A class of evolutionary models for participation games with negative feedback

We introduce a framework to analyze the interaction of boundedly rational heterogeneous agents repeatedly playing a participation game with negative feedback. We assume that agents use different behavioral rules prescribing how to play the game conditionally on the outcome of previous rounds. We update the fraction of the population using each rule by means of a general class of evolutionary dynamics based on imitation, which contains both replicator and logit dynamics. Our model is analyzed by a combination of formal analysis and numerical simulations and is able to replicate results from the experimental and computational literature on these types of games. In particular, irrespective of the specific evolutionary dynamics and of the exact behavioral rules used, the dynamics of the aggregate participation rate is consistent with the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, whereas individual behavior clearly departs from it. Moreover, as the number of players or speed of adjustment increase the evolutionary dynamics typically becomes unstable and leads to endogenous fluctuations around the steady state. These fluctuations are robust with respect to behavioral rules that try to exploit them.Participation games, Heterogeneous behavioral rules, Revision protocol, Replicator Dynamics Logit Dynamics, Nonlinear dynamics

Endogenous fluctuations in the demand for education

Enrolment rates to higher education reveal quite large variation over time which cannot be explained by productivity shocks alone. We develop a human capital investment model in an overlapping generations framework that features endogenous fluctuations in the demand for education. Agents are heterogeneous in their beliefs about future wage differentials. An evolutionary competition between the heterogeneous beliefs determines the fraction of the newborn generation having a certain belief. Costly access to information on the returns to education induces agents to use potentially destabilizing backward looking prediction rules. Only if previous generations experience regret about their human capital investment decisions, agents will choose a more sophisticated prediction rule that dampens the cycle. Access to information becomes key for stable flows to higher education. expectations ; human capital investment ; endogenous fluctuations ; intergenerational spill-overs evolutionary dynamics ; bifurcation analysis -- Einschreibungen an Fachhochschulen und Universitäten weisen starke zyklische Schwankungen auf, die nicht allein durch Produktivitätsschocks erklärt werden können. Es wird ein Humankapitalmodell mit überlappenden Generationen vorgestellt, das die Eigenschaft besitzt, Zyklen in der Nachfrage nach Bildung endogen zu erklären. Im Modell sind die Akteure heterogen in Bezug auf ihre Voraussagen über zukünftige Lohndifferentiale. Ein evolutionärer Wettbewerb unter den Voraussagemethoden bestimmt den Anteil der Akteure, der ein bestimmtes Prognoseinstrument verwendet. Da der Zugang zu Informationen über zukünftige Humankapitalrenditen mit Kosten verbunden ist, weichen die Akteure auf vergangenheitsorientierte Voraussagemethoden aus, die destabilisierend wirken können. Nur dann, wenn frühere Generationen die Art und Weise wie sie prognostizierten bereuen, werden die Akteure kompliziertere, zukunftsgerichtete, Prognoseinstrumente wählen, welche die Zyklen dämpfen. Damit werden leicht verfügbare Informationen über Arbeitsmarktentwicklungen zur Schlüsselvariablen für konstante Zugänge zu Fachhochschulen und Universitäten, aber auch anderen Bildungsträgern.

A computational electoral competition model with social clustering and endogenous interest groups as information brokers

We extend the basic model of spatial competition in two directions. First, political parties and voters do not have complete information but behave adaptively. Political parties use polls to search for policy platforms that maximize the probability of winning an election and the voting decision of voters is influenced by social interaction. Second, we allow for the emergence of interest groups. These interest groups transmit information about voter preferences to the political parties, and they coordinate voting behavior. We use simulation methods to investigate the convergence properties of this model. We find that the introduction of social dynamics and interest groups increases the separation between parties platforms, prohibits convergence to the center of the distribution of voter preferences, and increases the size of the winning set.

Voting cycles when a dominant point exists

We conduct experiments in which humans repeatedly play one of two games against a computer decision maker that follows either a reinforcement learning or an Experience Weighted Attraction algorithm. Our experiments show these learning algorithms more sensitively detect exploitable opportunities than humans. Also, learning algorithms respond to detected payoff increasing opportunities systematically; however, the responses are too weak to improve the algorithms payoffs. Human play against various decision maker types doesn't significantly vary. These factors lead to a strong linear relationship between the humans and algorithms action choice proportions that is suggestive of the algorithm's best response correspondence.

Identification of Voters with Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior, these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.spatial voting models, electoral competition, winning set, interest groups

Identification of Voters with Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger

This short paper investigates the consequences of voters identifying with special interest groups in a spatial model of electoral competition. We show that, by effectively coordinating voting behavior, identification with interest groups leads to an increase in the size of the winning set, that is, the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Consequently, our paper points at a novel process through which interest groups can enhance the electoral chances of a challenger.

Endogenous fluctuations in the demand for education

"Enrolment rates to higher education reveal quite large variation over time which cannot be explained by productivity shocks alone. We develop a human capital investment model in an overlapping generations framework that features endogenous fluctuations in the demand for education. Agents are heterogeneous in their beliefs about future wage differentials. An evolutionary competition between the heterogeneous beliefs determines the fraction of the newborn generation having a certain belief. Costly access to information on the returns to education induces agents to use potentially destabilizing backward looking prediction rules. Only if previous generations experience regret about their human capital investment decisions, agents will choose a more sophisticated prediction rule that dampens the cycle. Access to information becomes key for stable flows to higher education." (author's abstract)"Einschreibungen an Fachhochschulen und Universitäten weisen starke zyklische Schwankungen auf, die nicht allein durch Produktivitätsschocks erklärt werden können. Es wird ein Humankapitalmodell mit überlappenden Generationen vorgestellt, das die Eigenschaft besitzt, Zyklen in der Nachfrage nach Bildung endogen zu erklären. Im Modell sind die Akteure heterogen in Bezug auf ihre Voraussagen über zukünftige Lohndifferentiale. Ein evolutionärer Wettbewerb unter den Voraussagemethoden bestimmt den Anteil der Akteure, der ein bestimmtes Prognoseinstrument verwendet. Da der Zugang zu Informationen über zukünftige Humankapitalrenditen mit Kosten verbunden ist, weichen die Akteure auf vergangenheitsorientierte Voraussagemethoden aus, die destabilisierend wirken können. Nur dann, wenn frühere Generationen die Art und Weise wie sie prognostizierten bereuen, werden die Akteure kompliziertere, zukunftsgerichtete, Prognoseinstrumente wählen, welche die Zyklen dämpfen. Damit werden leicht verfügbare Informationen über Arbeitsmarktentwicklungen zur Schlüsselvariablen für konstante Zugänge zu Fachhochschulen und Universitäten, aber auch anderen Bildungsträgern." (Autorenreferat

Voting cycles when a dominant point exists

We consider a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. These parties are incompletely informed about voter preferences and search adaptively, by means of polling, for those policy platforms which might make them win the election. We introduce interest groups in this spatial framework. Di§erent interest groups coordinate voting behavior and transmit information about voter preferences to the political candidates. Moreover, organization of voters into di§erent interest groups occurs endogenously. We investigate the dynamics of this spatial model of electoral competition by looking at the mean-dynamics, i.e. by replacing stochastic variables by their expected values. The resulting Markov process shows that voting cycles exist. The mechanism driving these voting cycles may explain some empirical regularities found in the political science literature