Inflation Expectations and Inflation Uncertainty in the Eurozone: Evidence from Survey Data

This paper uses the European Commission’s Consumer Survey to assess whether inflation expectations have converged and whether inflation uncertainty has diminished following the introduction of the Euro in Europe. Consumers’ responses to the survey suggest that inflation expectations depend more on past national inflation rates than on the ECB’s anchor for price stability. The convergence in inflation expectations does not appear to be faster than the convergence in actual inflation rates. Regarding inflation uncertainty, the data indicate a relationship with country size, suggesting that within EMU, inflation uncertainty may increase in countries that have a smaller influence on ECB policy.monetary union, inflation differentials, consumer survey

Credit Risks and European Government Bond Markets: A Panel Data Econometric Analysis

A fixed effects panel data estimation of the determinants of European government default risk is undertaken. Credit risk of sovereign debt is assessed by comparing yields on benchmark government bonds with high-quality private risk represented by interest rate swap yields. Using a new data-set from the European Commission (DG2's AMECO database), we find government default risk to depend positively on changes in the debt to GDP ratio and the variability of inflation and negatively on lagged inflation and changes in taxable capacity. Finally, there is evidence for persistence of government bond yield spreads reflecting differences in cross-country government default risk.Bond Market; Bonds; Government Bonds; Interest Rates; Interest; Yield

Life Without the Stability Pact

There is now a real chance that the Euro member states will not abide by the strict rules of the Stability Pact. Economic and political pressures are currently moving in that direction. What then imposes budgetary discipline on governments? This paper explores how government bond markets and financial regulators could take over the disciplinary role of the Stability Pact. For example, the application of the large exposure rule to public debt should ¶encourage¶ banks to diversify their government bond holdings, shielding countries banking system from bank failures in other countries. Information disclosure and capital adequacy requirements for government bonds should increase the sensitivity of governments borrowing costs with respect to debt, deterring governments from running high budget deficits. Markets need to believe that EMU governments and the ECB will adhere to the Maastricht Treaty and to the no-bail-out clause in particular. The Stability Pact is not essential for the disciplining of governments, the Maastricht Treaty is. Finally, whether rules and markets matter or not, may be a function of the broader economic conjuncture.

Managing Government Default Risk in Federal States

Federal governments typically apply fiscal rules to impose fiscal discipline on lower levels of government. Analogously, by trading in government debt, government bond markets impose fiscal discipline on lower levels of governments. this paper finds new evidence for Australia, Canada and Germany showing that whether these rules or markets matter, or not, may be a function of the worlds appetite for credit risk. Rules and markets only tend to bite during periods when there is a low appetite for credit risk in world financial markets. Therefore, this paper proposes an alternative more incentive-based framework of fiscal discipline. this incentive-based framework should increase the sensitivity of government borrowing costs with respect to debt levels, increase the geographical diversification of investors portfolios with respect to government bonds, and prevent government financing from fuelling private sector bailout expectations.

Inflation Expectations and Inflation Uncertainty in the Eurozone: Evidence from Survey Data

Monetary union, inflation differentials, consumer survey,

The Vulnerability of Banks to Government default risk in the EMU

CThis paper examines the vulnerability of banks in EMU countries to shocks to default risk premiums on public debt. This vulnerability depends on (1) the total amount of public debt in bank portfolios, (2) the extent to which the default risk of public debt of EMU member states is diversifiable, and (3) the degree of actual geographical diversification of public debt holdings by banks. We simulate the effect of country-specific default shocks on the market value of public debt held by banks. The simulations are based on data of public debt positions at the aggregate banking sector level and take into account the historical covariance structure of default risk premiums in the EMU. We compare two scenarios. First, we calculate the domestic public debt. Next, we calculate this effect if banks diversify their investments in public debt across EMU governments. We find that the standard deviation of the equity-to-assets ratio declines considerably if banks diversify their public debt holdings and conclude that the risks of bank failures caused by default on public debt can be reduced through proper geographical diversification. We close with some implications for prudential regulation.

Short-Term and Long-Term Government Debt and Nonresident Interest Withholding Taxes

This paper examines the incidence of nonresident interest withholding taxes in the international 3-month Treasury-bill market and the international 5-year government bond market. The approach is one of the pooled cross-section, time-series regressions. The evidence suggests that the yields on national Treasury-bill and on 5-year government bonds fully reflect the nonresident interest withholding taxes imposed on American or Japanese investors. Nonresident interest withholding taxes on short-term and long-term government debt thus do not appear to be borne by the international investor.