

Original Paper UDC 111.1/Nietzsche, Heidegger

Received December 21st, 2007

**Janko M. Lozar**Univerza v Ljubljani, Filozofska fakulteta, Aškerčeva 2, SI-1000 Ljubljana  
janko.lozar@guest.arnes.si**Nietzsche and Heidegger****Abstract**

*The present treatise attempts to point out the complexity of the relationship between Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. The background of this relationship is the phenomenon of attunement. Heidegger criticized Nietzsche for his metaphysical nihilism, which is arguably manifestes in his thought of the Will to Power as Will to Will. Heidegger's interpretation is nevertheless a genuine approach to this enigmatic thinker, pointing out for the first time the relevance of Nietzsche for modern metaphysics; relevance, which had previously been set aside despite all possible either affirmative or negative approaches to the thinker of Zarathustra. All this notwithstanding, however, there still remains a topic in Nietzsche, which needs our further attention and which can fruitfully contribute to the understanding of what appears to be their common thought. The door leading into the arena of both Nietzsche and Heidegger is the topic of atypical fundamental attunement. Deciding this matter thus proves of crucial importance for the understanding not only of Nietzsche and Heidegger, but also of our present-day situation.*

**Key Words**

Anxiety, serenity, Zarathustra, Being, time

Heidegger's Nietzsche-interpretation is a genuine approach to Nietzsche, pointing out for the first time strictly philosophical, and not only fictional, relevance of this enigmatic thinker for modern metaphysics; relevance which had been previously missed out despite all possible either affirmative or negative approaches to the thinker of *Zarathustra*. However, there still remains a Nietzsche topic that could help us discover a Nietzsche which was neglected by Heidegger himself, and which can fruitfully contribute to the understanding of Heidegger's enormous philosophical opera as well as of the truth of contemporaneity.

We should now open of the door of meaning leading into the arena of both Nietzsche and Heidegger straight to the topic of atypical fundamental attunement. But before we delve into this issue, we first have to present a minimal picture of Heidegger's philosophical project. Being-in-the-world, we learn, is the basic existentiale of *Dasein*. *Dasein* encounters itself and the world primarily through its being-in-the-world. Unlike other philosophers from the past, both distant and recent,<sup>1</sup> Heidegger offers a philosophical treatise on our pre-theoretical attitudes, bearings and activities, which in Cartesian, or rather

1

With the exception of, as one might expect, Plato. Compare for instance his dialogue *Theaetetus*, where *doxa* is deemed a *positive* element; or in *Parmenides*, where the exist-

ence of ideas in themselves, as contrasted to the transient world of our senses in itself, is deemed totally unfruitful.

one-sided Platonist, tradition proved the primary obstacle on the way to truth and true knowledge. Reconsidering Heidegger's contribution, we must bear in mind that it differs in crucial respects from that of René Descartes. We can pinpoint the major difference between the two among the greatest philosophers of modern age by concentrating on the first meditation of Descartes' *Meditations* and the second paragraph of *Being and Time*: entering the Cartesian world, we are first asked to do away with the sphere of our everydayness. If we want to take the path of true knowledge, we have to forget and set aside everything which makes the world and life homely and philosophically relevant in its "pre-philosophical" comportment: the method here undertaken is that of radical doubt, as is well known.<sup>2</sup> The feeling of belonging to a family and country, love of parents, love of the chosen one, dreams, memories of things long past, stories told by our grandparents, premonitions, anticipations, sentiments, fears and anxieties, the melody of one's mother tongue, the pleasures and wonders of sensual life etc., it all has to be set aside as something erroneous, leading astray from the true path to knowledge. Doubt also undermines the basic belief in our senses: what we at first see as a burning candle, after a certain period of time turns into liquid wax, therefore the perception of a candle is something that simply cannot be trusted.<sup>3</sup>

How altogether differently speaks to us the beginning of Heidegger's major work: Human being is a being which encounters itself and the world in all dimensions and aspects as a being-in-the world. Not only this: in addressing, either theoretically or practically, entities in their essence, *Dasein* always already understands the being of beings. All that was bracketed out in Descartes now serves as the positive ground for developing either scientific or philosophical knowledge, particularly through the reflection on the mode of *Dasein's* being in its comportment. Descartes' *cogito sum* is the subject, whose nature – after the obliteration of all experience – can be thought in categories primarily because he endeavours to reveal the essential structure of cogito, in disregard of its being. In Heidegger, *Dasein* is discussed in terms of fundamental existentialia, because its being, existence rather than essence, proves to be the ultimate "objectless object" of his philosophical endeavour. If categories address the essentiality of beings, human being included, Heidegger's attempt at the determination of the existence or existentiality of the human being has to set aside the categorical language and create his own terminology. This is why basic philosophical words which address the existence of *Dasein*, the "sum" of *cogito*, are given a telling name of existentialia. And the basic existentialia, revealing the truth of *Dasein's* existence, are the following: attunement, understanding and language. The explication of the pre-theoretical truth of human being thus serves as the grounding of theory, of reason, in the groundless ground of the primary openness to being in its existentiality. It also answers the question what are the reasons for human being's theoretical openness to the essentiality of existence at all; the question, which had been previously evaded (forgotten, according to Heidegger) because of the supposed extra-temporal quality of *cogito*, absolute ego and transcendental consciousness.

According to Edmund Husserl, the theoretical self, after having accomplished transcendental reduction, finds the questions of being and non-being irrelevant – small wonder that Husserl compares this "mental experience" to the experience of religious conversion.<sup>4</sup>

Heidegger's *Dasein* is an entirely different matter. The first and primary determination of human being as *Dasein* is its thrownness into the world, being and time. And *Dasein*, says Heidegger, cannot step outside its thrownness. It is for this (pre-theoretical) reason that *Dasein*, thrown into the possibility

of non-being, finds itself already open to the openness of being as the caring comportment to being. Thrown into the openness of being, it is always already thrown into being addressed by Being and into its own addressing Being. This is where the primordially of *Dasein*'s pre-conceptual language lies. The being of *Dasein* is always already understood in the language of addressing Being and Being addressed by being. In addressing Being, *Dasein* always already understands what it means to be. On the way to being it always already understands itself through being, and actively understands its address-ness by being. The Being of *Dasein* is thus always already understood as the understanding of Being. And last but not least, in being open to the openness of Being, in being affected by this openness, *Dasein* is primordially moved by this openness and thus always already thrown in fundamental movedness, motion, commotion and emotion. The final, yet really primary aspect of the Being of *Dasein* is thus affective, emotional – attunement.

To come into an intimate vicinity of the latter phenomenon or existentials of attunement, however, we are first obliged to reflect on the very nature of this path to the truth of the Being of *Dasein*, the path, which is always already the path of, in and through language. What are then various aspects of language as *logos*, considered within the framework of history of philosophy and on the ground of being-in-the world? Three aspects of *logos* are the following:

The first, most obvious aspect of language is manifest in the everydayness of common existence: impersonal talk. Heidegger stresses that impersonal talk isn't used in the negative sense but rather *positively* as a phenomenon, which constitutes the manner of being of understanding of everyday *Dasein*. This is the shortest possible explication of the difference between Descartes and Heidegger. By stressing its positive character, Heidegger obviously responds to Descartes' demand for an exclusion of the everydayness of impersonal talk and everyday understanding of being-in-the world.

The second aspect of language, which is historically posited in explicit contrast to impersonal talk through the establishment of science, is the language of science as logic. Traditional modern philosophy, best formulated by Descartes, grounds and builds its project on the duality of *logos* as logic and *logos* as impersonal talk. The erroneous world of perception, sensation, emotions is neglected, rejected as illogical, confused and obscure, as he puts it in *The Passions of the Soul* (Descartes, 1989: 34), in order to begin the building up of a rational, logical system, set apart from the world of illogical becoming. In *Phaedo*, Plato says explicitly that senses distract the soul in its reaching the region of truth. Soul is deemed immortal, truth belongs to a sphere devoid of all change and becoming, ideas are not subject to changes. The dualism therefore rests on the following dualities: truth/lie, truthfulness/deception, beauty/ugliness, holy/profane, and good/evil.<sup>5</sup>

2

Or, as Husserl would put it, the method applied by Descartes is that of *epoché*. See Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1964, p. 16.

3

René Descartes, *Meditations*, Liberal Arts Press, New York 1951, p. 34.

4

See Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*:

*An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, Northwestern University Press, Chicago 1970, p. 234.

5

Again, this is not *all* Plato, as stated above, which only goes to prove that the variety of his dialogues argues for diversity and even contradictoriness of his numerous stances towards the essence and truth of man.

According to Nietzsche, the last duality forms the basis of all other dualities. What is subject to change, difference, is not good (not logical) for us humans and is therefore evil (and illogical), staying outside the realm of the idea of the good (as eternal logical truth); that which transcends all change and is within the realm of eternal identity, is good and beautiful and sacred and true – and logical. This is why Nietzsche calls his critique of philosophy and religion – a critique of morality.

Descartes' candle from the first meditation could serve as a metaphor for the whole region of temporal phenomena: objects of sensual perception, sensations, images of imagination, they are all subject to change and therefore illogical, and the deceptive working of *malign genius*. What lies above this sphere is not Plato's immortal soul, taking part in transcendent ideas, but rather the pure subject as *ego cogito*, or *cogito sum*, which grounds its substantiality in the first logical argumentation of logical thought in correspondence with logical being. As Descartes himself puts it, it is or should be the Archimedean point which transcends all change. This is nowadays generally understood as the shift to modern age or anthropocentrism, with *cogito* as the only subject within the universe of logically representable objects.

It is within this framework of thought, which might provisionally be called transcendentalism, that Husserl's project takes place. His *Cartesian Meditations* begin the same project, only in a more radical way. Husserl says that his meditations are a further development of Descartes'.<sup>6</sup> And again, the first demand is to bracket out the being of the world, to do away with illogical nature of the temporal world, which obstructs logical thought, if we are to find absolute certainty as the ground of philosophy as pure science of logic – what he strives for is the apodictic logical evidence of the absolute ego. However, the Husserl of *Cartesian Meditations* differs significantly from the Husserl of *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. What exactly happens in this text? If Husserl in *Cartesian Meditations* – in tune with Platonist and Cartesian tradition – brackets out the being of the world, in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, the being of the world, which is given in experience and handed down by tradition, is deemed a *positive* ground for carrying out our initial scientific investigation. The method introduced is that of the *Rückfrage*, retroactive question – need I say that it's the hermeneutic method of understanding? What is known, either in living experience or by way of tradition, is the first and necessary premise for engaging an investigation into the unknown – within that which is known. This could be called a step away from the Cartesian method of doubt – and a birth of the phenomenological method. Here, Husserl lays stress on the non-evident and non-reflected obviousness handed down by tradition, which rests in the illogical domain of the above-mentioned impersonal and superficially opinionated talk. This is in fact the manner in which tradition is handed down (there is no genuine logical handing down of a tradition), which is accepted through a passive reception of more or less binding beliefs, convictions and truths. And these passively received truths of the world are the sediment and the implicit ground necessary for explicit understanding of oneself and the world. However, despite this stepping away, Husserl still remains within the framework of Platonism exactly by his embracing the absolute ego as *the unquestioned logical ground* of apodictic evidence.

As Husserl managed to show, the logic of naturalist science, just as the *doxa* of everyday superficiality, rests on the presupposition of the duality of (the logic of) thinking and things. Logic is thus believed to be the only true bridge

between subjectivity and objectivity. The nature of truth is understood as the correspondence of reason and things, whereby reason steps out from its immanent, self-closed sphere into the world, which exists as closed in itself. And in doing so, reason is supposed to establish the correct correspondence between itself and the world.

This presupposition of science, the truth as correspondence of judgment and reality, is also the primary target of Heidegger's criticism of naïve scientific objectivism.<sup>7</sup> This is where the primordially of the existentials of being-in-the-world, which was introduced at the very beginning, comes readily into play. There is no subject in itself and no object in itself, the gap between which would then be bridged by the logic of the subject. That we can describe and attribute qualities to things, *Dasein* and things of the world first have to be given in the openness of the world as disclosedness, in which *Dasein* and the world are given and revealed, only then to be able to correspond and agree. Agreement of propositions and things is *enabled by* and *given in* the openness, disclosure of the worldhood of the world, the mutual address of human *being* and the *being* of the world.

Heidegger's criticism is also directed against the truth of transcendental science, which grounds its truth in the subjectivity of the subject. If transcendental truth managed to do away with the naïveté of naturalist sciences, as Husserl's example clearly shows, it still remains within the grips of truth of language as logic, which finds its first impetus for philosophy in the negation of everydayness of doxical impersonal talk. Heidegger clearly and convincingly shows, that truth as *adequatio intellectus ad rem*, accordance of mind and the thing, which supposedly rests in the self-evidence of transcendental consciousness, is not firstly and primarily given through the negation of everyday experience and being of the world, as in Descartes and Husserl, but rather *in the very givenness* of being-in-the-world. To put it differently, traditional truth rests upon and grows from common experience, opinions (*doxa*), sensations, perceptions, premonitions, remembrances, etc. Truth as correspondence of reason and things is grounded in truth as unconcealment (*Unverborgenheit, aletheia*).

With this in mind, we now enter the third and final dimension of *logos*, which retrospectively changes the very nature and attitude towards both impersonal talk and logic: language (*Sprache*). Heidegger's necessity of posing the question of Being starts from where Husserl stopped. If Husserl stopped at the unquestionable, self-evident (extra-temporal) Being of consciousness, Heidegger digs deeper only to discover that the Being of *Dasein* is not eternal, ever-present, but rather finite and mortal. In the introduction to *Being and Time*, Heidegger starts from the well-known and established "facts" about Being, handed down by tradition: "Being is the most general concept", "Being cannot be defined" and "Being is a self-evident concept not wanting further investigation".<sup>8</sup> However, for Heidegger, the question of Being becomes *the* retroactive question of his philosophical endeavour.

6  
Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 33.

8  
Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford 1978, p. 7.

7  
Needless to say, the same truth is already seriously undermined by Nietzsche and his thought of primary perspectivism.

The focus of our present attention is the Being of *Dasein* as the being-within-the world and the complex existentials of language as *logos*. Traditional thought rests upon the truth as *adequatio*, agreement of consciousness and being. Not so in Heidegger: we most surely acquire a better understanding of Heidegger's thought if we do not set aside his notion of truth as *aletheia*, unconcealment. If we commence from the ground of truth as correspondence, what happens is that we exclude in advance the worldhood of the world in its disclosure and set aside the most important question what is the *being* of this correspondence. Being-in-the world and its existentialia can only be addressed on the ground of truth as *aletheia*.

What is *logos* from the perspective of *aletheia*? What is language? It is the manner of Being of *Dasein*, which understands itself and the world through language. *Logos* as language is a further development of impersonal talk and logic precisely as its abysmal foreground. The knowledge of the world doesn't start with the requirement of agreement, adequacy of mind and being, but from the *openness* of both mind and being. Language as existentials is also the language employed in *Being and Time*, serving to reveal and articulate the sphere which was previously hidden and neglected. And this is moment to turn back to Heidegger's thesis that the Being of *Dasein* is always already disclosed in attunement.

The sphere of attunement (*Stimmung*) already holds certain knowledge of the self and the world. When we say "*Es stimmt*", we are "pre-theoretically" in tune with a certain truth, no matter how inarticulate it is – the translation into English would be "this holds true". This holding true, "*es stimmt*", implies being already in hold of a certain truth of the world and the self. Both *phainomenon* and *logos* are names applied in the investigation of the previously neglected sphere of being-in-the-world, which, as Heidegger says, is the groundless ground of theoretical knowledge. There is no absolute ground of the *cogito sum* or absolute ego.

To put it in a nutshell, Heidegger reveals the sphere of *logos*, which was neglected exactly in that it was believed to be self-evident, general, beyond definition. And *logos* – as the medial sphere which makes possible both impersonal talk and logic – is the name which brings together human being and the being of the world in their mutual openness and encountering.

At the beginning of *Being and Time*, Heidegger cites a sentence taken from Plato's *Sophist*: "*Me mython tina diegesthai*" (do not tell stories) (Heidegger, 1978, 1). This may well seem a direct critique of *mythos* within the sphere of philosophy, as if it had no place in it at all. However, we should not take this sentence literally, *i.e.* as a philosophical obviousness, but rather as an indirect, non-philosophically expressed critique of metaphysics (onto-theology). To put it philosophically, we should not explain or determine beings or entities in their origin by reducing them to yet another entity or essent. This is acceptable when considered within the framework of the critique of onto-theology. But what can we say about *mythos* itself? Is it really solely a matter of onto-theology? Not at all. How are we otherwise to understand Plato's metaphor of the Sun depicting the idea of the Good, which is beyond all entities, essences, beyond the being of beings? As well as Heidegger's Fourfold, which gives the being of beings and beings as such?

*Mythos* lies at the core of *logos*. It is not just the accompanying phenomenon of *logos*, or a language leading us astray from the logical path to true knowledge. Rather, it is to be understood as the final frontier and inner limit of *logos*,

beginning where *logos* fails, further articulating the truth revealed through *logos*. At the end of Plato's *Republic*, Socrates' concluding thought is:

“And thus Glaucon, the tale [*mythos*] was saved, as the saying is, and was not lost. And it will save us if we believe in it, and we shall safely cross the River of Lethe, and keep our souls unspotted from the world.”<sup>9</sup>

For Plato, *mythos* is the soul's saviour.

### On the Way to Interpretation – Nietzsche and Heidegger

In view of the three aspects of *logos*, discussed above, we shall now try to reveal a Nietzsche which evades Heidegger's criticism of Nietzsche's metaphysics as the oblivion of Being.

As regards the first, most frequent aspect of *logos*, impersonal talk, we stumble upon the common, everyday understanding of Nietzsche's thought. In our everyday understanding, we superficially address Nietzsche's philosophy without stopping even for a second to pay regard to the meanings and historical truth of us moderns. The substance of everyday, impersonal and superfluous truth of Nietzsche's philosophy is embedded in the following “facts”: there is no truth, everything is allowed, Nietzsche as the anticipator as well as instigator of German national socialism, the proof for it found in that every German soldier of WW1 carried in his satchel, beside medications, his book *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and that Hitler was given Nietzsche's walking stick; his “superman” is an image of the Arian SS soldier; it was his heretic thought that has driven him mad...

The truth expressed in impersonal talk of the “they” articulates a certain attunement as inclination to or against Nietzsche's thought. This is how tradition is handed down: we shouldn't judge these *a priori*, superficial judgments as a mere obstacle on the way to the “real” Nietzsche. There is no Nietzsche thought in itself. The attunement which permeates words, opinions, judgments on Nietzsche, the attunement of sceptical certainty, is the primary disclosure of Nietzsche to us through tradition. As the sedimentation of more or less passively received opinions, beliefs, *sentiments and resentments*, as the basic attunement, this should serve as a *positive* ground for a further and deeper investigation of his thought.

The second step is getting to grips with Nietzsche tackling the problem of logic: there are numerous fragments, paragraphs scattered all over his work, which concentrate on the issues of causal connection, the relationship of the subject and the predicate, thing in itself and thing for us. To those familiar with Plato's philosophy, Nietzsche's articulation of the problem of the thing in itself, participation and agreement of ideas and things is actually far from original: for already in the dialogue *Parmenides*, Plato executed a severe critique of his own theory of ideas, as can be found for instance in *Phaedo*. Nietzsche's critique of truth as *adequatio* is already tackled by Plato himself. The same can be said about his thought of the subject of activity, a critique of substance in his famous passage on the “striking of lightning”,<sup>10</sup> despite its

9  
*The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1969, p. 844.

10  
Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals*, Doubleday & Company Inc., New York 1956, p. 212.

stylistic perfection, it cannot be deemed his own. It was again already Plato who undermined the causal connection between ideas and things.

And the traditional division essence/appearance is already tackled by Kant: all we can know and realize are things themselves (*die Sachen selbst*), while the thing in itself (*das Ding an Sich*) remains unknown, beyond the horizon of reason. Nietzsche actually goes further in saying that if there is a collapse of the agreement between essences and appearances, things can no longer be thought through this duality, that is to say, they cannot be thought in Kant's sense of things for us as mere appearances.

This, however, already paves the way to Heidegger's concept of the thing as phenomenon, *to phainomenon*, discussed in *Being and Time*, as grounded in the truth as *aletheia*. Both impersonal talk and logic cannot come close to Nietzsche's original contribution. We do, however, come closer to his genuine thought through his *mythos*, namely the Thought of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same. Can *mythos* be understood as thinking? Indeed it can; under the entry *mythomai*, the Greek dictionary introduce the meaning *to think*. Even if we hadn't known this, could we have actually said that Hesiod's *Theogony* or Parmenides' poem *Peri physeos* (*On Nature*) were, as myths, lacking in any thought?

What is then the eternal recurrence of the same? In *Zarathustra*, which is an extraordinary amalgam of his *logos* and *mythos*, we are given the riddle of all riddles.

### Of the Vision and the Riddle

"Lately I walked gloomily through a deathly-grey twilight, gloomily and sternly with compressed lips. Not only one sun had gone down for me",

says Zarathustra (Nietzsche, 1961: 176). But he won't give in to this spirit of revenge, spirit of heaviness; he will climb the hill despite the dwarf sitting on his shoulder, nagging him:

"O Zarathustra, you stone of wisdom! You have thrown yourself high, but every stone that is thrown must – fall." (1961: 177)

It is at this moment that Zarathustra introduces the riddle of all riddles. There are two gates facing each other: one of them leads into the future, the other into the past. What if both paths are infinite? Is then the future still opposed to the past, do they contradict each other, if all the future has already happened? This is the moment of the shortest shadow, and we can only marvel at his image of the eternal recurrence of the same, which makes the dwarf as the spirit of revenge disappear:

"Behold this moment!" I went on. "From this gateway Moment a long, eternal lane runs *back*: an eternity lies behind us. Must not all things that *can* run have already run along this lane? [...] And if all things have been here before, what do you think of this moment, dwarf? Must not his gateway, too, have been here – before? And are not all things bound fast together in such a way that this moment draws after it all the future things! *Therefore* – draws itself too?"

For all things that *can* run must also run once again forward along this lane.

And this slow spider that creeps along in the moonlight, and this moonlight itself, and I and you at this gateway whispering of eternal things – must we not all have been here before? [...]

Must we not return eternally?

Thus I spoke, and I spoke more and more softly: for I was afraid of my own thoughts and reservations. Then, suddenly, I heard a dog *howling* nearby. Had I ever heard a dog howling in that way? My thoughts ran back. Yes! When I was a child, in my most distant childhood:



– Then I heard a dog howling in that way. And saw it, too, bristling, its head raised, trembling in the stillest midnight, when even dogs believe in ghosts.”<sup>11</sup>

We would most likely miss the message of this chapter, if we looked at it through the eyes of traditional *logos* as either impersonal talk or logic. Nietzsche’s mythical thought disturbs everyday understanding in its self-complacency, and the logic in its axiomatic peace. Both fail to get to grips with what Nietzsche wants to say – or better still – what the metaphor itself has to say both to him and us.

What comes into play here is *logos* as language and *mythos* as pre-logical thought. How does Zarathustra understand himself through the metaphor, and what attunement is revealed to us through his words? The riddle is obviously all about the truth of attunement and the world revealed in this attunement – the truth of the primary, pre-logical mutual attunement of human being and the being of the world. What does the story invoke? The attunement of modern man as the truth of the modern world:

“Gloomily walked I lately in corpse coloured twilight gloomily and sternly, with compressed lips. Not only one sun has set for me.” (1961: 178).

Everything recurs, everything has already happened, there is nothing new looming on the horizon. The existentials of attunement (*Stimmung*) expressed here is that of profound boredom, weariness and gloom – and it is from this fundamental ill-humor, attunement as misattunement (*Verstimmung*), that a certain truth about the human being and the world *in their mutual truth of being* is either covertly or overtly articulated. A brief mentioning of Schopenhauer’s will to life and his pessimism is enough to suggest what is meant by this resentment. Neither impersonal talk nor logic with its systematic comfort can either solve this riddle or rescue us from its dismal implications. Perhaps the best thing they can do – and they manage it pretty well – is to conceal it from us. What is the truth of boredom and weariness? Is not the truth of human *being* the truth of human *time* as the all-the-same-ness of things past, present and future? Is not the world, revealed in boredom and weary gloom, the world where everything has already happened, where everything returns over and over again – as always boringly, wearily and gloomily, eternally the same?

This misattunement is embodied in the dwarf as the spirit of heaviness. Now, the crucial question here is what is it that makes the dwarf, the spirit of heaviness and revenge disappear?

“For the full moon had just gone over the house, silent as death, it had just stopped still, a round glow, still upon the flat roof as if upon a forbidden place: that was what terrified the dog: for dogs believe in thieves and ghosts. [...]

Where had the dwarf now gone? And the gateway? And the spider? And all the whispering? Had I been dreaming? Had I awoken? All at once I was standing between wild cliffs, alone, desolate in the most desolate moonlight.”<sup>12</sup>

What is articulated in these mythical thoughts if not the *attunement of anxiety*? In anxiety all beings in their being dissipate into nothingness.

“Where had the dwarf now gone? And the gateway? And the spider?” (1961: 179)

11  
Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*,  
Penguin Classics, London 1961, p. 178–179.

12  
Fr. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.

Amid this absencing of absence, Zarathustra stands dreary in the dreariest moonlight. And it is *anxiety* which is unbearable for the spirit of heaviness always seeking truth and beauty beyond being-in-the-world. Does not the world reveal itself in anxiety as bereft of all meaning and homeliness? Do not all things lose themselves in the uncanny openness? The moon as the uncanny round glow which loses its place in the world?

Can we find any support for this argument? And first of all, how can we tell that this transformation, the event of being, does not take place in the realm of the will as the will to power? In *Zarathustra*, in the Paragraph “Redemption”, we read the following:

“This, yes, this alone is revenge itself: the will’s antipathy towards time and time’s ‘It was’.” (1961: 162)

What is the antipathy (ill-humour) of the will? Is it the will? Or is it something else? According to Nietzsche’s logic, can there be a will that manifests itself as ill-humour? Is there a lightning behind this striking? Accordingly, is there a will manifesting itself as unwillingness? No. What is then this ill-humour, ill-will, antipathy, disgust? Is it not misattunement? Doesn’t it all happen within the sphere of *Dasein*’s being-in-the-world as attunement rather than within the sphere of the will? It is exactly the misattunement of boredom and disgust that both Zarathustra and the dwarf express – the dwarf is namely being carried by Zarathustra himself. And by delivering the thought of the eternal recurrence of the same, *the resentment or missatunement makes way to anxiety* – the dwarf, the spirit of revenge and heaviness disappear in anxiety.

And what is the laughter of the shepherd who bites off the head of the snake, representing this very thought of eternally boring, disgustfully boring thought of being and time? Where does the laughter come from if not from the twilight of anxiety and “celestial serenity” (1961: 186)?

Let the enigma of the transformation of modern (mis)attunement remain what it is: a riddle. We can still say that Nietzsche’s philosophy is a story of the awakening of attunement, which turns from fundamental misattunement into attunement; and it is precisely this mythical thought which presents a Nietzsche who escapes the framework of Heidegger’s interpretation of Will to Power. Will to Power, which as Will to Will circles around its ill-willed core is Heidegger’s Nietzsche rather than Nietzsche himself. More exactly, Heidegger’s Nietzsche is the Nietzsche as the spirit of revenge, but it is not the whole Nietzsche. The Nietzsche who escapes this critical determination of nihilistic voluntarism is the Nietzsche of the anxious and laughing shepherd, as we endeavoured to show above. A Nietzsche, who also escapes Heidegger, is also the Nietzsche of *The Genealogy of Morals*, who pinpoints the problem of mechanical, incessant untiring tiresome constant hyperactivity, which is, according to him, a symptom of resentment of us Europeans.

It goes without saying that with this troublesome issue Nietzsche looked askance at his own thought of the Will to Power as constant hyperactivity and overpowering of power. As such, it most definitely presents the sixth essential name of Nietzsche’s philosophy, besides Eternal Recurrence of the Same, Nihilism, Revaluation of Values, Overman and Will to Power, as Heidegger states in his major study on Nietzsche.<sup>13</sup> If the sixth name of Nietzsche is drawn into the intimacy of his (or our) interpretation, Heidegger’s house of Nietzsche’s Being is suddenly disclosed in its Being closed for any possibility of a different kind of a visit.

All in all, the troublesome relationship between Heidegger and Nietzsche should not encourage us to reject either Heidegger or Nietzsche. More fruitfully, we should endeavour to set them apart in their best moments and thus make this excellence of the “in-between” more clearly visible.

### Truth of Attunement

In the last part, we shall try to articulate the dimension of attunement or disposition in terms which befit its ontological status. Attunement as disposition is not at our disposal. It is not an attribute of the substance called the subject. It is not subjected to the subject. We can neither will it nor willingly do away with it. Attunement as disposition rather disposes of *Dasein* in its being always already in tune with the being of the world. When we are well-disposed, we gather ourselves, being able to perceive, sense, feel, think with swiftness and ease. This getting together as gathering in disposition reveals the direct relationship of disposition with *logos* as the gathering of things in their disclosure.<sup>14</sup>

The English language brings us closer to another dimension of disposition and another ancient Greek word. In thinking or doing something we either lose or gain strength, our composure, gatheredness grows or fades. The “logical” nature of attunement reveals itself in its growth and fading away. We can thus point to the close affinity between *logos* and *physis* (nature). *Phyein* means to grow, become. For like *physis*, attunement (and the world!) grows and fades, is unconcealed and concealed. And since, as Heraclitus puts it, nature likes to hide itself, we have brought into discussion the genuinely Greek meaning of truth as *aletheia*, unconcealment. When our composure fades, either in non-composure or at rest, the disclosedness of the world conceals itself in concealment. We are, as we usually say, absent, even though still present. And this is the birthplace of the dualist truth of the world. Exactly when *aletheia* of attunement hides itself in concealment, the truth of the world becomes that of superficial or scientific experimental dualism and the world is “out there” in its being in itself.

The well-disposed person is outside himself by the things of the world. *Dasein* and the world bring each other into the richness of life. We have thus introduced the original meaning of ancient Greek *extasis*.<sup>15</sup> The rational ideal, which for more than two thousand years nourished distrust of sensuality, emotions and dispositions, has pushed ecstasy to the insignificant margin of human experience. But the dispositional ecstasy *discloses man and the world in an extraordinary mutual disclosure and encountering*. In order to protect it from being “rationally” reproached as irrational, we should look for the names which correspond to its distinctive nature; and these names are *serenity and anxiety*. The “dis” in the dis-closure of man in dis-position brings before us anxiety, but which – as articulated enigmatically in Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra* – turns into serenity.

13  
See Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche I*, GA 6.1, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1996, p. 34.

14  
In English we find a direct correspondence between *logos* and cognition: to gather something means to understand something.

15  
The Greek verb *existamai* means to stand outside oneself, to be outside oneself – not just man, but also the world.

Although Nietzsche's story of attunement is still a covert one, and Heidegger's existentials of mood is overtly discussed in *Being and Time* and elsewhere, the story of attunement is far from finished. It still awaits us moderns to perfect our skills of narrating it. As we have already said, perfecting the skill of narration is clearing the path of being as language. And being in tune with the thought of attunement, also through the attempt of hearing the far echo of Greek words in the truth of attunement, brings us into the very arena of philosophy not only in its historicity but also in its present relevance, as well as a future pregnant with new possibilities.

## Literature

Coriando, P.-L. (2002): *Affektenlehre und Phänomenologie der Stimmungen. Wege einer Ontologie und Ethik des Emotionalen*. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann.

Descartes, R. (1951): *Meditations*. New York: Liberal Arts Press.

Descartes, R. (1989): *The Passions of the Soul*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.

Heidegger, M. (1978): *Being and Time*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Heidegger, M. (1996): *Nietzsche I*. GA 6.1. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.

Heraclitus, (2003): *The Fragments*. London: Penguin Classics.

Husserl, E. (1964): *Cartesian Meditations*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Husserl, E. (1970). *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*. Chicago: Northwestern University Press.

Husserl, E. (1966): *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*. Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Matuschek, S. (1991): *Über das Staunen*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Nietzsche, F. (1999): *Kritische Studienausgabe*, Bonn: de Gruyter.

Nietzsche, F. (1956): *The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals*. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.

Nietzsche, F. (1961): *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. London: Penguin Classics.

Plato (1969): *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

**Janko M. Lozar**

### Nietzsche i Heidegger

Ova rasprava pokušava ukazati na složenost odnosa između Friedricha Nietzschea i Martina Heideggera. U pozadini tog odnosa jest fenomen ugađanja, što ga objašnjavaju oba mislioca. Heidegger kritizira Nietzschea zbog njegova metafizičkog nihilizma, što je diskutabilno prisutno u njegovu mišljenju Volje za moć kao Volje za Voljom. Heideggerova interpretacija unatoč tomu iznosi na vidjelo bogatstvo i potpunost izvornog pristupa tom enigmatskom misliocu, što je po prvi put ukazalo na relevantnost Nietzschea za modernu metafiziku; relevantnost što je prije bila zabačena unatoč svim mogućim afirmativnim ili negativnim pristupima misliocu Zarathustre.

Svemu tome usprkos, ipak, još uvijek ostaje temâ u Nietzscheu, koje je i sam Heidegger zabacio, a koje mogu odlučno i plodonosno doprinijeti razumijevanju onoga što se čini njihovom zajedničkom mišlju. Vrata što vode u arenu kako Nietzschea tako i Heideggera, tema je netematskog fundamentalnog ugađanja. Odlučivanje o toj stvari tako se pokazuje od ključne važnosti za razumijevanje ne samo Nietzschea i Heideggera već također i naše današnje situacije.

#### **Ključne riječi:**

Tjeskoba, vedrina, Zarathustra, bitak, vrijeme

**Janko M. Lozar**

## **Nietzsche und Heidegger**

### **Zusammenfassung**

*Die vorliegende Abhandlung versucht auf die Komplexität der Bezüge zwischen Friedrich Nietzsche und Martin Heidegger aufmerksam zu machen. Im Hintergrund dieser Bezüge steht das Phänomen der Stimmigkeit, das von beiden Denkern erörtert wird. Heidegger macht Nietzsche zwar dessen metaphysischen Nihilismus zum Vorwurf, der im Wille zur Macht im Sinne eines Willens zum Willen gegenwärtig sei. Dennoch verweist Heideggers Interpretation auf die Vielfältigkeit und Vielseitigkeit im ursprünglichen Denkansatz dieses hintergründigen Denkers, womit erstmals auf die Relevanz Nietzsches bezüglich der modernen Metaphysik verwiesen wurde; diese Relevanz war zuvor, sämtlichen affirmativen oder negativen Äußerungen über den Urheber des Zarathustra zum Trotz, verworfen worden.*

*Trotz alledem gibt es bei Nietzsche auch weiterhin Themen, die selbst Heidegger verkannt hatte, die jedoch auf vorzügliche und ertragreiche Weise zum Verständnis dessen, was man als Gemeinsamkeiten im Denken dieser beiden Philosophen betrachten darf, beitragen können. Das Tor, das sowohl in Nietzsches als auch in Heideggers Denkarena führt, ist das Thema ihrer thematisch neutralen, fundamentalen Stimmigkeit. Die Beurteilung dieses Sachverhalts erweist sich so als grundlegend für das Verständnis Nietzsches und Heideggers, aber auch für unsere heutige Situation.*

### **Schlüsselbegriffe**

Beklommenheit, Fröhlichkeit, Zarathustra, Sein, Zeit

**Janko M. Lozar**

## **Nietzsche et Heidegger**

### **Résumé**

*Ce débat tente de montrer la complexité du rapport entre Friedrich Nietzsche et Martin Heidegger. Derrière ce rapport se trouve le phénomène de mise en accord qui a été explicité par les deux penseurs. Heidegger critique Nietzsche pour son nihilisme métaphysique, ce qui est présent de manière discutable dans sa réflexion sur Volonté de puissance comme Volonté de Volonté. L'interprétation de Heidegger est néanmoins révélatrice de la richesse et de la profondeur d'une approche authentique de ce penseur énigmatique, qui a montré, pour la première fois, l'importance de Nietzsche pour la métaphysique moderne ; une importance qui, dans un premier temps, avait été laissée de côté malgré toutes les approches possibles et imaginables, affirmatives ou négatives, de la pensée de l'auteur de Zarathoustra.*

*En dépit de tout cela, il reste des sujets chez Nietzsche qui ont été laissés de côté par Heidegger lui-même, et qui pourtant pourraient contribuer, de manière décisive et fructueuse, à la compréhension de ce que leur pensée semble partager. Le cheval de bataille de Nietzsche comme de Heidegger est le thème d'une mise en accord fondamentale athématique. Cette question devient ainsi primordiale pour la compréhension, non seulement de Nietzsche et de Heidegger, mais aussi de notre situation contemporaine.*

### **Mots-clés**

Angoisse, sérénité, Zarathoustra, Être, temps