shvatiti kao pozitivna znanost o kršćanstvu, o tubitku kao vjerovanju. Članak pokušava potkopati apsolutnost ove razlike tvrdeći da se tubitak kao takav ne može uvjerljivo razlikovati od tubitka kao vjerovanja utemeljenog na kriteriju vjere. Ako vjera - shvaćena u iskonskom smislu kao pistis, kao temeljno povjerenje u bitak – spada među fundamentalne egzistencijale tubitka, i ako je Heideggerov tubitak uvijek otvoren za otvorenost svijeta, zbog čega bi njegova filozofija mogla biti strogo shvaćena kao onto-kozmo-logija, tada treba artikulirati razliku između onto-kozmologije i onto-teologije. U tom se kontekstu ističu dva autora, koji su uspjeli izbjeći zamku zaborava bitka: Eugen Fink sa svojom filozofskom fenomenološkom analizom svijeta i Jean-Luc Marion sa svojom teološkom fenomenološkom raspravom o Bogu bez bitka. Razlici između filozofskog i teološkog pristupa ne-ontičkom tlu (bilo u obliku svijeta ili Boga) stoga treba pristupiti pomoću pojma igre i dara. Oba ova pojma i fenomena, kako je prikazano u članku, uspijevaju izbjeći metafiziku prisutnosti. Tada ostaje pitanje kako misliti zajedničko polje filozofije i teologije bez gubljenja njihovih značajki. Jedan je mogući način pozabaviti se razlikom između, kao i isprepletenošću, zahvalnosti (za darivanje dara) i radosti (u igranju igre svijeta).The paper tackles the complex relationship between philosophy and theology, especially given Heidegger\u27s criticism of onto-theology. Special attention is paid to Heidegger\u27s paper “Phenomenology and Theology”, where a strong divide is set between philosophy and theology, where the latter is to be understood as a positive science of Christianity, of Dasein as believing. The paper attempts to undermine the absoluteness of this difference by claiming that Dasein as such cannot be compellingly distinguished from Dasein as believing based on the criterion of faith. If faith – understood in the primordial sense of pistis, as basic trust in being – belongs among fundamental existentiales of Dasein, and if Heidegger\u27s Dasein is always open to the openness of the world, which is why his philosophy could be strictly understood as onto-cosmology, then a difference between onto-cosmology and onto-theology needs to be articulated. Two authors stand out in this context, who have managed to avoid the trap of the oblivion of being: Eugen Fink with his philosophical phenomenological analysis of the world and Jean-Luc Marion with his theological phenomenological treatise on God without being. The difference between the philosophical and theological approach to the non-ontic ground (be it in the form of the world or God) should, therefore, be tackled employing the concept of play and gift. Both these concepts and phenomena, as the paper shows, manage to avoid the metaphysics of presence. The question then remains how are we to think the common ground of philosophy and theology without losing their distinctive features. One possible way is to address the difference between, as well as the intertwining of, gratitude (for the giving of the gift) and joviality (in playing the play of the world)

Limits of Eidetic Dominance

Eidetska vladavina Husserlove filozofije najprije se odražava u odnosu transcendentalnog subjekta prema vremenu i povijesti. Vladavina eidetike iskazuje suverenost subjekta koji je kadar dosegnuti razinu bezvremenog i onkrajpovijesnog kao najviše, čisto biće čistog Ja. Eugen Fink, Husserlov asistent, svojom šestom kartezijanskom meditacijom pokazuje kako transcendentalna konstitucija u svojoj aktivnosti ne može biti posve čista zato jer nalijeće na prepreku konstitucije onog ništa bića. Time se već otvara Heideggerova filozofija bitka, koja je zapravo usidrena u refleksiji onog ništa bića.Eidetic dominance of Husserl’s philosophy is first and foremost evinced in transcendental subject’s relation to time and history. The dominance of eidetics further evinces the sovereignty of the subject, who can reach the level of the extratemporal and ahistorical as the highest, purest being of the pure ego. With his sixth Cartesian meditation, Eugen Fink, Husserl’s assistant, convincingly shows how transcendental constitution in its activity cannot be purely pure exactly because it experiences the rub of the constitution of the nothing of beings. And with it there opens up the arena of Heidegger’s philosophy of being, which is actually anchored in the reflection on this very nothing of beings

Descartes, pionir prosvjetiteljstva

The article addresses the fundamental elements of Descartes’ embeddedness in the mediaeval and ancient tradition. The more elaborate explication of the common elements, shared by Descartes and his predecessors, enables us to reveal more clearly the rupture point in Descartes’ thought, and shows clearly in the direction of his undisputed legacy for the later times, including French Materialism. Special attention is paid to M. Heidegger’s claim, based on his specific understanding of the history of philosophy, that Descartes represents the paradigmatic shift in the self-understanding of man, which crucially marks the latter development of philosophy, both idealistic and materialistic. Yet another author worthy of explicating in this context is M. A. Gillespie, who clearly adopts Heidegger’s view and further corroborates Descartes’ ontological shift to be read from his markedly different theology.Članak se bavi osnovnim elementima Descartesove uklopljenosti u srednjovjekovnu i antičku tradiciju. Opširnije objašnjenje zajedničkih elemenata koje je Descartes dijelio sa svojim prethodnicima omogućuje nam da preciznije odredimo točku raskida u Descartesovoj misli te jasno ukazuje na njegovo neosporno naslijeđe za kasnija razdoblja, uključujući i francuski materijalizam. Posebna pažnja posvećena je tvrdnji M. Heideggera, koja se temelji na njegovom specifičnom shvaćanju povijesti filozofije, da Descartes predstavlja paradigmatski pomak u samoshvaćanju čovjeka, koja je značajno obilježila kasniji razvoj filozofije, kako one idealističke tako i materijalističke. Još jedan autor kojega vrijedi spomenuti u ovom kontekstu je M. A. Gillespie, koji jasno prihvaća Heideggerov stav te nadalje potvrđuje kako bi se Descartesov ontološki pomak trebao sagledati sa stajališta njegove izrazito drukčije teologije

Kurze Geschichte von Protagoras’ Philosophie

Poznato je da je s Nietzscheom i Heideggerom došlo do snažne re-evaluacije povijesti filozofije koja je dovela do inverzije do tada prevladavajuće paradigme progresivnog napretka. U Hegela i Husserla, da navedem samo dvije velike figure moderne filozofije, povijest filozofije razumljena je kao napredak od skromnih početaka u drevnoj Grčkoj do kulminacije u apsolutnoj subjektivnosti moderne filozofije. Nietzsche i Heidegger, međutim, svaki na svoj način, više su ili manje uvjerljivo izazvali takav pogled, otkrivajući povijest filozofije kao regresiju i pad prije negoli napredak. U njihovu zajedničkom pogledu, veliki, ali slabo razvijen početak filozofije, kako se prepoznaje u Sokrata, Platona i Aristotela, striktno su razumijevani kao početak opadanja spram doista značajnog početka koji se mogao pronaći kod predsokratičkih filozofa poput Heraklita, Parmenida i Anaksimandra, pa čak i notornog sofista Protagore. Ovaj rad želi osvijetliti to kataklizmičko pomicanje filozofsko-povijesne paradigme dajući posebnu pozornost povijesti interpretiranja Protagorina filozofskog impetusa. Rasprava završava kao otvoren interpretativni horizont, naglašavajući važnost ponovnog ispitivanja dviju suprotstavljenih paradigmi u povijesti filozofije.It is a well-known fact that, with Nietzsche and Heidegger, a powerful re-evaluation of the history of philosophy took place, which brought about an inversion of the previously prevalent paradigm of progressive advancement. In Hegel and Husserl, to mention but two major figures of modern philosophy, the history of philosophy was conceived as the advancement from humble beginnings in ancient Greece, towards the ultimate culmination in absolute subjectivity in modern philosophy. Nietzsche and Heidegger, on the other hand, both in their way, more or less compellingly challenged this view by revealing the history of philosophy as regression and downfall rather than advancement. In their common view, the grand, yet undeveloped beginnings of philosophy, as recognised in the figures such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, were strictly understood as the first downfall from the truly grand beginnings to be found in Pre-Socratic thinkers such as Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaximander, and even the notorious sophist Protagoras. The paper attempts to shed light on this cataclysmic shift of the philosophical¬historical paradigm by paying particular attention to the history of interpretation of Protagoras’ philosophical impetus. The treatise ends with an open interpretative horizon, thereby emphasizing the importance of a re-consideration of the two opposing paradigms of the history of philosophy.Il est connu qu’avec Nietzsche et Heidegger la philosophie de l’histoire a subi une forte réévaluation qui a mené à une inversion des paradigmes, jusque-là dominants, de l’évolution progressive. Chez Hegel et Husserl, mentionnant seulement deux grandes figures de la philosophie moderne, l’histoire de la philosophie était comprise comme une évolution dont les débuts modestes ont émergé en Grèce Ancienne et ont trouvé leur point culminant dans la subjectivité absolue de la philosophie moderne. Nietzsche et Heidegger ont, pourtant, chacun à leur manière, plus ou moins encouragé un tel regard en révélant que l’histoire de la philosophie est davantage régression et chute avant d’être évolution. Dans leur pensée commune, le commencement considérable, mais peu développé, de la philosophie telle qu’on la connaît chez Socrate, Platon et Aristote, est perçu comme le commencement d’un déclin en comparaison au commencement majeur que l’on pouvait trouver chez les philosophes présocratiques tels que Héraclite, Parménide et Anaximandre, voire chez le fameux sophiste Protagoras. Ce travail souhaite mettre en lumière ce déplacement cataclysmique du paradigme philosophico-historique en attirant spécialement l’attention sur l’histoire de l’interprétation de l’impetus philosophique de Protagoras. La discussion se termine en proposant un horizon ouvert d’interprétation et en mettant l’accent sur l’importance d’une nouvelle recherche de deux paradigmes opposées dans l’histoire de la philosophie.Es ist bekannt, dass es mit Nietzsche und Heidegger zu einer starken Neubewertung der Geschichte der Philosophie gekommen ist, die zu einer Inversion des bis dahin vorherrschenden Paradigmas des progressiven Fortschritts geführt hat. Bei Hegel und Husserl, um nur zwei große Figuren der modernen Philosophie zu nennen, wird die Geschichte der Philosophie als Fortschritt von den bescheidenen Anfängen im altertümlichen Griechenland bis zum Höhepunkt in der absoluten Subjektivität der modernen Philosophie erfasst. Indessen haben Nietzsche und Heidegger, jeder auf seine Art und Weise, mehr oder weniger überzeugend eine solche Sichtweise hervorgerufen und die Geschichte der Philosophie eher als Regression und Niedergang als Fortschritt offenbart. In ihrer gemeinsamen Betrachtungsweise wird der große, aber schwach entwickelte Anfang der Philosophie, wie er bei Sokrates, Platon und Aristoteles erkannt wird, strikt als Beginn des Herabsinkens im Vergleich zu einem wahrhaftig bedeutsamen Anfang angesehen, der sich bei vorsokratischen Philosophen wie Heraklit, Parmenides, Anaximander und sogar beim notorischen Sophisten Protagoras vorfinden lässt. Diese Arbeit setzt sich zum Ziel, diese kataklystische Verschiebung des philosophisch-geschichtlichen Paradigmas zu beleuchten, wobei der Geschichte der Interpretation von Protagoras’ philosophischem Impetus besondere Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet wird. Die Abhandlung endet als ein offener interpretativer Horizont und akzentuiert die Signifikanz einer erneuten Untersuchung zweier sich widerstreitender Paradigmen in der Geschichte der Philosophie

Nietzsche und Heidegger

The present treatise attempts to point out the complexity of the relationship between Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. The background of this relationship is the phenomenon of attunement. Heidegger criticized Nietzsche for his metaphysical nihilism, which is arguably manifestes in his thought of the Will to Power as Will to Will. Heidegger’s interpretation is nevertheless a genuine approach to this enigmatic thinker, pointing out for the first time the relevance of Nietzsche for modern metaphysics; relevance, which had previously been set aside despite all possible either affirmative or negative approaches to the thinker of Zarathustra. All this notwithstanding, however, there still remains a topic in Nietzsche, which needs our further attention and which can fruitfully contribute to the understanding of what appears to be their common thought. The door leading into the arena of both Nietzsche and Heidegger is the topic of atopical fundamental attunement. Deciding this matter thus proves of crucial importance for the understanding not only of Nietzsche and Heidegger, but also of our present-day situation.Ova rasprava pokušava ukazati na složenost odnosa između Friedricha Nietzschea i Martina Heideggera. U pozadini tog odnosa jest fenomen ugađanja, što ga objašnjavaju oba mislioca. Heidegger kritizira Nietzschea zbog njegova metafizičkog nihilizma, što je diskutabilno prisutno u njegovu mišljenju Volje za moć kao Volje za Voljom. Heideggerova interpretacija unatoč tomu iznosi na vidjelo bogatstvo i potpunost izvornog pristupa tom enigmatskom misliocu, što je po prvi put ukazalo na relavantnost Nietzschea za modernu metafiziku; relavantnost što je prije bila zabačena unatoč svim mogućim afirmativnim ili negativnim pristupima misliocu Zarathustre. Svemu tome usprkos, ipak, još uvijek ostaje temâ u Nietzscheu, koje je i sam Heideger zabacio, a koje mogu odlučno i plodonosno doprinijeti razumijevanju onoga što se čini njihovom zajedničkom mišlju. Vrata što vode u arenu kako Nietzschea tako i Heideggera, tema je netematskog fundamentalnog ugađanja. Odlučivanje o toj stvari tako se pokazuje od ključne važnosti za razumijevanje ne samo Nietzschea i Heideggera već također i naše današnje situacije.Ce débat tente de montrer la complexité du rapport entre Friedrich Nietzsche et Martin Heidegger. Derrière ce rapport se trouve le phénomène de mise en accord qui a été explicité par les deux penseurs. Heidegger critique Nietzsche pour son nihilisme métaphysique, ce qui est présent de manière discutable dans sa réflexion sur Volonté de puissance comme Volonté de Volonté. L ’interprétation de Heidegger est néanmoins révélatrice de la richesse et de la profondeur d’une approche authentique de ce penseur énigmatique, qui a montré, pour la première fois, l’importance de Nietzsche pour la métaphysique moderne ; une importance qui, dans un premier temps, avait été laissée de côté malgré toutes les approches possibles et imaginables, affirmatives ou négatives, de la pensée de l’auteur de Zarathoustra. En dépit de tout cela, il reste des sujets chez Nietzsche qui ont été laissés de côté par Heidegger lui-même, et qui pourtant pourraient contribuer, de manière décisive et fructueuse, à la compréhension de ce que leur pensée semble partager. L e cheval de bataille de Nietzsche comme de Heidegger est le thème d’une mise en accord fondamentale athématique. Cette question devient ainsi primordiale pour la compréhension, non seulement de Nietzsche et de Heidegger, mais aussi de notre situation contemporaine.Die vorliegende Abhandlung versucht auf die Komplexität der Bezüge zwischen Friedrich Nietzsche und Martin Heidegger aufmerksam zu machen. Im Hintergrund dieser Bezüge steht das Phänomen der Stimmigkeit, das von beiden Denkern erörtert wird. Heidegger macht Nietzsche zwar dessen metaphysischen Nihilismus zum Vorwurf, der im Wille zur Macht im Sinne eines Willen zum Willen gegenwärtig sei. Dennoch verweist Heideggers Interpretation auf die Vielfältigkeit und Vielseitigkeit im ursprünglichen Denkansatz dieses hintergründigen Denkers, womit erstmals auf die Relevanz Nietzsches bezüglich der modernen Metaphysik verwiesen wurde; diese Relevanz war zuvor, sämtlichen affirmativen oder negativen Äußerungen über den Urheber des Zarathustra zum Trotz, verworfen worden. Trotz alledem gibt es bei Nietzsche auch weiterhin Themen, die selbst Heidegger verkannt hatte, die jedoch auf vorzügliche und ertragreiche Weise zum Verständnis dessen, was man als Gemeinsamkeiten im Denken dieser beiden Philosophen betrachten darf, beitragen können. Das Tor, das sowohl in Nietzsches als auch in Heideggers Denkarena führt, ist das Thema ihrer thematisch neutralen, fundamentalen Stimmigkeit. Die Beurteilung dieses Sachverhalts erweist sich so als grundlegend für das Verständnis Nietzsches und Heideggers, aber auch für unsere heutige Situation