Inflation in Developing Countries: Does Central Bank Independence Matter?

We analyse whether central bank independence (CBI) affects inflation in developing countries. For this purpose we have constructed a new data set for the turnover rate (TOR) of central bank governors for a very large sample of countries, which also covers the 1990s. We find that once various control variables are included, the CBI proxy is often not significant. We also conclude that in those regressions in which the CBI proxy is significant, the coefficient of the TOR becomes significant only after high inflation countries are added to the sample.Inflation, central bank independence

The Importance of Being Vigilant: Has ECB Communication Influenced Euro Area Inflation Expectations?

Using daily data on inflation-indexed bonds, we find evidence of a negative relationship between ECB communication regarding risks to price stability - measured on the basis of the frequency and strength of the keyword ‘vigilance’ - and changes in euro area break-even inflation. However, this result is only found for the second half of 2005. At that time, the start of a tightening of ECB monetary policy was increasingly likely. This suggests that communication should be closely in line with policy actions before it can be effective. Still, we also find that the economic significance of this type of communication has been small.central bank communication, ECB, inflation expectations

Is a word to the wise indeed enough? ECB statements and the predictability of interest rate decisions

We show that comments by euro area central bankers contain information on future ECB interest rate decisions, but that the comments mainly reflect recent developments in macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, models using only communication variables are outperformed by straightforward Taylor rule models. During the first years of the European Economic and Monetary Union, comments by ECB Executive Board members and high-level Bundesbank policy-makers were more informative than comments by national central bank presidents. We also find that differences of opinion were informative when they concerned the outlook for economic growth. Finally, our results suggest that the ECB used communication especially to signal interest rate increasescentral bank communication, ECB, interest rate decisions

Determinants of Long-term Growth: New Results Applying Roboust Estimation and Extreme Bounds

sensitivity analysis, outliers, economic growth, robust estimation

Statements of ECB Officials and their Effect on the Level and Volatility of the Euro-Dollar Exchange Rate

This paper studies the reaction of the mean and volatility of the euro-dollar exchange rate to statements of ECB officials during the first years of EMU. We focus on statements on monetary policy and the (potential) strength of the euro. We find that the Bundesbank has dominated the news coverage. We conclude that ECB statements have mainly influenced volatility. In some cases there are effects of statements on the level of the euro-dollar rate. Efforts to ‘talk up’ the euro have not been successful. There is also evidence of asymmetric reactions to news.ECB, euro, foreign exchange, news approach

Does ECB Communication Help in Predicting its Interest Rate Decisions?

We examine the usefulness of communication by the European Central Bank for predicting its interest rate decisions. We use ordered probit models based on the Taylor rule which we estimate using statements by ECB officials as well as macroeconomic variables. Statements by ECB officials on the main refinancing rate and future inflation are significantly related to ECB decisions. However, an out-of-sample evaluation shows that communication-based models do not outperform models based on macroeconomic data in predicting decisions. Both sets of models only accurately predict decisions to leave interest rates unchanged.ECB communication, interest rate decision, Taylor rule, ordered probit models

On the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth

Often it is maintained that economic freedom may further high levels of economic growth. This paper compares various indicators for economic freedom. It is concluded that although these measures differ somewhat in their coverage, they show similar rankings for the countries covered. Some elements in these measures are, however, questionable. The robustness of the relationship between freedom and growth is also examined. Our main conclusion is that more economic freedom fosters economic growth.

Does Central Bank Communication really Lead to better Forecasts of Policy Decisions? New Evidence Based on a Taylor Rule Model for the ECB

Nowadays, it is widely believed that greater disclosure and clarity over policy may lead to greater predictability of central bank actions. We examine whether communication by the European Central Bank (ECB) adds information compared to the information provided by a Taylor rule model in which real time expected inflation and output are used. We use five indicators of ECB communication that are all based on the ECB President’s introductory statement at the press conference following an ECB policy meeting. Our results suggest that even though the indicators are sometimes quite different from one another, they add information that helps predict the next policy decision of the ECB. Furthermore, also when the interbank rate is included in our Taylor rule model, the ECB communication indicators remain significant.ECB, central bank, communication, Taylor rule

Inflation in developing countries: does Central Bank independence matter?

Abstract We analyse whether central bank independence (CBI) affects inflation in developing countries. For this purpose we have constructed a new data set for the turnover rate (TOR) of central bank governors for a very large sample of countries, which also covers the 1990s. We find that once various control variables are included, the CBI proxy is often not significant. We also conclude that in those regressions in which the CBI proxy is significant, the coefficient of the TOR becomes significant only after high inflation countries are added to the sample.