Henry Simons and the Other Minsky Moment

This paper examines the influence of Henry Simons on Hyman Minsky. Simons' proposals for banking reform are contrasted with Minsky's alternative 'big bank' and 'big government' programme for stabilising the economy. The paper concludes by arguing that Simons' proposals for stabilising banking would have prevented a credit bubble, but would not avoid economic instability. Nevertheless, Minsky remained an admirer of Simons’ ‘banking’ approach to the study of capitalism

Shared Ideas amid Mutual Incomprehension: Kalecki and Cambridge

The chapter examines the Cambridge Research Project of 1938-1939, in which Kalecki worked on the effects of the economic depression on particular industries. His work was subject to methodological criticism and the project was wound down at the end of 1939. The chapter examines the reasons for this failure in the incompatibilities between the Marshallian approach to economics, and the business cycle approach used by Kalecki

The Financial Peculiarity of Greece Some Lessons for a Theory of Financial Crisis

This paper presents a critical appraisal of financial crisis theories and their ability to illuminate the present crisis in Greece. The paper suggests that financial crises are differentiated because of global financial integration of economies that are different due to international economic specialisation and division of labour, giving rise to different debt structures in different countries. The policy response of governments has been one of institutional inertia and refinancing of banks through multilateral and state channels. This effectively makes banking crisis into a crisis of the state. The relevant theory becomes the Luxemburgist political economy of the state as refinancer of last resort, at the expense of the non-financial (real) economy

Open Market operations: beyond the New Consensus

This paper examines the changing role of central bank open market operations within the new operating framework for monetary polic

"'Enforced Indebtedness' and Capital Adequacy Requirements"

The capital adequacy requirements for banks, enshrined in international banking regulations, are based on a fallacy of composition--namely, the notion that an individual firm can choose the structure of its financial liabilities without affecting the financial liabilities of other firms. In practice, says author Jan Toporowski, capital adequacy regulations for banks are a way of forcing nonfinancial companies into debt. "Enforced indebtedness" then reduces the quality of credit in the economy. In an international context, the present system of capital adequacy regulation reinforces this indebtedness. Proposals for "dynamic provisioning" to increase capital requirements during an economic boom would simply accelerate the boom's collapse. Contingent commitments to lend to governments in the event of private-sector lending withdrawals, alongside lending to foreign private-sector borrowers, are a much more viable alternative.

"Excess Capital and Liquidity Management"

These notes present a new approach to corporate finance, one in which financing is not determined by prospective income streams but by financing opportunities, liquidity considerations, and prospective capital gains. This approach substantially modifies the traditional view of high interest rates as a discouragement to speculation; the Keynesian and Post-Keynesian theory of liquidity preference as the opportunity cost of investment; and the notion of the liquidity premium as a factor in determining the rate of interest on longer-term maturities.

Monetary Policy in an Era of Capital Market Inflation

The theory of capital market inflation argues that the values of long- term securities markets are determined by a disequilibrium inflow of funds into those markets. The resulting over-capitalization of companies leads to increased fragility of banking and undermines monetary policy and stable relationships between short- and long-term interest rates, such as that postulated by Keynes in his theory of the speculative demand for money. Moreover, while the increased fragility of banking is an immediate effect, capital market inflation also creates an unstable Ponzi financing structure in the capital market as a whole.